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Abstract 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is currently embroiled in a deep-seeded political impasse. The 
source of this diplomatic deadlock is the separate theoretical trajectories characterising each 
side’s approach to the conflict. Israel is more content with managing the conflict whilst the 
Palestinian leaderships desperately seek an outright resolution. Alternatively, at the grassroots 
level Palestinians are far more concerned with effectuating change in their own personal 
circumstances. This encompasses issues which do not directly relate to the resolution the 
Palestinian leaderships seek. A distinct switch in discourse from nationalism to human and 
civil rights is occurring on the ground. Such a switch exemplifies this political disillusionment 
and is indicative of the alternative theory conflict transformation theory. Parlevliet argues 
conflict transformation should be analysed in conjunction with human rights. In this regard, 
the current climate in Israel-Palestine offers a unique case study in which to apply and answer 
Parlevliet’s call. In doing so, this study takes Lederach’s contribution to the theory of conflict 
transformation and analyses it alongside Parlevliet’s argument in relation to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict and the growing call for human rights. It demonstrates the multi-layered 
and holistic nature of the human rights argument by showing how the switch in discourse 
attempts to address issues along the micro-macro spectrum. In accordance with conflict 
transformation, the thesis draws upon a number of theories and methodologies to explicate how 
the switch to a human rights discourse circumnavigates a host of ideological and political 
barriers, which impede a possible resolution to the much protracted conflict. It concludes by 
exposing the cyclical nature of the micro-macro polemics, and how they ultimately reinforce 
each other in strangling any diplomatic possibility for opening up more alternative discourses 
to the current political approaches to the conflict.  
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Glossary 
Al-Nakba – A colloquial Arab term referring to the displacement of 700,000 Palestinian 
refugees during the first major Arab-Israeli war in 1948. Roughly translates as “the 
Catastrophe.” 
Benjamin Netanyahu – Current Israeli prime minister serving fourth premiership after 
winning the nomination in last year’s 2015 general election.  
East Jerusalem – Predominantly Arab half of the city considered the future Palestinian capital 
under the terms of the two-state solution. Israeli and Palestinian definitions differ. The former 
bases its definition on the municipal boundaries drawn by Israeli authorities after the Six-Day 
war in 1967. The latter refer to the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Israel’s occupation of East 
Jerusalem is deemed illegal according to international law.  
Fatah – A Palestinian political party founded in 1959 and largest faction of the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation. Fatah are the current reigning party serving the Palestinian Authority. 
The party retains control in the West Bank but lost a general election in the Gaza Strip in 2006. 
No general elections have taken place in the West Bank since 2005. 
Gaza Strip – One of two separate geographical territories constituting the proposed Palestinian 
state. Currently self-governing and located on the Mediterranean coast. The territory 
compromises a total area of 362 square kilometres with a population of approximately 1.6 
million.  
Green Line – The demarcation line distinguishing between west and east Jerusalem. Often 
used to refer to the pre-1967 borders by other nation states or international bodies like the UN. 
Hamas – An Islamist political party with militant and social wings operating in the Gaza Strip. 
Elected into power in 2006 ousting the former ruling Fatah party. Founded after the first 
Intifada in 1987 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
Intifada – An Arabic term translated as “uprising” in English. In terms of the conflict there 
have been two intifadas each lasting several years. The first Intifada lasted from December 
1987 until the Madrid Conference in 1991. The second Intifada took place from September 
2000 to February 2005 in reaction to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visiting the Temple 
Mount. Both Intifadas were violent but it is generally considered the first began as a civil 
demonstration.  
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Israeli Defences Forces (IDF) – Israeli military. 
Judea and Samaria – Hebrew terms for the West Bank. Roughly, Samaria is north of 
Jerusalem and Judea South.  
Knesset – The Israeli Parliament building. 
Mahmoud Abbas – President of Palestinian Authority since 2005, and chairman of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation since 2004. Leader of the Fatah party.  
One-State Solution – A proposed resolution advocating the unification of Israel and the 
Palestinian Territories under a single government.  
Operation Cast Lead – Code name for Israel’s three week military offensive against Hamas 
in the Gaza Strip between December 2008 and January 2009.  
Operation Protective Edge – Israel’s 2014 military operation in the Gaza Strip against Hamas, 
Also known as 51 Day War. 
Oslo Accords – A set of agreements between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
mediated by the Norwegian government in the early to mid-nighties. Negotiations took place 
in Oslo with the actual signings taking place elsewhere.  Oslo I was signed in Washington D.C. 
in 1993, and Oslo II in Taba, Egypt in 1995. The agreements remain the blue print to resolving 
the conflict.  
Palestinian Authority (PA) – Sometimes referred to as the Palestine National Authority 
(PNA), the PA is the interim self-governing body formed in 1994 pursuant of the Oslo I 
Accords between the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the government of Israel.  
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) – Founded in 1964 to liberate Palestine through 
armed struggle. Recognised as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by over 
100 countries. 
Saeb Erekat – Member of Fatah and Chief Palestinian negotiator during the Oslo Accords. 
Separation Barrier – Israeli constructed wall separating the state of Israel from the occupied 
West Bank. Initial construction began in 2003 and is set to total 700km in length upon 
completion. Built to stem the flow of suicide bombing during the second Intifada, Israel refers 
to national security to justify the wall’s construction. Opponents claim the wall is an attempt 
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to annex large swathes of Palestinian land. A similar separation wall also exists along the 
territory comprising the Gaza Strip.    
Settlements – Civilian communities constructed by Israel throughout the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem to settle Jewish Israelis. According to international law all settlements within the 
territories are illegal. In 2005 the settlements in Gaza were evacuated and destroyed.  
Two-State Solution – The popular and most politically discussed resolution proposing the 
formation of two states: Israel and Palestine. The former is based on the 1967 borders before 
the occupation with West Jerusalem as its capital, and the latter constitutes the West Bank, 
Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.  
West Bank – The occupied Palestinian territory west of Jerusalem running along the Jordan 
River.  
West Jerusalem – Predominantly Jewish half of the city. Refers to the section of the city which 
remained under Israeli control after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.  
Zionism – A political and nationalist ideology, founded in the late 19th century by Theodor 
Herzl, advocating the re-establishment of a Jewish homeland.  
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Introduction 
“One state two state all that stuff, this is a conflict about boundaries, identity, existence, and all those 
things. It always has been, whether you want to start back 150 years ago, 1947, 1948, wherever you 
want to start. The conflict stays the same. I don’t see anything on the horizon that is going to change 
that.”1 
Gerald Steinberg’s pessimistic prediction regarding the current state of affairs of the much 
protracted and divisive Israel-Palestine conflict is indicative of the current impasse stifling the 
possibility of a future resolution. On the international stage, the two-state solution is the 
universally accepted package for resolving the conflict, with the Gaza Strip and West Bank set 
aside to form an independent and viable Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
However, questions of contiguity, persistent settlement building, and political divisions 
amongst the Palestinians themselves have persistently undermined the prospect of 
implementing the two-state solution since it was formally agreed upon nearly 25 years ago at 
Oslo. Nevertheless, the alternative seems even more implausible. If the two peoples cannot 
satisfy their own ambitions for self-determination via separation, then surely binding the two 
together in a single state is beyond the realms of possibility. A single state from the Jordan 
River to the Mediterranean Sea appears premised on the absurd idea “that two nations that 
could not negotiate a divorce should get married instead.”2 
It is the restrictive limitations of these rigid forms of thinking that have perpetuated the 
increasing disillusionment with the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis at the 
political, civil and grass roots levels. Chief Palestinian negotiator, Saeb Erekat, solemnly 
admits the current relationship between the PA and the Knesset is “below zero...There is no 
trust now, no trust whatsoever.”3 Similar rhetoric is found emanating from the Israel camp. 
Minister of Education Naftali Bennet was quoted in Hebrew newspapers blaming the lack of 
progress in the peace process on the absence of a reliable Palestinian partner.4 Current Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu echoed these sentiments as he charged Palestinian leader 
Mahmoud Abbas of refusing to sit at the negotiating table, and accused the Palestinians of 
1 Steinberg, G., Interview 10/8/15 
2 Freedman, J., Yearning for the Same Land, http://www.newstatesman.com/2012/07/yearning-same-land, 
18th July, 2012 
3 Erekat, S., Interview, 1/7/15 
4 MiddleEastMonitor., Bennet: There is no Palestinian Partner for Peace, 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/10084-bennett-there-is-no-palestinian-partner-for-
peace, 4th March, 2014 
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consistently refusing to end the conflict in his most recent UN General Assembly address.5 
This is despite former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert contradicting these views in stating 
he found the president of the Palestinian Authority (PA) “to be a genuine, serious and 
trustworthy partner for peace negotiations.”6 
At the civic level, a host of NGOs operate within Israel, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the 
diaspora with the aim of achieving a multitude of important goals, from human rights (AL 
Haq), to educating Israelis about the occupation (Gush Shalom), to finding a resolution along 
the two-state solution framework (PIJ). Simultaneously, Steinberg’s own NGO Monitor tracks 
and meticulously scrutinizes the funding and activities of these very NGOs in order to 
undermine their work and raise awareness amongst the political right in Israel of their liberalist 
agendas, which are often perceived as threatening the Jewish state. 
One level down and it is almost universally accepted amongst scholars and activists that at the 
grassroots level Israeli society lacks the will to initiate change to the current status quo. Adam 
Keller, lead spokesperson for the NGO Gush Shalom explains this is because “Israelis, in 
general, think peace was something that was already tried and failed.”7 On the Palestinian side, 
any remnants of optimism with the peace process become increasingly diminished each time 
negotiations fail and people have to deal with the consequences of yet another costly military 
offensive by Israel. Nearly fifty years of occupation, and over twenty years of broken 
agreements and failed peace talks have rendered the Palestinians a defeated people. “Their 
spirits have been broken…All the hopes that they harboured for decades, all the sacrifices they 
made…came to dust.” 8 It is not difficult to locate these embittered feelings of disillusionment 
when speaking to Palestinians on the ground. Haitham Khatib for instance, a self-employed 
photojournalist and author, dejectedly admits fellow Palestinians are moving across the border 
to live in Jordan because of the occupation.9 The underlining feeling is that Israelis have 
succeeded in forcing Palestinians to relinquish their claim to the land. The sense of mistrust in 
the significant other, alongside a growing understanding of the conflict in realpolitik terms 
5 Netanyahu, B., as quoted in Jerusalem Post., Full Text of PM Netanyahu’s Address to the UN General 
Assembly, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Full-text-of-PM-Netanyahus-address-to-
the-UN-General-Assembly-419717, 1/10/2015 
6 Olmert, E., as quoted in Al Jazeera English., Upfront- Headliner: An Exclusive Interview with Ehud Olmert, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mx-Tc2Sh7c4, 3rd October, 2015 
7 Keller, A., Interview, Skype, 2/9/15 
8 Finkelstein, N., Interview, Skype, 25/11/2015 
9 Khatib, H., Interview, Skype, 10/12/2015 
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have left a growing number of Palestinians conscious of whether they actually will, one day, 
live in a liberated Palestinian state.    
It is within this climate of beleagueredness and mutual mistrust that Steinberg’s cynical 
assessment that there are no possible solutions to conflict unfortunately appear insightful. 
Postulating a solution to the conflict is beyond any contemporary resolution paradigms, 
Steinberg instead proposes conflict management: a theoretical framework based on efforts to 
“focus on informal and indirect processes, and a structure of coordinated gradual unilateral 
relations.”10 In concrete terms, this would entail reworking the current agreements regarding 
the West Bank and transferring large amounts of Israeli controlled areas to Palestinian control. 
However, he qualifies this in stating these transfers must occur alongside certain limitations so 
that Israel maintains its security controls in the Jordan Valley.11 Israel’s conflict management 
approach is indicative of its strategic conservatism and its tendency to take precautions in not 
rushing to solve the conflict before conditions are ripe. 12 
“What lies behind the absence of a constructive Israeli national security agenda…is neither illogical 
nor confusion but rather a belief that there are no solutions to the challenges the country faces and 
that seeking quick fixes to intractable problems is dangerously naïve.”13 
Senior cabinet minister Naftali Bennet describes this strategy as coming to terms with the 
unpleasantness of the situation rather than risking catastrophe by trying to resolve the conflict.14 
Critics commend this tactic with regards to Israel’s other adversaries such as Iran, but question 
its solicitation 15apropos the Palestinians since it brings the country and its regime into 
disrepute.  More importantly, from the Palestinian perspective, it further prolongs the wait for 
the political solution they desperately crave.16 
Each side’s polarizing approaches only widen the chasm between them and deepen the current 
impasse, which is a result of how they respectively engage with each other within the confines 
of the conflict and react to its fluctuating dynamics. Israeli politicians and Israeli society at 
large appear more than content with only preserving their own security, and for this they do 
10 Steinberg, G., Unripeness and Conflict Management: Re-Examining the Oslo Process and its Lessons, 
https://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/conflict/Papers/re-examiningoslo.pdf, 2002, pp. 1 
11 Steinberg, G., Interview, Jerusalem G, Steinberg., 10/8/15 
12 Sachs, N., Why Israel Waits: Anti-Solutionism as a Strategy, Brookings Institute, 
http://www.brookings.edu/experts/sachsn,  Oct 20th, 2015 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 Khatib, H., Interview, Skype, 10/12/2015 
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not require any immediate resolution. The security wall which divides Jerusalem, and which 
was constructed in reaction to the spate of suicide bombings during the Second Intifada has 
succeeded in reducing the number of Israeli fatalities resulting from terrorism. In curtailing the 
threat of terrorism, managing the conflict serves Israel’s security needs, making it less inclined 
to finding a full-fledged resolution. Palestinians on the other hand are tired. They urgently wish 
to seek a solution but are wary of Israel’s preconditions in recognising Israel as the Jewish 
state. Within the ranks of the PA, there is little reason to manage the conflict since the 
agreements for a Palestinian state have already been agreed: “We don’t need to take it to the 
Knesset or the parliament or to our respective governments. It’s already been signed, it’s 
already been ratified.”17 The PA’s calls for a state consisting of the Gaza Strip, West Bank and 
East Jerusalem are a reflection of the Palestinian strategy to seek an actual resolution to the 
conflict, whilst Israel’s proclivity to bide its time is representative of its desire to manage it.  
To overcome this impasse, Palestinians at the grassroots level are increasingly beginning to 
adopt a human rights-based discourse in their approach to the conflict. In an ironic sense of 
agreement with Steinberg’s cynical view, Palestinians “are not thinking about one-state, two-
states, five-states or a federation…they are thinking about freedom.”18 In a televised round 
table discussion broadcasted by Al Jazeera, political activist and journalist Linah Alsaafin 
described how she was unconcerned with how many states eventually come out of the conflict, 
but was more interested in “achieving human rights.”19 Similarly, Natalie Tibi, the daughter of 
Arab-Israeli parliamentarian Ahmad Tibi, was quoted saying she “did not care what the future 
state would be called, only that her grandmothers be allowed to return to their homes in Jaffa.”20 
These sentiments are especially prevalent amongst Palestinian youth who have been subjugated 
to the consequences of failed negotiations. The reasoning behind this is twofold. Firstly, it 
stems from a realisation of the current situation; the fact the political channel currently seems 
dead in its tracks, especially given the well-publicized and tenuous relationship between 
Netanyahu and PA President Mahmoud Abbas. A recent poll by the Palestinian Centre for 
Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) found that out of a total of 1270 adult interviewees, 74% 
believed the chances of establishing a Palestinian state in the next 5 years were slim to non-
17 Erekat, S., Interview, 1/7/15, Jericho 
18 Qumsiyeh, M., Interview, Bethlehem, 27/7/15 
19 Alsaafin, L., as quoted in Al Jazeera English, The Café – One State, Two Sates or even Three States?, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oqkmImwhFVg, 18th August 2012 
20 Rudorenm J., A Divide Among Palestinians on a Two-State Solution, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/middleeast/a-divide-among-palestinians-on-a-two-state-
solution.html, 18th March, 2014 
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existent. Moreover, the same poll found 82% consider Israel’s true intentions are to annex the 
land occupied in 1967 and deny Arabs their basic human rights.21 Disillusioned with the peace 
process, the majority of Palestinian youths are more concerned with their own economic 
status.22 Only 4% of Palestinians consider UN recognition of a Palestinian state as the top 
priority for PA leader Mahmoud Abbas, in comparison to over 80% who see the creation of 
new jobs as a more pressing issue.23 Secondly, conceptualising the conflict in human rights 
terms provides a universalised legal framework in which to further their agenda. Such a 
discourse circumvents all political and social obstacles and directly addresses key issues for 
most Palestinians who “have lost their faith in the Israelis, have lost their faith in the Americans 
and have lost so much faith in their own leadership.”24 Even Mahmoud Abbas’ son Tareq has 
publically endorsed this view, stating in an interview with the New York Times that if the 
Israelis “don’t want to give me independence, at least give me civil rights.”25 
Notable political figures in Israel have warned of the consequences for the country if this 
approach is adopted completely and manages to unite a fragmented Palestinian society.  Former 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert warned back in 2007 that Israel risked being compared to 
Apartheid South Africa if it failed to implement the two-state solution. Olmert further 
suggested the possible adoption of an equal rights struggle would compromise the country’s 
Jewish majority beyond repair and eradicate the state as it is presently conceived. 26 South 
Africa’s last Apartheid president Frederik Willem de Klerk recently reiterated this warning, 
stating the possible collapse of a two-state solution would result in Israel being an Apartheid 
state.27 Some even go beyond this foreshadowing. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter not 
21 PCPSR., Press Release, http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/634, 21st March 2016 
22 Segal, A., as quoted in Roundtable Discussion – The Younger Generation, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, 
Economics and Culture (PIJ), Vol. 18, N. 4, 2013, pp. 86 
23 Mizrahi, J., & Greenberg, S.., The Israel Project: Arab Spring and Frozen Peace: Palestinian Opinion, 
http://www.gqrr.com/articles/2011/07/27/new-survey-of-west-bank-and-gaza-shows-strong-palestinian-
support-for-negotiations-with-israel?rq=israel%20project,  July 2011 
24 Abu Zayyad, Z., Roundtable Discussion – Obstacles to Successful Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: How to 
Overcome Them, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture (PIJ), Vol. 19, No. 3, 2014, pp. 110 
25 Abbas, T., in Rudoren, J., A Divide Amongst Palestinians on a Two State Solution, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/19/world/middleeast/a-divide-among-palestinians-on-a-two-state-
solution.html, March 18, 2014 
26 Olmert, E., in McCarthy, R., Israel Risks Apartheid-Like Struggle if Two-State Solution Fails, Says Olmert, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/30/israel, 30TH November, 2007 
27 Barnea, N., De Klerk: Without the Two-State Solution, Israel Could Turn into an Apartheid State, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4731790,00.html, November 27th, 2015 
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only publically condemns Israel as an Apartheid state, but argues its practice of segregation 
and discrimination are far worse than that of the South African regime.28 
The increasing adoption of human and civil rights rhetoric amongst grassroots movements on 
the Palestinian side should be viewed as a form of conflict transformation; an alternative 
theoretical framework from the aforementioned conflict management and conflict resolution 
paradigms. Conflict transformation provides a framework in which the multileveled aspects of 
a prolonged, violent conflict, such as Israel-Palestine, can be readdressed at different stages in 
order to transform the dynamics of the conflict from one of increasing violence to an 
environment more conducive to a sustainable peace. Methodologically, it offers concrete steps 
to provide effective relief from an ever worsening situation, and reverse the much discussed 
fear of the conflict transforming from one centred on land and identity to one engaged in 
religious warfare.29 
A key theorist in the school of conflict transformation, Lederach outlines four central modes 
which dictate the nature of adversarial relationships throughout a conflict: personal, relational, 
structural, and cultural.30 At the same time, in her article Rethinking Conflict Transformation 
from a Human Rights Perspective Parlevliet argues, “Considering human rights and conflict 
transformation in conjunction deepens one’s analysis of what is involved in moving from 
violence to sustainable peace.”31 Contending human rights provide a vehicle in which to 
holistically transform the structural conditions sustaining conflicts, Parlevliet similarly outlines 
four dimensions to human rights: rules, structures, relationships, and process.  These 
dimensions encompass not only their legal application and but also their value in establishing 
a compassionate and empathetic society. Both theoretical edifices form a dual set of parallel 
analytical pillars in which to analyse a variety of normative issues endemic to the Israel-
Palestine conflict. By considering a host of normative issues from the perspective of Lederach’s 
modes alongside Parlevliet’s emphasis on the synergetic relationship between conflict 
transformation and human rights, the significance of these separate tangents to the Israel-
Palestine context and relation to the civil and human rights discourse is deconstructed. The 
28 See Carter, J., Palestine: Peace not Apartheid, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2006 
29 Khoury, J., Israel Turning Conflict into a Religious One, Warns Abbas, with Disastrous Consequences, 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.682822, October 28th, 2015 
30 Lederach, J., Conflict Transformation, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation, October 
2003 
31 Parlevliet, M., Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective, http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/parlevliet_handbook.pdf, September 
2009, pp. 2  
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purpose of the Lederach spine is to set up the normative issues and how the different modes 
relate to the Israeli-Palestinian case, whilst the Parlevliet spine focuses predominantly on the 
phenomenon of an emerging human rights discourse in this particular context.  
Before continuing, it must be noted at the outset that this thesis by no means attempts to claim 
to solve the conflict in any way. Such an assertion would completely undermine the historical 
complexity of the conflict and its ever fluctuating political and social subtleties.  It avoids any 
suggestion as to a final solution to the conflict and the possible formation of any single, bi or 
two states. What this thesis does achieve is to elucidate not only the growing employment of a 
human rights-based discourse in the Palestinian struggle but also highlight, using the theoretical 
edifices provided by Lederach and Parlevliet, how these analyses expose avenues for 
alternative discourses to emerge; and why this change in tactic at the grassroots level 
reintroduces and reopens informative and constructive discussions pertaining to a range of 
personal, structural and cultural issues, which are otherwise overlooked by the traditional 
conflict resolution and conflict management frameworks. It recognizes that “while it is 
necessary to address visible violence by reducing or stopping it, it is equally critical to 
acknowledge and address the context and attitudes as root causes of the conflict.”32 
Lederach’s modes provide the primary analytical framework to draw a number of individual 
issues together. The individual issues analysed are categorised under each of the separate 
modes according to their specific characteristics. Towards the end of each chapter Parlevliet’s 
call to acknowledge this phenomenon alongside a human rights perspective is considered to 
reveal how such a discourse not only compliments this investigation, but provides a theoretical 
avenue for deconstructing the elements of power deepening the sense of division and hostility 
between the two peoples. In essence, the objective is to produce a holistic analysis of the 
separate issues prolonging the conflict by sub-dividing them according to Lederach’s modes. 
It shows how the normative issues analysed under each mode form a cycle which continuously 
perpetuate the current status quo, ultimately reinforcing the structural conditions and agitating 
the already non-existent personal relationships between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians 
further.   
32 Darwesih, M., Human Rights and the Imbalance of Power: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 
http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Dialogue_Chapters/dialogue9_darweish_comm.p
df, 2010, pp. 86 
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The following thesis is divided into five chapters. The first provides an overview of conflict 
transformation as a theory, and touches upon its significance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The remaining four chapters each deal with the separate modes outlined by Lederach. Each 
chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the mode in question and is further sub-divided to 
incorporate the normative issues affecting the conflict which pertain to that particular mode. In 
the second chapter, the personal mode is linked to the more apparent and corporeal aspects of 
the conflict which directly interfere with people’s daily lives on an individual basis. This 
analysis simultaneously touches upon some of the structural attributes responsible for 
personally impacting the lives of Palestinians. More importantly, briefly highlighting aspects 
of the structural elements restricting people personally, assimilates with Parlevliet’s human 
rights as rules dimension. Lederach’s relational mode forms the basis of chapter three and is 
easily linked with Parlevliet’s third dimension of the same name. Here, the more systemic 
consequences of the laws detailed in chapter two are shown to have a detrimental aftereffect 
for both societies in terms of their interrelation with one another, as this breakdown spills over 
into economic and environmental domains. Allport’s contact theory is drawn upon at this stage 
to provide an additional theoretical perspective on the breakdown of Jewish-Arab relations, 
and how this is counterproductive to the nurturing of a possible solution. Chapter three analyses 
how separation and discrimination are embedded within the judicial and military institutions 
of Israel, highlighting the structural features of the conflict in conjunction with Lederach’s third 
mode and Parlevliet’s second dimension. In chapter five, the structural relations of power are 
revealed to reinforce the cultural divides between the two societies. This chapter discusses how 
the widening of cultural divides have led to the increase in extreme and dehumanizing rhetoric 
within the Israeli Knesset. Linking this phenomenon with Lederach’s final mode and 
Parlevliet’s final dimension, this chapter draws upon political discourse analysis to demonstrate 
how the characterization of Palestinians as terrorists is disseminated throughout mainstream 
Israeli culture and media to legitimise the current structural architecture. The objective, 
essentially, is to demonstrate the interconnectivity between the normative issues sustaining the 
conflict and how they relate to the symbiotic processes inherent within Lederach’s modes and 
Parlevliet’s dimensions. It stresses the significance of Parlevliet’s application of conflict 
transformation in linking it to the rationale underpinning the current switch in Palestinian 
objectives from attaining a nation state to achieving human rights. Finally, the conclusion 
utilizes Lederach’s modes to illustrate how the current trajectory of the conflict is constantly 
winding itself into smaller and denser theoretical and political spaces to introduce alternative 
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approaches to resolving the conflict. Lederach’s modes, in this sense, are shown to form a cycle 
in the process of becoming tenser and more radical.  
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Chapter 1: Theory, Data Gathering and Methodology 
1.1 Conflict Transformation 
Before examining the Israel-Palestine conflict and situating the current state of affairs within 
Lederach and Parlevliet’s analyses, it is compulsory to elaborate on the actual theory of conflict 
transformation and its value to this study. At its core, conflict transformation attempts to 
convert the ontological foundations of conflicts through epistemological means. It recognises 
the necessity of approaching the conflict from both the micro and macro levels by 
acknowledging the “very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern 
of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict.”33  
This attribute of conflict transformation to look beyond the perceptual features of the conflict 
and uncover the societal dynamics, which feed into and sustain it, is indispensable to the 
following investigation, since it illuminates the indirect socio-political processes that normally 
go unaddressed. Thus, it is a “process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, 
interests, discourses and…the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of 
violent conflict.34 Moreover, the theory’s emphasis on drawing upon a multitude of concepts 
and approaches to transform the contours and narrative of conflicts proved a crucial asset in 
the following chapters since a range of frameworks, theories and methodologies were utilised 
as part of the endeavour to explicate the structural and cultural elements underpinning the 
groundswell of human rights discourse. During the course of the thesis, contact theory will be 
drawn upon to elucidate the breakdown in intergroup relations. In addition, Galtung’s 
conceptualisations of structural and cultural violence are employed in relation to the 
institutionalization of violence within the Israeli judicial and political systems. To highlight the 
cultural roots of Israeli attitudes towards Arabs, a political discourse analysis is deployed to 
reveal the interconnectivity between inequality, prejudice and the status quo. As a collective, 
this range of concepts and methodologies is synthesised into a single cohesive argument in 
which to elucidate the formation of societal contradictions, and how they “become manifest in 
attitudes and behaviour.”35 Supplementing this endeavour, a wealth quantitative and qualitative 
data is referenced in the form of opinion polls, statistical analysis and interviews with a variety 
33 Miall, H., Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task, 
http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2013/4682/pdf/miall_handbook.pdf, 2004, pp. 4 
34 Ibid 
35 Ibid 
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of authorities from within the confines of the conflict, including NGO leaders, academics, 
political representatives and average citizens.  
As mentioned above in the introduction, conflict transformation stands in stark contrast to the 
traditional frameworks of conflict resolution and conflict management. The former is primarily 
concerned with ending something undesirable: in this case the occupation itself. Whereas, the 
latter focuses on limiting and maximising the negative and positive attributes of relations. The 
problem for Lederach is that both frameworks ultimately consider conflicts as inherently 
negative phenomena, and fail to appreciate their natural occurrence and benefit for human and 
societal progression. Conflict resolution is clothed in language which assumes conflicts are 
short term processes able to be dissolved of quickly. A major consequence of this line of 
reasoning is that conflict resolution has often been guilty of “seeking to stop the conflict and 
create harmony at the expense of justice.”36 In the context of Israel-Palestine, the Oslo Accords 
testify to this notion, since the agreed format for a solution to the conflict has “failed to bring 
justice to Palestinians or peace and security to Israelis.”37 Social conflicts such as Israel-
Palestine, by their very nature, are unjust. The expectation that its violent expressions would 
dissipate naturally without the root causes of the conflict being unearthed were not only futile, 
but morbidly naïve. In hindsight, it appears absurd to think the Oslo Accords could ever achieve 
a positive peace by forestalling the agreement on issues like Jerusalem, refugees, settlements 
and borders to a later date; the very components of the conflict most central to the Palestinian 
narrative and sense of aggrievement. 38  
Lederach, on the other hand, considers conflict management more pragmatic in acknowledging 
the long-term aspects of conflicts. Fundamentally, the theory proposes amplifying favourable 
and restricting detrimental facets of conflicts. Israel’s separation barrier is justifiable under this 
reckoning for it practically eradicated the most pressing negative feature of the conflict by 
significantly reducing the number of suicide bombings by 90%.39 Conversely, Netanyahu’s 
calls to cultivate peace through economics is a political attempt to foster better social relations 
36 Lederach, J., Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, Syracuse University Press, New 
York, 1995, pp. 16 
37 LeVine, M., & Mossberg, M., Thinking Outside the Oslo Box, 
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/12/oslo-accord-israelpalestinepeaceprocessoccupation.html, 
December 6th, 2014 
38 Israel and the PLO., Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, in Laqueur, W., & 
Rubin, B (eds)., The Israel-Arab Reader, Penguin, London, 1993, pp. 414 
39 IDF., The Separation Barrier, http://www.law.idf.il/351-en/Patzar.aspx, accessed (21/03/16) 
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through Israel and Palestine’s already established trade relations.40 The concept of managing is 
premised on the idea conflicts are not completely eradicated as result of resolution, and 
emphasis must be place on manipulating their destructive and advantageous components.41 
Lederach points out, however, that the language of management cloaks a presumption that 
conflicts are somehow malleable; as if they were controllable and something to be contained. 
This reasoning fails to “capture the broader sense of peacemaking, as it narrows its focus to the 
technical and practical side of the effort.”42 Managing the critical nexus between human action 
and interaction is incomparable to the management of resources in the physical world.43 In 
terms of Israel-Palestine, managing the conflict only serves the interests of the dominant party 
and fails to address the core injustices aggravating the Palestinian resistance, with economic 
growth alone providing no guarantee a modern state will emerge.44 Amany Khalifa, an 
organiser for the NGO Grassroots Jerusalem, recently affirmed this view in a media interview 
where she explained recent protests as a reaction to “oppression, occupation, lack of Palestinian 
leadership and a myth from the international community called ‘development and economic 
growth.’”45 
Alternatively, conflict transformation is more adept at operating within the confines of the 
competing narratives and historical complexity indicative of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It 
is far broader, and more dynamic than its resolution and management counterparts, which are 
too narrow in their mandate. This is especially important in conflicts like Israel-Palestine 
“where parties share an extensive past and have the potential for significant future 
relationships, and where the episodes arise in an organisational, community or broader social 
context.”46 Most importantly, conflict transformation’s significance lay in its applicability to 
contexts where repetitive rounds of episodic violence have normalised. Refocusing the societal 
40 Ahren, R., Netanyahu: Economics, Not Politics, is the Key to Peace, http://www.haaretz.com/netanyahu-
economics-not-politics-is-the-key-to-peace-1.257617, November 20th, 2008 
41 Lederach, J., Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures, Syracuse University Press, New 
York, 1995, pp. 17 
42 Ibid 
43 Ibid 
44 Fukuyama, F., Political Order and Political Decay, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York, 2014, pp. 540 
45 Khalifa, A., in Palumbo-Liu, D., “They Think They Have Nothing More to Lose”: Young Palestinians on the 
Frustration and Oppression Fuelling the Current Wave of Protests in Israel, 
http://www.salon.com/2015/11/06/they_think_that_they_have_nothing_more_to_lose_young_palestinians_
on_the_frustration_and_oppression_fueling_the_current_wave_of_protests_in_israel/, November 6th, 2015 
46 Lederach, J., "Conflict Transformation." Beyond Intractability. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict 
Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: October 2003 
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horizons of each side toward fostering healthier associations, transformation attempts to 
overhaul engrained socio-psychological barriers.47 
Parlevliet’s article calling for human rights to be considered in conjunction with conflict 
transformation should be seen as an extension of Lederach’s approach. Her analysis parallels 
Lederach’s work in many respects and is central to the following thesis since she concurs that 
conflict transformation looks beyond the surface inequalities, and attempts to transform the 
very “systems, structures and relationships which give rise to violence and injustice.”48 The 
central tenet of her argument integrates seamlessly with Lederach’s conceptualisation of 
conflict transformation, since the latter’s approach also accentuates the synthetic amalgamation 
of justice and peace, alongside “the building of right relationships and social structures through 
a radical respect for human rights.”49 Parlevliet shares Lederach’s doubts regarding conflict 
resolution and conflict management, maintaining neither framework is as explicitly grounded 
in social justice as conflict transformation. In relation to Israel-Palestine, Parlevliet’s value is 
twofold. Firstly, she emphasizes the theory’s ability to effectively address the “power 
imbalances and unjust relationships” characteristic of asymmetric conflicts. Secondly, her 
analysis contends that conflict transformation offers a more fruitful opportunity for considering 
human rights.50 This second element is specifically important with regards to the phenomenon 
of an increasing tendency to employ a human rights-based discourse within the Palestinian 
camp.  
It is with Lederach and Parlevliet’s adequately aligned that it is necessary to place their 
respective edifices alongside each other to illuminate the connections between the two in their 
descriptive and prescriptive analyses. Below is a diagram outlining how each edifice is 
paralleled with its respective counterpart in the remaining chapters. 
47 Ibid 
48 Respond.org, as quoted in Parlevliet, M., Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights 
Perspective, http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/parlevliet_handbook.pdf, September 
2009, pp. 3 
49 Lederach, J., "Conflict Transformation." In Burgess, G., and Burgess, H (eds)., Beyond Intractability. Conflict 
Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. Posted: October 2003 
50 Parlevliet, M., Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective, http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/parlevliet_handbook.pdf, September 
2009, pp. 3 
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Lederach Modes  Parlevliet Dimensions 
Personal Rules 
Relational Structures 
Structural       Relationships 
Cultural Process 
Referring to the above diagram, it is noticeable that although both edifices exhibit strong and 
significant symbiotic parallels, they are listed in separate orders. Nonetheless, these minor 
differences aside, both scholars offer important conceptual edifices to categorise the numerous 
normative issues affecting people at different levels within the context of the conflict. The 
parallels between these two edifices are drawn firstly to situate the normative issues within 
Lederach’s analysis, and secondly to demonstrate how they pertain specifically to the issue of 
human rights in Parlevliet’s article.  
An overall description of Lederach’s four modes and Parlevliet’s dimensions as totalities must, 
therefore, be provided to explicate to what effect and to what extent they fit within the theory 
of conflict transformation as a comprehensive framework.  For both Lederach and Parlevliet, 
conflict transformation considers peace “as centred and rooted in the quality of relationships.”51 
This definition extends beyond everyday face to face interactions and encompasses all facets 
of social, political, economic and cultural relationships.52 The central component of this 
theoretical approach is to look further afield than the obvious, physical aspects of the conflict 
and uncover the underlining processes shaping the relationship between the disputing factions. 
Lederach’s view is that these processes shaping the relationship “represent a web of 
connections that form the broader context of the conflict.”53 It is the context of the relationship 
whereby “particular issues arise and either become volatile or get quickly resolved.”54 
Similarly, Parlevliet points out the multidimensional attributes of human rights offer an 
invaluable tool box in which to dissect the “inequality, inequity, injustice and 
insecurity…underpinning violent conflicts.”55 Concerning Israel-Palestine, the impasse 
51 Lederach, J., Conflict Transformation, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation, October 
2003 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
55 Parlevliet, M., Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective, http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/parlevliet_handbook.pdf, September 
2009, pp. 8 
Charles Elkins  
Conflict Transformation and Human Rights in Israel-Palestine 
23 
dividing both societies explains the Palestinian grassroots initiative to generate a groundswell 
of civil and human rights discourse. This approach sets the nationalistic objectives aside and 
proposes fostering more harmonious and egalitarian attitudes in the hope of supplementing 
positive Jewish-Arab inter-relationships. 
1.2 Interview Process 
An influential component of the following thesis is the data collected from the interview 
process.  Throughout the study, the contribution of those interviewed is referenced constantly. 
Thus, it is important to justify its relevance to the thesis, as well as give some indication of how 
this process transpired and the data accrued. 
The material collected during the interviews immensely contributed to the central argument 
anchoring the thesis. It was whilst discussing a range of social, political and legal issues 
pertaining to the conflict with interviewees that the investigation’s theoretical starting point 
concerning the human rights discourse was located. Haaretz journalist Khaled Diab, biologist 
Mazim Qumsiyeh, UN observer Hamed Qawasmeh, NGO leaders Roie Revitsky and Adam 
Keller, author Ilan Pappe, political activist Jamal Juma, and political scientist Ahmed Hamad 
all attested to the developing human rights discourse amongst Palestinians on the ground. 
Those interviews conducted during the initial interview process such as Saeb Erekat did not 
gather anything pertaining to this phenomenon since the author was primarily concerned with 
the academic discourse surrounding the one-two state solution debate. Unfortunately, little 
scholarly discussion concerning the phenomenon of a human rights-based discourse in the Holy 
Land exists, which is why it was considered necessary to reveal its manifestation and analyse 
it alongside the philosophical underpinnings of human rights as a body of law, and the overall 
social and humanitarian context of the Israel–Palestine conflict.  
The thesis further hinges on the views of those interviewed since despite the emerging portent 
of a human rights discourse being palpable on the ground, it is by no means an organised 
movement. This explains why it is difficult to give any indication of when this new discourse 
began to materialise, for it is yet to be encapsulated into a single ideological unit. There is no 
civil movement occurring in the form of an active group collectively protesting for Israel to 
abide by its human rights obligations. Rather, it is more a dispersed and disjointed discourse 
which is becoming more audible and nascent. As Jamal Juma states, “We want to have a civil 
rights movement.”56 It is thus more of a hope amongst those who believe in its practicality than 
56 Juma, J., Interview, 24/8/15 
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a well-established concrete strategy. The views of interviewees who attested to this 
development were therefore used to analyse what human rights mean and entail in the Israel-
Palestinian context, using the theoretical pillars of Lederach and Parlevliet. Given the 
limitations in terms of academic evidence to estimate the scale of this development, the views 
of those interviewed was used as an opportunity to introduce a significant social development 
on the ground into the academic discourse regarding the conflict. 
In accordance with traditional ethnographic research, the vast majority of the data gathered 
during the interviews was accumulated from within the social context. Though some of the 
interviews were conducted over the internet using various communication interfaces (Skype, 
email), the majority of interviewees lived and worked in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. Interviews with participants from outside the immediate social context were all 
conducted via the internet: Noam Chomsky, Norman Finkelstein, Miko Peled and Virginia 
Tilley. All are prominent and respectable figures within the academic discourse surrounding 
the conflict. The common thread connecting these interviews with those within the immediate 
social context was the employment of the in-depth technique.  
In-depth interviews are characteristically extensive in their duration and tend to involve a 
greater sense of personal expression on the part of the interviewer in order to build a sense of 
intimacy. The interviewer often seeks a deeper, more complex understanding of the subject 
matter and asks a range of open and closed questions to multiple tangents relating to the 
overarching topic of conversation.57 Most of the interviews conducted for this thesis lasted well 
over an hour and in some cases consisted of multiple meetings. More importantly, the in-depth 
method offered a means to unearth weightier and more cogent information than is usually found 
in surveys. This is not to disparage the validity of the information offered by surveys, for this 
thesis also makes extensive use of a number polls throughout the course of the investigation. It 
is to say, by looking beyond the statistics and percentage figures, in-depth interviewing offered 
a valuable technique in which to contextualise a range of normative issues in more personal 
terms. In tandem with the data collected from various polls and surveys, the interviews were 
synergised to amalgamate both quantitative and qualitative research methods in formulating a 
singular portrayal of the current social reality in Israel-Palestine. Moreover, referring to the 
statistical analysis in surveys conducted by Palestinian, Israeli and international organisations 
57 Johnson, J., & Rowlands, T., The Interpersonal Dynamics of In-Depth Interviewing, in Gubrium, J., Holstein, J., 
Marvasti, A., & McKinney, K (eds)., The Sage Handbook of Interview Research: The Complexity of the Craft, 
Sage, London, 2012, pp. 99 
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was not only to convey the perspectives of all key stakeholders but to demonstrate how the data 
in all the polls paradoxically assimilated. Of course, statistical data collected through surveys 
has its own complications and can never be relied upon as pure empirical fact. But in this case, 
its value lay in its ability to explicate how the views of Jews in Israeli polls correlated with the 
concerns of Arabs in Palestinian surveys, and more importantly, with the testimonies of the 
interviewees. 
 Another crucial benefit of the in-depth method is that it offers the interviewer a chance to 
evaluate theories they have “formulated through naturalistic observation, to verify 
independently knowledge that they have gained through participation as members of a 
particular cultural setting.”58 This particular dynamic of in-depth interviewing was 
instrumental to the conceptualisation of this thesis since originally the author had intended to 
focus primarily on the question of a one-state solution. A burgeoning enclave of academics 
pontificate the logistics of a single state between the Jordan River and Mediterranean Sea. Most 
of these analyses focus on the irreversibility of the settlement enterprise and the projected 
imbalance of Arab-Jewish demographics in the future to justify this radical proposition. The 
author originally intended to investigate the possibility of sharing the land under a single state 
at the outset of the data collection process. Nevertheless, it became apparent once talking to 
interviewees and interacting with people on the ground that the one-state-two-state dichotomy 
was a non-existent discussion for most people despite its growing relevancy in political and 
academic circles. This discovery was reflected in the pattern of questioning as the data was 
collected. With the initial interviews, along with the obligatory introductory questions, the 
majority of the questions centred on this dichotomy and the possibility of establishing a single 
democratic state between Israel and the occupied territories. In-depth interviewing enabled the 
author to review the relevancy of this debate in the context of grassroots movements in East 
Jerusalem and the West Bank. Once it was discovered the average Palestinian was disillusioned 
with the political process, it became clear the human rights discourse provided a fall back 
initiative to circumnavigate numerous political and ideological hurdles to finding a definitive 
resolution. Albeit some questioned the potency of the tactic, several of the interviewees, as 
shown above, testified to this growing phenomenon.59 The in-depth method therefore provided 
a significant technique in which to evaluate the relevancy of the author’s own assessment of 
58 Ibid, pp. 100 
59 Rivitsky, R., Interview, 1/9/15 
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the conflict and compare this to the opinions of academics, politicians and activists on the 
ground.    
Finally, the actual means by how the interviewees were selected was a result of the author’s 
engrossment into the conflict’s social context. Whilst conducting field research, the author 
simultaneously undertook an internship in a local academic publication: Palestine-Israel 
Journal. As part of his responsibilities, the author was expected to attend conferences, lectures 
and protests on behalf of the organisation as well as interview key figures while on assignment. 
This enabled the author to meet the vast majority of the individuals interviewed for the 
following thesis, who in most cases, had also previously written for the publication. For 
instance, the author met Jamal Juma and Haitham Khatib at political protests in the West Bank. 
Robin Twite was present at a conference on religious co-existence, and Gerald Steinberg held 
a public lecture regarding the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions movement in West Jerusalem. 
The author was instructed to attend all of these events for the purpose of reporting what 
happened for the publication’s online blog. Furthermore, Khaled Diab’s acquaintance occurred 
at the journal’s offices in East Jerusalem. Diab was a participant in the roundtable discussions, 
which consisted of several civil society figures and journalists discussing the growing 
religiosity of the conflict. The author also participated in this discussion and was tasked with 
transcribing it for the journal’s forthcoming issue. Some of the comments Diab made during 
the roundtable discussion concerned the author’s own research, convincing the latter to request 
an interview at the end of the meeting. In some cases, such as Claire Anastas, the process was 
more organic and reactionary. While the author was browsing in their souvenir shop in 
Bethlehem, Anastas struck up a general conversation with the author. Conversely, with the 
likes of Noam Chomsky, Virginia Tilley, Norman Finkelstein and Miko Peled, the interviews 
were a result of investigative, formal researching. In this sense, they were contacted by the 
author directly. The decision to contact the aforementioned individuals was based on the author 
either reading their academic works or understanding their significance to contemporary debate 
surrounding the conflict. At the same time, it is important to note the unsuccessful interview 
attempts. Several current Jewish and Arab-Israeli Knesset members including Ze’ev Elkin, Avi 
Ditcher, Haim Katz, Tzipi Livni, Hanin Zoabi and Osama Sa’adi were contacted. The presumed 
counter opinion of all these prospective interviews could have added a greater sense of balance 
to the investigation given they reside on either sides of the political spectrum. Unfortunately, 
all either declined to speak or chose not to reply to the invite of an interview. Nevertheless, 
both interviewees and non-interviewees were selected on the basis of their shared engagement 
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with the conflict. Whether it be directly in terms of politics and civil society, or indirectly in 
terms of academic works written from outside the conflict arena.  
1.3 Political Discourse Analysis 
In the fourth chapter a brief critical discourse analysis is conducted in relation to an 
examination of Israeli culture. For this reason, it is necessary to explain what exactly the theory 
entails, how it is employed and why it is significant in relation to the overarching argument of 
this thesis. 
Fundamentally, political or critical discourse analysis, as it is sometimes referred to, is both a 
theory and a method which analyses how language is employed in various social arenas. A 
clearer definition may separate political discourse analysis (PDA) as the focus on speech 
patterns of politicians, whilst critical discourse analysis (CDA) as predominantly concerned 
with more social discursive practices. However, both branches of the theory/method are often 
conflated by practitioners since “critical-political discourse analysis deals especially with the 
reproduction of political power, power abuse or domination through political discourse.”60 By 
locating and highlighting these practices in various forms of political speech and text, 
PDA/CDA aims to uncover the primordial societal attitudes implicit in mainstream discourse. 
Principally, the method seeks to observe the communicative processes which contribute and 
sustain structures of social dominance, offering “a direct insight into discursive political 
practises.”61 In contrast to other forms of discourse analysis, PDA/CDA “is primarily interested 
and motivated by pressing social issues.”62 Its theoretical value Van Dijk argues, lay within its 
ability to look beyond direct speech acts, such as commands, in order to elucidate the source 
of social inequalities.63 
According to Van Dijk’s particular conception of PDA/CDA, the analyst employing the 
method is obligated to abide by a number of theoretical principles. Most importantly, they must 
take a particular socio-political stance, and their perspective should be of those who suffer most 
from inequality.64 Moreover, analysts are expected to look beyond the “immediate, serious or 
pressing issues of the day.” In evaluating the production of texts, their structural understanding 
60 Van Dijk, T., What is Political Discourse Analysis, 
http://discourses.org/OldArticles/What%20is%20Political%20Discourse%20Analysis.pdf, accessed 
(23/4/2016), pp. 11 
61 Ibid, pp. 41 
62 Van Dijk, T., Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse & Society, vol. 4 (2), 1993, pp. 252 
63 Ibid, pp.250 
64 Ibid, pp. 252 
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of the social climate in question “presupposes more general insights, and sometimes indirect 
and long term analyses of fundamental causes, conditions and consequences of such issues.”65 
The significance of Van Dijk’s stipulations in his nuanced conceptualisation of PDA/CDA are 
integral to the aims and underlining sentiment to the following thesis. First and foremost, the 
thesis abides by the principle of addressing pressing social issues in drawing attention to the 
current state of affairs in Israel-Palestine on the ground. Furthermore, it takes a specific socio-
political stance in highlighting the implicit Arab prejudice in mainstream Israeli media outlets, 
and assumes this in respect to the burgeoning Palestinian call for human rights. It not only 
connects these findings with the two dominant edifices anchoring the entire investigation, but 
also evaluates them in the wider structural context defining the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 
critical target, in this sense, is the more dominant side to this asymmetric conflict, which enacts, 
sustains, legitimates, condones and even ignores social inequality and injustice.66  
Lastly, a crucial presupposition in conducting an effective critical discourse analysis is 
comprehending the nature of social power and dominance; for without this understanding, it is 
difficult to formulate ideas on how discourses contribute to its reproduction.67 With social 
power defined by Van Dijk as the privileged access to socially valued capital, for instance 
wealth, position, status, force, group membership, education and knowledge, this classification 
is more than applicable in the Israeli-Palestinian context where Jews are often the benefactors 
of such resources. The method is thus particularly adroit to unearthing racist ideologies which 
may be expressed through mass media, since it observes the subtle formation of distinct in-out 
groups. In the analysis conducted in chapter five, this proves vital in ascertaining the 
assimilation of Arabs and terrorism beside the humanization of Jewish violence. Taken 
alongside disparaging characterizations of Arabs and the very notion of Palestine in Israeli 
schoolbooks, as well as the comments of some of Israel’s most prominent political and social 
figures, the wider implications of this in the scheme of the thesis is that it contributes to 
explaining how socially constructed narratives and formulations of different communal groups 
play an integral role in exacerbating social inequality from the macro to the micro levels.  
65 Ibid, pp. 253 
66 Ibid, pp. 252 
67 Ibid, pp. 254 
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Chapter 2: Personal Mode 
Lederach’s personal mode refers to attributes which bear directly upon the individual. Lederach 
elaborates this encompasses the perceptual, cognitive, emotional, and spiritual aspects of 
human experience over the course of the conflict.68 From a conflict transformation perspective, 
the aim is to minimize the destructive effects of the conflict whilst maximizing the 
conduciveness for individual growth at the various levels listed above. The key qualifier in this 
mode is Lederach’s insistence on recognising how conflicts affect people in their everyday 
existence. This qualification is especially important when considering the present situation in 
Israel-Palestine, since despite the ever present threat of terrorism, analysed in perspective, 
systemic structural inequalities at the roots of the conflict preserve “control and power in the 
hands of one ethnic group: the Jewish majority.”69 Palestinians are thus more directly affected 
at a personal level by the continuation of the impasse and the prolonging of the occupation.  
The following chapter adopts Lederach’s categories within his own conceptualisation of the 
personal mode, which consists of the perceptual, cognitive, emotional and spiritual aspects of 
the conflict. Beginning with the perceptual aspects, the chapter uses the very physical and direct 
use of house demolitions as a launching pad to discuss other normative issues which have a 
clear and detrimental effect on Palestinians cognitively, emotionally and spiritually. In the 
course of the chapter, some structural forms of violence are touched upon to highlight their 
direct impact on the average life of Palestinians. In this regard, ID permits, certain Israeli 
legislation, settler violence and Hebron are all touched upon alongside the destruction of 
Palestinian property. Parlevliet’s human rights as rules dimension is then drawn upon to 
conclude the chapter.  
 2.1 Perceptual  
The perceptual aspects of the conflict which affect people personally are those most 
discernible, and most likely to transpire into direct confrontations. Several features of the 
conflict pertain to this particular attribute with settler violence, uneven application of the law, 
as well as restrictions on freedom of movement, and religious practise all subsidising a cauldron 
of personal resentment and disenfranchisement which regularly transmutes into outright 
68 Lederach, J., Conflict Transformation, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation, October 
2003 
69 Darwesih, M., Human Rights and the Imbalance of Power: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 
http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Dialogue_Chapters/dialogue9_darweish_comm.p
df, 2010, pp. 85 
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violence. To date, arguably the most emotive and psychologically damaging aspect of the 
conflict on, a personal level, is the second class status of Palestinians and the practise of house 
demolitions this legalises.   
Recognition and reconciliation for their mass displacement has always defined the Palestinian 
narrative since their ethnic cleansing in the conflict’s defining wars of 1948 and 1967.70 At the 
conflict’s present juncture, Israeli demolition of Palestinian property in East Jerusalem and the 
West Bank completely undermine any opportunity for Palestinians to carve out any sense of 
normality in their everyday lives. The process of house demolitions in East Jerusalem stems 
from the aftermath of the 1967 war when Israel annexed 702km of occupied Jerusalem as well
as 642 km of the surrounding West Bank and rebranded it the Municipality of Jerusalem.71 For
the 66,000 Palestinians living within the newly designated boundary, this resulted in a 
fundamental shift in their legal status. Former Arab citizens suddenly were classified as 
permanent residents.72 This distinction between citizen and permanent resident is key to 
understanding state sponsored forms of discrimination which constrict the average Palestinian, 
and define their personal experiences within the confines of the conflict.  
Permanent residents are required to carry a blue Jerusalem ID card upon their person at all 
times which permits the holder to freedom of movement and working rights within the state of 
Israel. This differentiates them entirely from Palestinians residing in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip who require separate permits to enable them to enter the country.73 Ostensibly, 
permanent residents of Israel are entitled to all the benefits of citizenship attributed to Israeli-
Jews - health, social service benefits, voting rights - but without the personal security, it 
normally entails. The major difference between the forms of status lies with regulation 11a2 of 
the Entry into Israel Law which stipulates: “The Minister of Interior may at his 
discretion…cancel any permit of residence granted under this law.”74 The ambiguity of this 
law is exercised frequently to retract the residency of any person who may reside, for whatever 
70 See Pappe, I., The Ethnic Cleaning of Palestine, Oneworld, UK, 2006 
71 OCHAOPT., East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns, 
https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_jerusalem_report_2011_03_23_web_english.pdf, March 
2011, pp. 13 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid 
74 As published by  UNODC.org., Israel: Law No. 5712-1952, Entry into Israel Law, 
https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/law-no--5712-1952--entry-into-israel-
law_html/Entry_Into_Israel_1952.pdf, 1952 
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reason, outside of the Jerusalem Municipality for a period exceeding seven years.75 
Hypothetically, if a Palestinian from an Arab neighbourhood in East Jerusalem was to attend 
university abroad for a number of years, they run the risk of becoming ineligible to return to 
their former home upon completion of their studies. The same applies to any permanent 
resident holder who may attain full citizenship to any other country whilst residing abroad. For 
instance, if a resident holder attained a British passport whilst living and working in the UK, 
they face having their permanent residency revoked, as well as any entitlements to return 
rescinded. 
This denial of the basic right to statesmanship and the second class citizenship attached to 
permanent residency is manifested by a lack of individual privileges entitled to citizens. 
Residency holders are prohibited from applying for Israeli passports76and are unable to pass on 
their residency rights hereditarily.77 Children of resident holders have to apply separately for 
their own permit and are not issued one automatically on the basis of their parent’s residency. 
Mixed residency unions are also considered under a different criterion than those of citizens. 
If a residency holder marries a Palestinian from either the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, they 
are not permitted to bring their spouse to live in Israel. They either have to move to where their 
spouse lives or leave Israel-Palestine altogether. Children of such couples are not guaranteed 
permanent residence as a consequence of a single parent having residency because this would 
contradict the purpose of the law itself, which is primarily to Judaize the remaining 
neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem. Approximately 14,000 East Jerusalemites had their 
residency rights revoked since 1967,78 making it a “major tool for displacement.”79   
Concerning the personal implications, the consequences of these policies are felt most 
strikingly and obviously with the demolishing of Palestinian homes to make way for Israeli 
settlements, particularly in East Jerusalem. As permanent residents, Palestinians are constantly 
discriminated against when applying for building permits. “Kafkaesque restrictions stifle those 
who wish to obtain a building permit, so much so that construction in accordance with the law 
75 OCHAOPT., East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns, 
https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_jerusalem_report_2011_03_23_web_english.pdf, March 
2011, pp. 13 
76 Hirshman, B., Interview, 7/7/2015 
77 OCHAOPT., East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns, 
https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_jerusalem_report_2011_03_23_web_english.pdf, March 
2011, pp. 13 
78 B’Tselem., Revocation of Residency in East Jerusalem, 
http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/revocation_of_residency, 18th August 2013 
79 Hirshman, B., Interview, 7/7/2015 
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has become virtually impossible.”80 70.52 km of land make up the entirety of East Jerusalem.
35%, approximately 24.52km, has been expropriated for settlements expansion. An additional
30% has no planning approvals to date, whilst the remaining 35% has planning schemes 
approved by the Jerusalem District Committee for Planning and Building.81 Only 9.22km,
approximately 13%, has been set aside for Palestinian construction, much of which is already 
built up and overpopulated. The other 15.52km has been designated as ‘green’ or ‘open’ spaces
in which no construction of any sorts, either residential or general, infrastructure is permitted.82 
As a result, most Palestinian families have resorted to building illegally. In addition to the 
minuscule amount of land designated for possible construction, a number of expensive 
administrative fees force many Palestinians to build illegally.  Overcoming numerous 
bureaucratic hurdles potentially takes several years and is normally beyond the average 
Palestinian family’s income; especially when there are no guarantees if all paperwork and 
payments are sufficed.83 Palestinians in East Jerusalem are stranded in a catch twenty-two 
situation where the bureaucratic procedure for acquiring a permit is immensely difficult on one 
hand, but the need for shelter forces one to build illegally on the other. This trend of illegal 
construction is only set to continue amid reports a mere 7% of the building permits issued in 
the last few years have been allocated for Palestinian areas. Of the 3,238 permits issued in 
Jerusalem over the course of 2015 only 188 were allocated to Palestinian neighbourhoods.84  
When people resort to building without the necessary documentation, the Jerusalem 
Municipality deems these structures illegal and issue demolition orders in accordance with 
Israeli planning policy. Statistics from 1992-2010 show a total of 1250 structures were 
demolished in East Jerusalem.85More recent conservative figures estimate a further 204 
housing units were demolished in the same areas between 2011-2015.86 The overall effect of 
these demolitions is more striking when the number of people displaced is considered. In East 
Jerusalem alone 579 Palestinian residential units were demolished between 2004 -2015, 
80 Margalit, M., Demolishing Peace: House Demolitions in East Jerusalem, International Peace and Cooperation 
Centre, 2014, pp. 12 
81 OCHAOPT., East Jerusalem: Key Humanitarian Concerns, 
https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_jerusalem_report_2011_03_23_web_english.pdf, March 
2011, pp. 29 
82 Ibid 
83 Ibid 
84 Ibid 
85 Margalit, M., Demolishing Peace: House Demolitions in East Jerusalem, International Peace and Cooperation 
Centre, 2014, pp. 24 
86 B’Tselem., Statistics on Demolition of Houses Built Without Permits in East Jerusalem, 
http://www.btselem.org/planning_and_building/east_jerusalem_statistics, 15th September 2015 
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resulting in the displacement of 2,133 people, 1,158 of which were infants.87 Statistics from 
the West Bank mirror this severe pattern of displacement where the Jordan Valley, and the 
South Hebron hills, in particular, are the main target areas for demolitions. 927 demolitions 
took place in these areas between 2006 -2015, at the total displacement of 4,319 Palestinians, 
including 2,129 minors.88 In 2015, 107 housing units in the West Bank were demolished at the 
displacement of 356 people, and 722 people were displaced as a result of 175 demolitions in 
2013.89 Currently, it appears the practise is once more swinging towards a more ruthless 
direction and draconian application, as 2016 is set to be the most destructive year yet since the 
UN began keeping records on this process. In a press release earlier this year, the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated the destruction of Palestinian 
property in the first six weeks of 2016 had exceeded the total number for 2015. The IDF 
demolished or dismantled 283 houses and other structures were demolished or dismantled, 
displacing 404 Palestinians, including 219 children.90 
Margalit documents the obvious disproportionality in how the law concerning illegal structures 
is enforced in Jerusalem. She finds unequivocal proof that despite the clear evidence indicating 
most illegal construction takes place in the mostly Jewish, western side of the city, most 
demolitions are carried out in East Jerusalem.91 Between 2004 -2008, 21,419 building 
violations were recorded in West Jerusalem. In contrast, only 5,898 violations were 
documented in East Jerusalem during the same period. Only 27% of violations perpetrated on 
the western side of the city were issued judicial demolition orders. Conversely, 84% of building 
violations in East Jerusalem were issued with the same order.92 That constitutes a 57% 
difference in the likelihood of a demolition being ordered depending upon which side of the 
city the violation takes place.  These numbers also hide the difference in severity between 
demolitions on either side of the Green Line. A clear indication is provided by comparing two 
cases on either side of the city, carried out days apart from each other. On November 17, 2010 
an entire house of 1102m in East Jerusalem was destroyed in the neighbourhood of Beit
Hanina. Two days later on the 19th November, 2010, a balcony consisting of 192m was
87 Ibid 
88 B’Tselem., Planning and Building: Statistics on the Demolition of Houses Built without Permits in Area C, 
http://www.btselem.org/planning_and_building/statistics, 6th September 2015 
89 Ibid 
90 OCHAOPT., Press Release, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/hc_statement_demolitions_feb16_final.pdf, 
17th February 2016 
91 Margalit, M., Demolishing Peace: House Demolitions in East Jerusalem, International Peace and Cooperation 
Centre, 2014, pp. 58 
92 Ibid, pp.  59 
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demolished in the Musrara neighbourhood of West Jerusalem. Far from representing a mere 
coincidence, the two cases illustrate how the municipality employs the term “structure” instead 
of “house” to claim equal treatment in the execution of demolitions despite the fact an entire 
family of six was left homeless in the former case, and none in the latter.93 
2.2 Cognitive and Emotions 
The threats of house demolitions are not only a very serious and dramatic tool for seizing 
control of land, but are a serious strain on the personal and psychological well-being of 
Palestinians. A large number of families in East Jerusalem are reported to suffer from what is 
commonly referred to as “bulldozer anxiety;” a depressive syndrome resulting from the 11,000 
demolition orders in the area still pending.94 Margalit reports, “A quarter of the population lives 
in constant fear, with this black cloud…hovering over their heads as they go to sleep not 
knowing what the future holds for them.”95  
The immediate consequences of a demolition order extend far beyond displacement. Typically, 
demolitions are followed by long periods of instability for the family.96 “It tears down the 
family structure, increases poverty and vulnerability and ultimately displaces a family from the 
environment that gives it cohesion and support.”97Once demolished, the family losses the 
property as a financial asset, sometimes along with all the contents. Often, families are further 
humiliated by being fined or charged to cover the costs of the actual demolition. Some families 
have even resorted to destroying the structures themselves to avoid any of these additional 
administrative fees costs,98 with B’Tselem having recorded up to 69 incidences of self-
demolitions since 2008 in East Jerusalem alone.99  
In the aftermath of a demolition, those displaced characteristically begin to manifest symptoms 
of depression as they endeavour to cope with the loss of losing a home. Studies reveal these 
symptoms are magnified in children when parents are incapable of meeting their needs as a 
93 Ibid, pp. 62-63 
94 Ibid pp. 13 
95 Ibid 
96 Save the Children., Broken Homes: Addressing the impact of House Demolitions on Palestinian Children & 
Families, https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Broken_Homes_English_low_res.pdf, 
April 2009, pp. 8 
97 Ibid, pp. 10 
98 Ibid, pp. 13 
99 B’Tselem., Statistics on Demolition of Houses Built Without Permits in East Jerusalem, 
http://www.btselem.org/planning_and_building/east_jerusalem_statistics, 15th September 2015 
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result of the trauma suffered.100 Imran Castiro, for instance, a 12-year-old boy whose family 
home in the Beit Hanina district of East Jerusalem was destroyed in 2013 stated, “I wake up at 
night panicking and cannot go back to sleep.”101Moreover, the overall impact of the conflict on 
Palestinian children entails both physical and mental abnormalities. Child health and nutritional 
experts attribute the increasing number of child malnutrition and anaemia cases to the crippling 
situation in the Gaza Strip and the deteriorating state of affairs in the West Bank.102 Mentally, 
the situation is more disturbing as a large proportion (35%) of Palestinian school children are 
reported to have developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).103 These findings amongst 
children are integral to reversing the current trajectory of the conflict, since “the trauma of 
personal loss due to the occupation… have long-standing detrimental effects on individuals.”104 
Many Palestinians hold the Israeli authorities responsible for their own exposure to trauma, 
with house demolitions particularly being seen as a source of heightened anxiety. Psychologists 
and medical practitioners alike confirm the lack of a personal safe haven make it impossible to 
“establish secure and adaptive relationships,” essential for fostering, empathetic and mentally 
well-developed adults.105 Other studies find extensive exposure to the ongoing conflict directly 
influence and inform the way Israelis and Palestinians both think, feel and act in their attitude 
and behaviour toward one another.106  
The important implication of this finding strikes at the heart of the issue of policies like the 
demolition of property or the increasing cases of settler violence. Blatant discrimination 
underlines their enforcement, which in turn is deeply rooted within the increasingly intolerant 
nature of the Israeli public’s national psyche. These very attitudes support specific anti-
100 Save the Children., Broken Homes: Addressing the impact of House Demolitions on Palestinian Children & 
Families, https://www.savethechildren.org.uk/sites/default/files/docs/Broken_Homes_English_low_res.pdf, 
April 2009, pp. 13 
101 Castiro, I., as quoted in Pellicano, M., Palestinian Children Traumatized After House Demolitions, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/06/palestinian-children-trauma-house-demolitions.html#, 
June 10th, 2013 
102 Quota, S., & Odeh, J., The Impact of Conflict on Children: The Palestinian Experience, Journal of Ambulatory 
Care Management, January-March, 2005, pp. 76 
103 Ibid 
104 Hassanein, S., & Abu-Rayya, H., Loss and Psychological Support Among Palestinian Women in the Occupied 
Territories: An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the “From a Bereaved Woman to Another” Project, Journal of 
Loss and Trauma, 19, 2014, pp. 443 
105 Darwesih, M., Human Rights and the Imbalance of Power: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 
http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Dialogue_Chapters/dialogue9_darweish_comm.p
df, 2010 pp. 79 
106 Ayer, L., et al., Psychological Aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A Systematic Review, Trauma, 
Violence, & Abuse, 2015, pp. 14 
Charles Elkins 
Conflict Transformation and Human Rights in Israel-Palestine 
36 
democratic polices.107 The severity and rise in their enforcement since the end of the second 
Intifada coincides with a “very strong shift in Israeli mentality and politics toward the right, 
nationalism,” and “extremism.”108 Surveys undertaken by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) 
and the Israeli polling agency, Dialog, both compiled results which reveal the extent to which 
Israeli Jews favour discriminatory policies towards Arabs. Opinions considered over a period 
of five years between 2003 -2008 show barley half of Israelis are in favour of Arab equality.109 
The same poll also found only 1.4 % of respondents, from a total of 1201 thought the 
Palestinian issue, the future of the occupied territories and the settlements constituted the most 
important problem for the government.110 In 2012, a similar survey conducted by Dialog 
discovered 503 of the 595 interviewees endorsed apartheid-like policies against the state’s Arab 
citizens.111 
2.3 Spiritual 
These anti-Arab attitudes explain not only the legalistic rationale behind the house demolition 
policy but also why certain neighbourhoods, like Silwan in East Jerusalem, have become a 
battleground for control between Palestinian and Israeli Jewish families. The legalistic rhetoric 
is but only a singular discourse in justifying the expropriation of Palestinian property. Religious 
sentiments are simultaneously called upon to add a further, more culturally appropriate layer 
of justification in this endeavour. Prior to 1990 the Wadi Hilweh/City of David neighbourhood 
in Silwan did not have any Jewish residents. Over the past two and a half decades, the 
neighbourhood has since undergone a dramatic demographic transformation, with Jewish 
settlers controlling over a quarter of the same area.112 Flagrant disregard for good governance 
practices have overseen this slow but significant transformation in the area’s demographic 
makeup as “the Jerusalem Municipality leads an open policy of discrimination against the 
107 Darwesih, M., Human Rights and the Imbalance of Power: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 
http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Dialogue_Chapters/dialogue9_darweish_comm.p
df, 2010, pp. 89 
108 Chomsky, N., in Chomsky, N., & Pappe, I., On Palestine, Penguin Books, USA, 2015, pp. 99 
109 Israel Democracy Institute (IDI)., The 2008 Israeli Democracy Index: Auditing Israeli Democracy Between the 
State and Civil Society,  www.idi.org.il/sites/english/ ResearchAndPrograms/The Israeli Democracy 
Index/Documents/2008DemocracyIndex.pdf, 2008, pp. 49 
110 Ibid, pp. 54 
111 Levy, G., Survey: Most Israelis Jews Wouldn’t Give Palestinians Vote if West Bank was Annexed, 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/survey-most-israeli-jews-wouldn-t-give-palestinians-vote-if-west-bank-
was-annexed.premium-1.471644, Oct 23rd, 2012 
112 Rapoport, M., Shady Dealings in Silwan, Ir Amim, http://www.ir-
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Palestinians…in favour of Jewish settlers.”113 At its current rate of settlement, Silwan will 
undergo a complete metamorphosis from an Arab neighbourhood, connected to the Palestinian 
expanse of East Jerusalem, to a Jewish neighbourhood comprising a vital part of West 
Jerusalem.  Founder of the NGO Terrestrial Jerusalem, Daniel Seidemann describes this 
process as a government-backed attempt to convert the enclaves of Jewish settlers in the 
neighbourhood into a “renewed pseudo Biblical theme park.”114 
The religious significance of Silwan explains the tension taking place in the neighbourhood. 
Situated in close proximity to the third holiest site in Islam - Al-Aqsa – the compound also 
happens to be connected to the most sacred site in Judaism – the Western Wall. Both of these 
important religious monuments play their part exacerbating the recent surge in toxicity between 
Palestinians and Israelis as the former accused the latter of attempting to change the current 
status quo around the area.115 Israel’s continued occupation impedes directly on most 
Palestinians’ spiritual practise as access to the most important religious sites in Christianity and 
Islam are restricted. Whether it be the Al-Aqsa Mosque for Muslims or the Church of the Holy 
Sepulchre for Christians, Arabs with a Palestinian ID card are subject to military-issued 
movement permits, whilst Palestinians with a foreign passport are subject to a number of 
restrictive visa requirements.116 Israel's concentrated effort to restrict an individual’s right to 
religious practice coincide with overt attempts to re-Judaize neighbourhoods next to holy sites 
sacred to both peoples. Taken as a totality, such measures inflame existing animosities and 
contribute to the disintegration of religious co-existence.   
Undoubtedly, however, the most evident breakdown in religious co-existence between Jewish 
Israelis and Palestinians is the situation in Hebron. Located south of Jerusalem in the West 
Bank, Hebron is the final resting place of Abraham, the patriarchal forefather of all three 
monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. During the Oslo process, The Hebron 
Accords officially divided the city into H1 and H2 blocks. Israel was assigned control of the 
latter and the PA the former.117 A consequence of these agreements is that Israel effectively 
113 Ibid  
114 Ibid 
115 Hanna, M., Al-Aqsa Status Quo at the Heart of New Violence, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/middleeast/2015/10/al-aqsa-status-quo-heart-violence-
151020113442046.html, 20th October, 2015 
116 PLO State Affairs Department., The Annexation of Tourism: Israel’s Policies and Their Devastating Impact on 
Palestinian Tourism, www.nad-plo.org, accessed 10/01/16, pp. 9 
117 Israel and Palestinian Authority: Hebron Accords (January 15, 1997), in Laqueur, W., & Rubin, B (eds)., The 
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has total control over the site of Abraham’s burial which is both an operating Synagogue and 
Mosque. IDF soldiers have consistently aggravated this power by unilaterally closing the 
Mosque side of the site to Muslims during Jewish religious holidays,118 as well as preventing 
the Muslim call to prayer so as not to disturb illegal settlers during festivities.119 Settlers in 
Hebron are particularly renowned for their religious fundamentalism and clear disdain for their 
Arab co-habitants. Often the most hostile and violent, the xenophobic religious-nationalist 
psyche of the Hebron settlers is frequently encouraged by the IDF protecting them. 
Consequently, the atmosphere in the city is the tensest in any throughout the former Mandate, 
since “Hebron is the only Palestinian city that has Israeli settlers in the heart of its built up area, 
side-by-side with Palestinians.”120   
Hebron’s settler community is comprised of a meagre 400-500 people residing in 4 illegal 
settlements. Within H2 alone, roughly 40,000 Palestinians live alongside the few hundred 
Israeli settlers with a total of nearly 200,000 living across areas H1 and H2. The interaction 
between Palestinians and Israeli settlers is less than minimal, explaining why the latter are 
under constant military protection. At any one point in H2, 2000 IDF soldiers are deployed to 
provide all around the clock security for the Israeli settlers, a ratio of nearly 4:1.121 Violence 
and discrimination from both security forces and settlers fuels the utter collapse of relations 
between the two communities and compounds the personal sense of loss and victimization 
amongst Palestinians. Between the beginning of 2012 and November 2013, 700 Palestinians 
were injured by Israeli forces and settlers.122 More recently, within a period of little over a 
month, statistics reveal 22 residents had been murdered by security forces from the 1st October 
to 8th November, 2015.123 Incidences of settler violence and harassment towards Palestinians 
occur on an almost daily basis under the noses of the security forces who are not shy in 
118 IMEMC., Israel to Close Ibrahimi Mosque to Muslims for Passover, http://www.imemc.org/article/71148, 
April 6, 2015 
119 Middle East Monitor., The Occupation Banned Adhan at Al Ibrahimi Mosque 54 Times Last Month, 
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times-last-month, December 3rd, 2010 
120 Freidman, L., & Etkes, D., Hebron – Settlements in Focus, http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/hebron-
settlements-focus, October 2005 
121 Marcuse, R., After Birthright: Hebron – 500 Settlers, 2000 Soldiers and the Tensest Place I’ve Ever Been, 
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https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_hebron_h2_factsheet_november_2013_english.pdf, 
November 2013 
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vocalising that their mandate is to protect Jews not Palestinians.124 The latter’s inability to 
equally impose the law has cultivated an ugly culture of impunity.125 Former prominent figures 
in the PLO, such as Hanan Ashrawi go so far as to accuse the IDF as colluding with the settlers 
to make life unbearable for Palestinians.126 The near exemption of settlers before the law means 
a miniscule population of 400 is able to terrorize and hold hostage an entire city of Palestinians 
as they face little consequence for their actions.127   
 2.4 Parlevliet’s Human Rights as Rules Dimension 
For most Palestinians at the personal level, the current situation affects their physical well-
being, self-esteem, emotional stability and spiritual integrity. The current discursive switch to 
a civil and human rights based approach should therefore be seen as a means to impose a 
uniformed rule of law, holding everyone accountable to the same rules. It is a tactic to resist 
and transform the current status quo by employing a strategic use of legalism to “orient and 
legitimize counterhegemonic struggles.”128 For Clare Anastas, a shop keeper from Bethlehem 
whose business is literally ten feet in front of the separation barrier, the breakdown in relations 
between Arabs and Jews at the personal level is a consequence of the uneven application of the 
law. Asked whether the trust between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians could be restored with 
the current state of hostilities she replied, “When there is law. No one can hurt you.”129  
This line of thinking mirrors Parlevliet’s first dimension of human rights as rules on a purely 
legal basis. That is, to “outlaw certain behaviours and actions and demand others, as contained 
in international instruments and domestic legislation and as enforceable through a court of 
law.”130 Under Lederach’s personal mode this would include Article 2 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which ensures authorities shall competently 
enforce remedies when a person’s rights are recognized as violated,131 as well as Article 3: 
124 Hass, A., Israeli Soldier to Palestinians in Hebron: We Protect Jews, Not You, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-1.589772 http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.589772, May 9th, 2014 
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Alhaq.org, 2013, pp. 6 
126 Ashrawi, H., Interview, 21/10/15 
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Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4, Summer 2001, pp. 21 
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“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right of men and 
women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set forth in the present Covenant.”132 
Given Israel has ratified such international instruments, the overriding Palestinian perspective 
is that it should abide its legal obligations. This is especially relevant at the time of writing, 
where a spate of stabbings from both sets of people have led to multiple extra judicial killings 
of Palestinians,133 but only short jail terms for Jews.134  
Parlevliet, however, goes beyond a narrow, legalistic application of human rights law, arguing 
“it does not capture what is involved in ensuring respect for human rights in a society where 
injustice, insecurity, inequity and inequality have long been entrenched.”135 According to her 
assessment, “while fundamental human rights can be taken as absolute concepts that are non-
negotiable, their application, interpretation and realization is not absolute.”136 Evidence of this 
is found within Israel itself, which has consistently utilised a nuanced application of human 
rights to justify its oppressive illegal practises in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Parlevliet 
manages to avoid this issue by offering a holistic approach to applying human rights within 
conflict transformation. In a continuation of Lederach’s work, she advocates considering the 
different dimensional values underpinning human rights.  
The third dimension she outlines parallels directly with Lederach’s second mode by advocating 
the value of social relationships. Both scholars advocate the transformative qualities of face-
to-face relationships throughout the duration of conflicts, whether positive or negative, with 
Lederach linking them specifically to “issues of emotions, power…interdependence, 
communicative and interactive aspects,”137 and Parlevliet as a means “to effectuate certain 
kinds of relationship in the public sphere.”138The absence of interaction and peaceful 
coexistence, along with their forced separation only serves to make the possible development 
132 Article 3., Ibid 
133 Amnesty International., Israeli Forces in Occupied Palestinian Territories Must End Pattern of Unlawful 
Killings, https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2015/10/israeli-forces-must-end-pattern-of-unlawful-
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135 Parlevliet, M., Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective, http://www.berghof-
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of mutually respectful relationships between Jews and Arabs that much more difficult, as it 
“creates a divisive discourse that frames the life-course experience of individuals.”139 Building 
amicable social relations is set to become an even greater and more imperative task given the 
current rate of settler expansion into the West Bank and the attitude of its most prominent 
representative body, the Yeshiva Council. The council’s lead spokesperson compares the 
current state of relations between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians to a medical dilemma in 
which a soldier has a piece of shrapnel lodged in their backside: “Operate to remove it, and the 
procedure could paralyze him; live with it, and he could continue to walk although not without 
pain.”140  
139 Hammack, P., Identity, Conflict, and Coexistence: Life Stories of Israeli and Palestinian Adolescents, Journal 
of Adolescent Research, Vol. 21, No. 4, July 2006, pp. 324 
140 Sachs, N., Why Israel Waits: Anti-Solutionism as a Strategy, Brookings Institute, 
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Chapter 3: Relational Mode 
The parable of the injured soldier at the end of the previous chapter, which compares Jewish-
Israeli and Palestinian relations to the endurance of an uncomfortable injury, offers an 
illustrative analogy into the attitudes which currently underpin some influential portions of the 
Israeli public. As a conflict transformation practitioner, Lederach is very much interested in 
reversing this process to engender more peaceful and equal relationships. According to his 
relational mode, the purpose is to depict “the changes effected in and desired for the 
individual.”141 Currently, young Palestinians in East Jerusalem describe their encounters with 
Jewish Israelis as limited to either work or university, with some even stating they have little 
incentive to foster personal relations with them as friends.142 For the purposes of this thesis, 
the aim is not to offer any solutions to the breakdown in everyday Jewish Israeli-Palestinian 
relations, but to detail the causes of this collapse and the societal phenomena which exacerbates 
it. This is not a complete deviation from Lederach’s aim as a practitioner since under this mode, 
a key aspect is to “look beyond visible issues to the underlining changes produced by conflict 
in how people perceive, what they pursue, and how they structure their relationships.”143 In this 
sense, this chapter uncovers the underlining issues which aggravate the conflict and prevent 
any formation of positive interrelationships between the two communities from taking root.  
Once again, a singular normative issue is used as an exemplar to link related issues together. 
In this case, the more apparent appearance of the separate road systems for Israelis and 
Palestinians in the West Bank is used as a lynchpin to discuss the enforced separation of both 
peoples. A major facet of this division includes the disparity between the two economies and 
the influx of foreign workers, which have made Israel less dependent upon Palestinian labour 
than it was in previous years. The gross imbalance in water distribution throughout the region 
is connected to the economic issues to show how Israel’s environmental policy essentially 
intensifies the growing humanitarian disaster in Gaza and generates larger pockets of unrest in 
the West Bank. Contact theory is then drawn upon to illustrate how the current social climate 
is lacking the pre-conditions necessary for equal based dialogues to take place. The normative 
issues analysed under Lederach’s relational mode are finally paralleled once more with 
141 Lederach, J., Conflict Transformation, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation, October 
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Parlevliet’s human rights as relationships dimension. Explaining the discursive switch 
currently underway amongst Palestinians, her importance at this stage centres on her focus that 
human rights can stimulate positive relationships both vertically and horizontally.     
3.1 Separation- Physically and Existentially 
Israel often comes under fire for its treatment and collective punishment of Palestinians, 
leading many outspoken critics and human rights activists to compare its regime to that of 
apartheid South Africa.144 A key difference academics maintain when considering the 
similarities between the two regimes though is the South African distinction between “petty” 
and “grand” apartheid.145 Petty apartheid denotes the palpable and physically noticeable 
aspects of segregation: restaurants, lavatories, public spaces. Grand apartheid, on the other 
hand, consisted of the regime's structural elements, like legislative institutions which 
maintained the capacious societal division between blacks and whites. The attributes of grand 
apartheid are often seen as more comparable when considering the analogy between Israel and 
South Africa, since within the state of Israel itself there are no Jewish only public areas. Jews 
and Arabs both use the same emergency services and are submitted to the same hospitals. 
However, the situation in the West Bank is increasingly beginning to resemble a more petty 
form of apartheid, with one of the most discernible indications being the set of separate roads 
for Palestinians and Jewish settlers. 
The “forbidden road regime,” as it is often referred to in humanitarian circles, is “based on the 
principle of separation through discrimination.”146 Consisting of approximately 105 km, this 
network of roads is completely off limits for any Palestinian vehicles, with another 180 km 
only accessible to VIP vehicles and ambulances.147 In a continuation of its collective 
punishment policy, Israel’s justification for the segregated road system is premised on the 
categorization of Palestinians as a threat.148 According to this rationale, all Palestinians pose a 
distinct security risk and therefore placing restrictions upon their movement within the territory 
is justifiable.  In practise, the true purpose of the “forbidden roads” is to serve the settlements. 
Officials consistently deny this accusation despite clear evidence suggesting the contrary. For 
144 White, B., Israeli Apartheid: A Beginner’s Guide, Pluto Press, London, 2009 
145 Tilly, V., Interview, 3/7/15 
146 B’Tselem., Forbidden Roads: Israel’s Discriminatory Regime in the West Bank, 
https://www.btselem.org/download/200408_forbidden_roads_eng.pdf, August 2004, pp. 3 
147 Human Rights Watch., Separate and Unequal: Israel’s Discriminatory Treatment of Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt1210webwcover_0.pdf, December 
2010, pp. 14 
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instance, the roads often provide express lanes for illegal settlers to access Israel and often 
serve “no more than a few settlers.”149 In addition, the rate of road construction in the region 
has far exceeded the natural growth of the settlement enterprise. 
Israel’s network of “forbidden roads” is sub-divided into three categories which delineate to 
what extent they serve to restrict Palestinian movement. The first is the completely prohibited 
roads, which as the name suggests, forbid any Palestinian vehicle. IDF soldiers enforce this 
prohibition through a system of checkpoints and road blocks. In some instances, some of these 
road blocks have obstructed access to Palestinian villages without any official prohibition 
having been announced. Their impracticality also mean Palestinians are proscribed from even 
crossing forbidden roads, restricting access to roads which are not formally prohibited.150 The 
second category is the partially restricted. These include roads which Palestinians are expected 
to apply and obtain a permit in order to travel. Permits are issued by the Civil Administration 
through the District Civil Liaison Office and successful applications depend very much upon 
the social climate at the time. During periods of sporadic violence and upheaval, travel is 
especially restricted with only permit holding buses granted access.151 Given the legal status of 
these roads are not set in any formal written policy, access to them can be temperamental, 
discouraging people from relying on them. The final category includes the roads where travel 
is restricted. These include the roads which can be accessed as a result of restrictions on other 
roads. In general, permits are not required to access these roads, but the IDF do check vehicles 
and people passing through the checkpoint. Checkpoints can be long and tedious affairs 
depending on the traffic, causing many to refrain from using them.  
 Due to Israel’s “forbidden roads” regime, Palestinians have had little choice but to adapt their 
travel habits by avoiding main roads and finding longer, more inconvenient alternate routes.152 
Many have been forced to use public transport instead of their cars since private vehicles are 
prohibited from passing certain checkpoints. The more macabre consequence of the regime are 
the deaths of Palestinian civilians caused as a result of soldiers refusing to let them cross 
checkpoints for medical treatment. In 2004, B’Tselem recorded 39 such cases, of which 15 
were minors.153 While on their own these cases are extreme, the practise of delaying people at 
149 Ibid, pp. 6 
150 Ibid, pp. 11 
151 Ibid, pp. 15 
152 Ibid, pp. 19 
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checkpoints on their way to seek medical attention is not, as ambulance crews heading into the 
West Bank often endure similar treatment.  
The sense of uncertainty around the regime is sustained by an absence of clinical legal 
formalities, which dictates what does and does not consist of severe malpractice. IDF 
spokespersons justify the actions of their soldiers by arguing they are adhering to “verbal 
orders.”154 It is this lack of clarity in official policy which have led some outspoken critics to 
go as far as to say Israeli apartheid is much worse than its South African counterpart.155 
Commenting on the distinguishing features of Israeli apartheid, law professor and former 
chairman of the UN Commission on Human Rights John Dugard argues it is less honest than 
its South African predecessor. Dugard notes how the Israeli brand is not set in any rigid legal 
system and lacks any obvious physical examples of segregation. 156 Former Education Minister 
of Israel Shulamit Aloni alluded to such manifestations when publically admitting the existence 
of systemic discriminatory practises amongst the IDF in reference to the forbidden roads. 
Recalling an incident where she came across a soldier confiscating a Palestinian’s vehicle for 
driving on a Jewish only road, she inquired what exactly distinguished the road as “Jewish 
only.” In response the solider said,  
“It is his responsibility to know it, and besides, what do you want us to do, put up a sign here and let 
some anti-Semitic reporter or journalist take a photo so he that can show the world that Apartheid 
exists here?”157 
The underlining sentiment of racial superiority in the above statement gives credence to the 
comparison between the current Israeli regime and Apartheid South Africa. Indeed, even 
Nelson Mandela himself once stated in a public address, “We know all too well that our 
freedom is incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinians.”158 However, one of the key 
differences between Israeli and South African Apartheid is the nature of relations between the 
two adversary groups in each case.  In South Africa nearly 80% of the population were black. 
This meant the ruling white population was heavily dependent upon the black population as a 
154 B’Tselem., Checkpoints, Physical Obstructions and Forbidden Roads, 
http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/checkpoints_and_forbidden_roads, 20th May, 2015 
155 Dugard, J., Hisham B. Sharabi Memorial Lecture: Apartheid and Occupation under International Law with 
John Dugard, http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/5191/pid/3584, 26Th March, 2009 
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reliable labour resource. In Israel, not including the West Bank, these figures are reversed as 
20% of the population are either Arab-Israeli, Bedouin or Druze, whilst the remaining 80% 
consist of different Jewish denominations. As a state therefore, the ruling Jewish majority in 
Israel are self-sufficient and far less dependent upon the labour force of the Palestinian 
underclass. “South Africa was different because the white population needed its black 
counterpart. It was its workforce. Israel does not want the Palestinians.”159 
A major consequence of this difference is the lack of interactions taking place between Jewish 
Israelis and Palestinians on an everyday basis. The current Zionist agenda to Judaize as much 
land as possible with the least number of Arabs as possible, along with the physical signs of 
segregation such as the separation barrier and the “forbidden roads” regime, all contrive to 
create an ever more intense situation in which direct contact between the two groups is 
restricted to such an extent that, “ young Palestinians…have never exchanged a single sentence 
with an Israeli Jew.”160 There used to be a massive labour migration across from the occupied 
territories “where Palestinians flooded into Israel and worked in all kinds of sectors,” including 
agriculture and construction.161 Since the erection of the separation barrier after the second 
Intifada, however, Israel has intensified its efforts to realise its founding father’s dream to 
“expel Arabs and take their place.”162 As well as placing more stringent restrictions on 
Palestinians to enter Israel, over 430 factories and 9,000 small shops have been destroyed since 
September 2000, accelerating the rate of unemployment and strangling the local economy.163  
Israel’s measures to weaken its dependency on Palestinian labour is seen by some scholars as 
a means to avoid a similar fate to apartheid South Africa. As noted above, the downfall of 
apartheid South Africa was its heavy dependence upon the black population as a workforce. 
Presently, Israel is not reliant on the Palestinian labour force hence the outcome of the conflict 
is set on a totally different trajectory.164 During the Oslo process, the rate of permits issued to 
Palestinians for work in Israel remained between 46,000 and 51,000 a year.165 A dramatic drop 
159 Chomsky, N., On Palestine, Penguin Books, London, 2015, pp. 76 
160 Tilley, V., Interview, 3/7/2015 
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to only 4,000 in 2001 indicates the extent to which the Intifada impacted the Israeli political 
and national psyche in enforcing the principle of separation. Statistics prior to the Oslo Accords 
are far more indicative of a state of affairs when Israelis and Palestinians were more integrated. 
During the 70’s and 80’s Palestinian workers represented a third of Israel’s overall workforce 
and generated nearly a quarter of the gross national product for both the West Bank and Gaza 
strip.166 To offset the loss of Palestinian labour, Israel began importing workers from abroad in 
1993.167 In 1987, foreign, non-Palestinian workers in Israel constituted a mere 0.2% of the 
population, yet only three years after Oslo, the same demographic stood at 5.1%.168 This shift 
occurred as Israel became increasingly cautious of its dependency on Palestinian labour after 
the fall of Apartheid.169  
Consequently, this policy had the adverse effect of further limiting the amount of physical 
contact between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians. Even during South African Apartheid, blacks 
and whites grew up together and were frequently greeted by each other’s presence. White 
families would have black maids and gardeners. It may have been a severely unequal 
relationship, but blacks and whites could meet in their everyday surroundings and did converse. 
In Israel-Palestine on the other hand, apart from Jerusalem, where there is minimal contact in 
the tightly squeezed Old City, there are next to no opportunities or regular social settings where 
the two groups actually meet. Unfortunately, more often than not, the only Israelis Palestinian 
children “come into contact with are the soldiers whom they meet or settlers.”170 This stark 
divide in physical contact intensifies the mutual feelings of resentment on both sides.  
3.2 Economy – The Last Possible Recourse for Relations 
As noted previously, the relational mode extends beyond the visual signs of the conflict and 
encompasses the subtle underlining issues deepening the current impasse. One of the major 
consequences of the Israeli occupation is its devastating effects on the Palestinian economy. 
Under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, another product of the Oslo Accords, both parties 
recognised the importance in laying the “groundwork for strengthening the economic base of 
the Palestinian side and for exercising its right of economic decision making in accordance 
166 Ibid 
167 Bartram, V., Foreign Workers in Israel: History and Theory, International Migration Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, 
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with its own development plan and priorities.”171 Twenty-two years later, scholars certify 
economic output per Palestinian worker grew insignificantly.172 Output per worker did not even 
rise until 2010, and was restricted to the much donor-contribution-dependent public sector 
only. In fact, in the first ten years after Oslo, macroeconomic analysis demonstrates 
productivity actually declined. These studies reveal Israel’s occupation, since Oslo severely 
constrained the Palestinian economy’s ability to invest, preventing any accumulation of capital, 
and cementing a state of stagnation.173 The limitations placed on the Palestinian economy are 
rooted in restricted access to roads, land, infrastructure and machinery; all of which the 
occupation imposes externally. Even Israel’s most fervent ally, the United States, 
acknowledges restrictions placed on “external markets imposed by the Government of 
Israel…continue to have a deleterious effect on the private sector and limit economic 
growth.”174 
The separation wall provides a salient and corporeal example of how the barrier has decimated 
the Palestinian economy. Before its construction, Jerusalem served as the nerve centre for 
Palestinian commerce, connecting many businesses to Arab cities throughout the West Bank. 
Nearly thirteen years since the construction commenced, “Palestinian agricultural and 
economic activity has decreased in areas once considered stable.”175 Not only was Palestinian 
land forcibly seized illegally in order to construct the barrier, but its route fragments numerous 
Arab communities, and severs any possibility of agricultural or urban contiguity, whilst 
expertly incorporating illegal Israeli outposts within its arbitrary boundary. The physical effects 
of the barrier are illustrated most notably by the remaining plans to complete the wall in East 
Jerusalem. In the map below (fig. 1), the Green Line clearly demarcates the internationally 
recognised border between Israel and Palestine, while the blue shapes symbolise Jewish-Israeli 
neighbourhoods.  Neighbourhoods like Gilo and the French Hill beyond the Green Line are 
technically illegal, according to international law. The white line, flanked by a set of parallel 
red lines, represents the proposed route of the separation barrier. Contrary to Israeli 
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justifications that the separation barrier serves only as a temporary security measure, the map 
shows how it is actually a tool used to seize large swathes of land, as it loops around several 
scattered outposts. As for Palestinian contiguity, the map also shows how numerous Palestinian 
neighbourhoods are effectively cut off from one another as result of the barrier’s construction. 
Bethlehem, for instance, was considered by Palestinians as forming a vital part of Jerusalem.176 
Now, a small town which is literally a two-minute walk away from Jerusalem may effectively 
be a thousand miles away given the restrictions placed upon Palestinians in the West Bank to 
visit the Holy City.        
(Fig.1)
In terms of the Palestinian economy, the closure of East Jerusalem effectively cuts the West 
Bank into two distinct, north and south entities. Previously, the north and south of the West 
176 Anastas, C., Interview, 7/8/15 
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Bank were connected through roads leading through East Jerusalem. Since these ties have been 
severed, commuters and businesses have to use poor quality roads further east of the separation 
barrier, prolonging journeys and increasing the cost of mobility.177 Alongside the restricted 
road system, hundreds of movement barriers throughout the West Bank further impair the 
Palestinian economy. Though the evidence suggests the number of roadblocks throughout the 
West Bank has steadily decreased since 2008, 490 still remain in 2014.178  Lack of access to 
most of the available land in the West Bank discourages potential international investors from 
further stimulating the economy. This is despite evidence suggesting the Palestinian economy 
being relatively free of corruption, bureaucratically effective and having well developed 
financial markets in comparison to other countries in the region.179  
Juxtaposing the current political impasse, the aftermath of the 2014 Gaza war and the increase 
in social tensions, these commercial impediments result in further “labour decline with serious 
consequences for the Palestinian economy.”180 As the occupation persists and more settlements 
are built, the possibility for a viable, vibrant and productive Palestinian economy are 
increasingly diminished. In the third quarter of 2015, unemployment in Palestine rose 27.4% 
up from 24.8%.181 Unfortunately, these statistics represent the norm rather an anomaly. 
Palestinian unemployment averaged 26.1% between January 2013 and July 2015, and “22.91% 
from 1995 until 2015.”182 Combined, roads and settlements slice large parts of the West Bank 
into small, densely populated enclaves with little to no interconnecting infrastructure. Viable 
job opportunities within these isolated enclaves are so few and far between, and the economic 
situation so dire that both adults and children, under the legal age limit, have resorted to 
working in settlement farms to get by.   
Human Rights Watch last year reported hundreds of Palestinian children were working on 
Israeli settlement farms.183 The NGO reported interviewing children as young as 11 years old, 
working eight hour shifts, six, sometimes seven days a week for around $19 a day. From the 
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178 Ibid, pp. 51 
179 Ibid, pp. 58 
180 International Labour Organisation (ILO)., ILO: Unemployment Amongst Palestinians up by Over 25 Per Cent, 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_371179/lang--en/index.htm, 28th May 2015 
181 Trading Economics., Palestine Unemployment Rate, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/palestine/unemployment-rate, accessed 20/01/2016 
182 Ibid 
183 Human Rights Watch., Ripe for Abuse: Palestinian Child Labour in Israeli Agricultural Settlements in the West 
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38 children and 12 adults interviewed for the report, all the interviewees admitted “they took 
the work due to a lack of alternative jobs and…the dire economic conditions faced by their 
families.”184 21 of the children interviewed had dropped out school by grade 10 or earlier, since 
completing one’s education is seen as a waste of time when future job opportunities are scarce 
due to restricted access to water, land and freedom of movement.  
In the wake of the current round of violence at the time of writing, Israel has taken steps to 
deepen this economic situation by banning Palestinians them from working in Israeli 
settlements.185 Citing security reasons, Israel has decided to restrict the number of permits 
issued to Palestinians on a day-to-day basis. The long term results of these measures are 
presently unanalysable. Yet, it can be safely assumed in the short term, they are likely to not 
only further restrict the minimal amount of contact time between Palestinians and Jewish 
Israelis but also exacerbate the current economic plight of the average Palestinian family. In 
spite of the settlements presenting one of the fundamental obstacles to peace, in a cruel sense 
of irony, they also present a small number of Palestinians with a stable income in an otherwise 
unstable economy. Israel, in this sense, has succeeded in reversing the labour dependency 
relationship which ultimately undermined Apartheid South Africa. Rather than Israel being 
dependent upon Palestinian labour, the Israeli government has engineered an economic climate 
where Arab labourers are dependent on the Israeli government.186  
The situation in Gaza, however, is significantly worse. According to the World Bank, since the 
beginning of 2014, Gaza’s economic performance was 250% worse than any of its relevant 
comparators, including the West Bank.187  Unemployment reached 43% in the fourth quarter 
of 2014 after increasing, on average, eleven percentage points from the previous year.188 Water 
restrictions seriously impact agricultural yields, compromising the territory’s food security.  
Moreover, since 2009, the Gaza Strip has been unable to treat its sewage properly. Israel’s 
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action during Operation Cast Lead severely damaged the “wastewater-treatment facilities, 
resulting in higher quantities of untreated sewage.”189  
A mere 30,000 cubic metres, approximately 25%, of Gaza’s waste water is treated and recycled 
for agricultural use per day. The remaining 90,000 cubic metres creates health hazards and 
damages Gaza’s small fishing industry as it makes its way into the Mediterranean.190 At 
present, the water situation is so severe the UN predicts by 2020 the Gaza strip will no longer 
produce any clean water as a result of irreversible damage to the territory’s main aquifer.191 
These harrowing predictions also included the West Bank and Israel. Although nowhere near 
as morbid as the UN’s predictions concerning the future water situation in Gaza, the World 
Resource Institute (WRI) recently ranked Israel as one of the most under threat states to suffer 
from severe water scarcity by 2040.192 
Israel and Palestine are both dependent on the same water sources: the Mountain Aquifer and 
the upper Jordan River and its tributaries. The Mountain Aquifer supplies almost a quarter of 
Israel’s water, including its illegal settlements, as well as practically every Palestinian in the 
West Bank. The depletion of this key natural resource presents a rare opportunity for both sides 
to address this urgent matter as a joint task force. It should conceivably present a possible 
avenue to forge closer ties, since according to the UN, nurturing cooperative opportunities in 
water management by explaining the challenges and benefits of collaboration “can help build 
mutual respect, understanding, and trust among countries and promote peace, security and 
sustainable economic growth.” 193 Examples of water cooperation are found across the globe, 
in some of the most hostile and conflict ridden areas. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT), for 
instance, has survived a number of skirmishes and conflicts between India and Pakistan, 
indicating “even the most hostile nations have a capacity for water cooperation.”194 The level 
of hostility on both sides, in Israel and Palestine, however, prevent any such cooperation from 
taking place. Former head of the British Council for Israel, and now head of the environmental 
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branch of the NGO Israel-Palestine Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI), Robin Twite 
argues there are practically no joint environmental management projects taking place 
currently.195 When he initially undertook the role in 1995, Twite recalls how he thought the 
environment presented a great unifying factor if Palestinians and Israelis could recognise their 
common interests. A sense of optimism after Oslo ushered a wave of cooperation, with 
approximately 35-40 research projects taking place between Israeli and Palestinian universities 
right up until 2000. Today, Twite estimates there are as a little as 5 or 6 due to the PA forbidding 
Palestinian universities from cooperating with their Israeli counterparts.196  
The closure of this avenue is only set to deepen the sense of injustice amongst Palestinians as 
their main water resource is not only further depleted, but also egregiously distributed as Israel 
acts as the main administrator. Hydro-political analysis over the past six decades reveal the 
asymmetrical practise of ground water pumping and allocation.197 Within the Jordan River 
basin, Israel consumes 57% and Jordan 35% of the water whilst Palestinians are allotted only 
8%. More shockingly, in the occupied territories, scholars and hydrogeologists estimate 80-
95% of the water allocated to the area is consumed by Israeli settlers who make up 10% of the 
population of the land.198 Critics condemn these disconcerting figures and denounce Israel’s 
water policies as constituting little more than a “drip-feed” the PA has little to no say in.199   
3.3 Allport’s Contact Theory 
Allport’s contact theory offers a holistic approach to understanding the complete breakdown 
in everyday Palestinian-Israeli relations. More importantly, for the objective of this thesis, it 
also exposes the interconnections between the above normative issues and how they pertain to 
Lederach and Parlevliet’s relational mode/dimension. Contact theory proposes hostile 
environments may be eventually abated by engineering peaceful social conditions in which 
positive interactions between adversaries can take place. Allport outlines four primary 
conditions necessary to engender positive intergroup contact: equal status, common goals, 
intergroup cooperation, and support by social and institutional authorities.200 At present, none 
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of these conditions are exhibited between Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians. All four conditions 
are either completely absent or only remotely applicable.  
According to Allport, “Prejudice may be reduced by equal status contact…in the pursuit of 
common goals.”201 The construction of separate road systems for each ethnic group in the West 
Bank, however, is a physical manifestation of the unequal status between Arabs and Jews. The 
well-tarmacked, spacious Jewish-only highways, interconnecting settlements in the West Bank 
to Israel proper, in contrast to the gravel-riddled, makeshift dirt roads which constitute the 
Palestinian road system in the exact same territory are a clear indication of the culturally 
institutionalised disparity between the two groups. These infrastructural indications of 
inequality are then reflected at the societal level, as recent polls in Israel show 45% of Israeli 
Jews do not think the state’s Arab residents should be considered equal.202  This culturally 
institutionalised inequality prevents any common goals from emerging, since the asymmetrical 
dynamic, which defines the relationship is exploited by making the inferior Palestinians 
dependent upon Israel’s insecure job market. Whereas, in Apartheid South Africa, common 
goals could be located in strengthening the economy to which both blacks and whites were 
subject. In Israel-Palestine, not only does each side have its own economy, but the latter relies 
heavily on the former without the reverse dependency taking root. A lack of common goals 
due to the dependency imbalances within the relationship result in a toxic atmosphere in which 
cooperation is unable to take place. The trivial number of joint ventures tackling the region’s 
mounting environmental dilemmas is testament to this. Water scarcity and degradation are 
issues which directly concern both sides, and therefore, should theoretically present a rare 
opportunity for cooperation. Yet, the lack of common goals and sense of inequality between 
the two inhibits any possibility for cooperative action. In addition, this particular issue extends 
into other domains beyond the environment. The self-deprecating and unpatriotic stereotype of 
peace organisations inside Israel explains the poor turn out for initiatives aiming to normalize 
societal relations.203 Fully compounding the situation is the complete absence of institutional 
support fostering equal relationships between Jews and Arabs, with Israeli policies in the legal 
and political domains directly restricting Palestinian access to movement, work and water. 
Thus, when compared to Allport’s prescription to engender positive contact, the current state 
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of affairs in Israel-Palestine is an inevitable consequence of an atmosphere which purposefully 
breeds separation. The further the two groups are separated, both physically and existentially, 
the more embittered the feelings of animosity are set to fulminate. A recent poll conducted by 
the Institute for International Security Studies found 36% of Jewish Israelis considered the 1.3 
million Arab residents in Israel as “enemies.”204 The same poll found 44% of Israeli Jews felt 
Arabs were to be treated with suspicion. In comparison, 19% of Israeli Arabs said they were 
not interested in having contact with Jews.205 It is these disturbing trends, which Parlevliet 
attempts to reverse by considering human rights alongside conflict transformation. 
3.4 Parlevliet’s Human Rights as Relationships Dimension 
According to Lederach, the relational mode “depicts the changes affected in and desired for 
face-face relationships.”206 Similarly, under Parlevliet’s analysis, focusing on human and civil 
rights as relationships “refers to the relevance of rights for organising and governing the 
interaction between states and citizens.”207 In the context of Israel-Palestine, the Palestinian 
call for equality stems from a desire for Israelis to recognise the significance of their plight and 
the deep, ontological consequences it permeates. By understanding the conflict from a human 
rights perspective, this discursive switch effectuates a change in how the conflict is perceived 
by addressing underlining consequences of its perpetuation, which are not easily categorised 
into notions of nationalism. On a horizontal basis, the focus on human rights is a means to 
balance the legal, economic and political disparities between Arabs and Jews. At present, only 
26% of Israeli Jews feel the growing relations crisis in the country can be overturned by making 
Arabs more equal to the country’s Jewish citizens.208 It is these attitudes which are the target 
of the human rights debate, since “they are concerned with how people should be treated so 
that their dignity is respected.”209 A focus on human rights draws attention to the untenable 
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human situation in the region by shifting the discourse away from vague nationalist aspirations 
to very specific and concrete civic, social and democratic rights.210 This is not to say switching 
attention from a two-state solution to Palestinian rights will miraculously improve the welfare 
of the average Palestinian but expanding the discourse “might have various positive effects.”211 
Removing the dire social implications of the conflict from the political realm by appealing to 
a human rights discourse, thoroughly steeped in clear legalistic terms, addresses the 
responsibility of ordinary Israelis to recognize how “their actions and beliefs impact on the 
extent to which others are able to realize their rights.”212  
Critics and staunch supporters of Israel would be correct at this stage to point out this relational 
aspect to human rights equally applies to Palestinians, as well as Israel. Nevertheless, given the 
asymmetrical nature of the conflict, the focus on Israeli attitudes and policy here is to highlight 
how the clear disparities between the two groups and violation of numerous Palestinian rights 
creates a breeding ground for heightened animosity and victimization, which eventually 
manifests itself in direct violence. Pointing to the physical signs of Apartheid and calling for a 
proportional distribution of key resources, equal rights advocates aim to transform the conflict 
for the sake of alleviating the social and economic pressures endured on a daily basis. One 
unnamed Palestinian put it succinctly when asked if (s)he had normal relations with Israelis on 
a personal level.  
“The problem is not with religion; it is whether it is humane or not humane, if they violate our rights 
or not. If they don’t violate our rights, and recognize them, we might talk to them.”213 
On a vertical basis, adopting a human rights based approach allows activists to emphasize “the 
responsibility of the state towards its citizens and to provide citizens with a platform for 
demanding accountability.”214 Regarding the current status quo, this is problematic since 
technically Israeli-Arabs are not citizens but are residents. Furthermore, Israel is neither the 
sovereign of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip. However, there is little doubt that Israeli attitudes 
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influence Israeli governmental policy. And as such, these policies significantly compromise 
the basic human rights of Palestinians within Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.  
In Israel itself, Arab residents are subject to draconian policies based on racial clarification to 
which Jewish citizens are not. This flagrantly contradicts Article 1 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR): “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”215 
The West Bank has been sliced apart by a road system which restricts access to those of Arab 
origin to work, strangling the Palestinian economy and creating a whole generation of young 
Palestinians who have little prospect for work and interaction with their Jewish peers in Israel. 
The implications suffuse societal relationships horizontally, further saturating an already 
unhealthy environment where both Israeli and Palestinian youths are unable to recall 
“times when the relations were better, where there were fewer checkpoints, when there was trust, 
when there was a vibe for peace, when there were talks for peace and when there was hope.”216 
This is only set to deepen the sense of alienation between the very generations who may be 
expected to engender a climate of peace. Furthermore, since 2004, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) has deemed the separation barrier surrounding the territory as illegal. 217 Moreover, 
as the occupying force, Israel is prohibited from exploiting the natural resources of the occupied 
territories for its own economic benefit. Such actions violate several tenets of international 
humanitarian law, including “Articles 49 and 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and Articles 
43, 46, 53, and 55 of the Hague Regulations.”218  
Thus, on the vertical axis of the relational dimension, human rights agendas not only pressure 
the state to abide by its legal obligations in accordance with international law, but in terms of 
conflict transformation, it “implies the need to address structural concerns that impact the 
relationship.”219 The aim is to use the equality based rhetoric of a human rights discourse to 
overcome the dehumanising attitudes within both societies, and reverse the processes which 
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legitimate violent or restrictive behaviour by the state towards the Palestinians and which vice 
versa justify violence against Israel. 220  In maximising mutual understanding by minimizing 
poor communicative channels, it is hoped the relational fears and goals of the people involved 
are made explicit.221 Parlevliet’s contention that human rights provide an avenue to analyse the 
connection between horizontal and vertical relationships within the context of the conflict 
therefore cohesively interlinks with Lederach’s third mode, which aims to uncover the 
structural components prolonging conflict. 
220 Darwesih, M., Human Rights and the Imbalance of Power: The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 
http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Dialogue_Chapters/dialogue9_darweish_comm.p
df, 2010, pp. 87 
221 Lederach, J., Conflict Transformation, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation, October 
2003 
Charles Elkins  
Conflict Transformation and Human Rights in Israel-Palestine 
59 
Chapter 4: Structural Mode 
Lederach’s structural mode emphasises the necessity to address the underlining causes of the 
conflict. It stresses the need to analyse how the conflict sustains and changes social structures, 
organisations, and institutions.222 Lederach splits this mode into two levels: descriptive and 
prescriptive. The descriptive level refers to the social conditions that harbour the potential for 
violent outbursts and how these affect structural change within the existing social, political and 
economic institutions. At the prescriptive level, conflict transformation designates areas for 
potential cooperation. For the purposes of this chapter, the following analysis will operate 
between Lederach’s levels. The chapter, and the thesis in general, does not attempt to prescribe 
any solutions to the fundamental aspects of the conflict, but it does explain why Palestinians 
on the ground are beginning to express their civil and human rights, rather than their 
nationalistic ambitions. Functioning between the two levels, it intends to highlight the 
structural factors effecting this change in discourse, but it does not elucidate on whether or in 
what regards this tactic can achieve its objectives; it simply recognises the tactic is occurring 
and how it connects a host normative issues at the different levels.  
Up until this point, a number of structural aspects of the conflict have already been referred to 
and categorised under a separate mode. The legislation which defines Israeli-Arab as residents 
not citizens, for instance, is a textbook example of how the second class status of Palestinians 
within Israel’s legal borders are inscribed into the country’s legal apparatus. This legislation 
represents only a singular policy in a catalogue of over 50 Israeli laws that purposefully 
discriminate Israeli-Arabs.223 The most concise way to deal with the structural dimensions of 
the conflict is to first divide the Palestinians into four separate categories: Israel itself, the West 
Bank, the Gaza Strip and the diaspora. In the overall scheme of the chapter, the final category 
is not analysed in any depth, since the diaspora is dispersed throughout the Middle East and 
the wider international community, and it is, therefore, beyond the means of this thesis to 
comment on Palestinian communities in each of these countries. Nonetheless, as will be 
demonstrated, the structural conditions imposed on the Palestinian experience in each of the 
other three territories vary in degrees of severity. The chapter then concludes by referring to 
Parlevliet’s human rights as structures dimension to complete the parallel with Lederach’s 
structural mode.   
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4.1 Israeli-Arabs 
Arab discrimination is encoded into the subtext of Israel’s legal apparatus. To date, Israel has 
passed thirty laws expropriating and transferring land from Palestinian to Jewish state 
ownership.224 The Absentee Property Law has proven to be the most effective in this 
endeavour. In 1950, the Knesset passed laws which set the boundaries of exclusion and 
inclusion. Those who fled the violence in the 1948 war (today’s Palestinian refugees) were 
classified as ‘absentees’ and subsequently had their property rights annulled. This statute 
provided the main legal instrument to repossess Palestinian property for Jewish settlement. The 
legislation’s terminology makes it transparent that its intended purpose was to uproot Arabs 
since ‘absentee’ applied only to nationals of Palestine, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Trans-Jordan, 
Iraq, and Yemen.225 In a bizarre form of Orwellian doublespeak, according to the definition 
outlined in the legislation, a person may be defined as ‘absent’ even while present within the 
state of Israel, creating a sub-class of ‘present absentees.’ Thus, whilst the law 
“applied in absentia to those Palestinian refugees outside Jewish-occupied Palestine, it also provided 
for the legal dispossession of those Palestinian citizens of Israel who had never left the newly created 
state or those Palestinians who were reabsorbed into Israel as a result of the armistice agreements of 
1949.”226 
The principle function underlining this definition was to legitimize the transfer of Arab land 
and property into Jewish hands to solidify Israeli control.227 In the same year, the Knesset 
passed the Law of Return, which enabled any Jew to be granted citizenship under the Right of 
Aliya.228 These two laws combined institutionalised an overt form of hypocrisy, whereby 
Palestinian refugees within Israel and the wider diaspora are unable to return and reclaim their 
property, whilst a Jew who has never set foot in the country can theoretically gain citizenship 
merely on the premise of their ethnicity. Miko Peled, renowned activist and son of a former 
Israeli army general, encapsulates the implicit double standards within these two sets of 
legislation: 
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“If we speak of a right of return for one nation, you would expect, if we accept it as a principle…that 
we would expect it in general. Yet when people talk about the right of return of Palestinians to their 
homeland, suddenly a red line comes up and everybody says we can’t talk about the right of return 
for the Palestinians…The right of return of Palestinians is not acceptable.”229 
Prominent NGO leaders inside Israel echo these sentiments: 
“Logically, you could say, if a right of return for refugees is returned after 2000 years, when there is 
not a single Jew in the world that can point out a particular place in this country and say with 
confidence, this is the particular hill or valley or whatever, where my ancestors lived two thousand 
years ago. There is no one with that extensive genealogy. The most they can say is I am a Jew and this 
was the Jewish land 2000 years ago. While Palestinians of course, there are still people living who 
remember where they were before 1948. You have quite a lot of younger Palestinians who have never 
been inside Israel but can draw you an exact map of where their grandparents lived…The Palestinian 
right of return is a very justified demand.”230 
The Absentee and Right of Return legislations are representative of the Israeli state’s land battle 
with the Palestinians pre-1948. Collectively, this aimed to gather the world Jewry in Israel 
(kibbutz galoyut); acquire, takeover or conquer the land (kibbush haadama); consolidate a 
secure demographic majority; disperse Jews throughout the country for settlement (pezur 
ochlosiya); and Judaize the Galilee (yehud hagalil).231  Thus, setting the legal parameters of 
who was and who was not a citizen. After the war in 1948, the Israeli state institutionalised the 
core objectives of the Zionist project at the expense of the Palestinians. 
Israel’s unquenchable thirst for territory, and its persistent policy of land acquisition has 
severely curtailed the natural development of the Palestinian localities which remained within 
the state after 48. In the aftermath of the war, cease-fire agreements with the surrounding Arab 
states left Israel in control of over 5 million dunnums of Palestinian land. The vast majority of 
this land was expropriated using the Absentee Property Law, with 300,000 dunnums being 
confiscated from the new internally displaced refugees inside Israel.232 Those who remained 
within the newly formed state have faced an uphill task in formulating a national identity ever 
since. Another military defeat to Israel in 1967 and the subsequent implementation of martial 
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law further inhibited the Arab community’s natural growth as travel permits, curfews, and 
political arrests prevented the formation of an independent political consciousness.233 
The evident discrimination embedded within the language and application of statutes like the 
Absentee Property Law only reinforce the similarities between the Israel and Apartheid. 
However, the legal infrastructure underpinning Israel’s brand of Apartheid is far more 
sophisticated than its South African predecessor.234 If Israeli Apartheid had been as overt in its 
legal formulation as it was in South Africa, the country would have been denounced as a pariah 
state long before the recent deliberations.235 The key to comprehending this critical difference 
is understanding how Israel’s national institutions function in relation to land ownership. 
White argues there is a two-tier structure preserving the ambiguity of Israeli Apartheid 
legislation. The first tier is comprised of the Zionist institutions such as the Jewish National 
Fund (JNF), the World Zionist Organisation (WZO) and the Jewish Agency (JA), which exist 
for the benefit of Jews. The second tier is the means by which these institutions are integrated 
into Israel’s legal infrastructure to oversee the governing of land.236 Interaction between the 
two levels enables the organisations above to acquire governmental responsibilities normally 
reserved for the state. Outsourcing state duties to private organisations maintains the 
international legitimacy of the state, whilst it impudently continues to expropriate Palestinian 
land. 
The JNF presides over 13% of Israeli territory and proudly claims to be the “caretaker of the 
land of Israel.” 237 More than a significant landowner, the institution performs tasks normally 
considered governmental duties, such as aiding the state manage over 93% of its land. 238 The 
Israeli Land Authority (ILA) oversees the management of this land with the JNF, playing a 
significant role in how it operates. JNF representatives occupy 6 of the 13 seats comprising the 
ILA's council. In recent years, its influence on ILA policy was most noticeable in the case of 
al-Arakib. 
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The Bedouin village of al-Arakib is located in the south of Israel, just a few miles north of 
Beersheba, the biggest city in the Negev desert. Reports vary in how many times the village 
has been destroyed by the state. In 2014, Haartez claimed it had been destroyed 50 times over 
a decade and half,239 whilst in late 2015, the Electronic Intifada went even further, claiming the 
Israeli state had demolished the village no fewer than 90 times over the course of five years.240 
Regardless of how many times it has actually been demolished, the village is a constant target 
for the JNF as the organisation, in coordination with the ILA, has been planting trees in the 
area for a number of years as part of a reforestation initiative. Residents of the village argue 
the programme precipitates the destruction of their homes and livelihood.241 The ILA on the 
other hand, under the auspices of the JNF, accuse residents of trespassing on government land. 
Villagers protesting ownership are repeatedly dismissed. Official receipts authenticating the 
transactions transferring land from Ottoman rule to Arab ownership in 1906 are deemed 
invalid.242 Citing its own legal apparatus, Israel considers this documentation illicit, since the 
land was appropriated under the Absentee Property Law in 1954. The semi-governmental 
nature of the JNF thus empowers it to legally prevent Palestinians from habituating the site.  
The same structural apparatus used to dispossess Arabs and resettle Jews is easily observed in 
East Jerusalem, where expropriation has been the official policy since full annexation of the 
city after the Six Day war. Tens of thousands of dunams have been confiscated under a process 
called “expropriation by the Ministry of Finance.”243 Figures from 2009 estimated 50,000 
housing units had been constructed on these lands, with municipal housing institutions aiding 
the establishment of new neighbourhoods beyond the Green Line for the settlement of 190,000 
Jewish residents.  The political establishment has always complimented this process, with it 
ironically intensifying since Oslo, which was supposed to set the parameters for East Jerusalem 
forming the capital of a viable and independent Palestinian state. NGO’s inside Israel argue 
this has thwarted any possibility of dividing the city as part of a future peace agreement since 
the “main settlement momentum in East Jerusalem has been aided, directly and indirectly, by 
239 Seidler, S., Israel Begins Razing Bedouin Village of Al-Arakib – for the 50th Time, 
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senior government officials in the various Israeli administrations.”244 Similar to the arguments 
made against Palestinian residents in the Negev, Israel classifies thousands of structures 
throughout East Jerusalem as illegal if they were built without the relevant permits. Lack of 
town planning schemes and the countless bureaucratic hoops placed upon Palestinians in order 
to attain building permits, in conjunction with the natural population growth of the Arab 
community in this area, mean many are unable to abide by this law. The personal implications 
of these discriminatory structures has already been highlighted in chapter two, exemplifying 
the interconnectivity between the normative issues at the various levels outlined in the 
introduction.  
Palestinian properties in East Jerusalem were also appropriated using non-profit organisations 
to serve government objectives. Elad, a non-profit organisation established in 1986, and 
dedicated to raising awareness of the Jewish connection to the City of David, operates as a 
government agency in East Jerusalem. The organisation paid nominal fees to a host of 
ministerial companies for properties expropriated from Palestinian residents under the 
Absentee Property Law within the area.245 According to the Absentee Property Law, anyone 
proven to be absent from their property in what was to become the state of Israel, between the 
effective date in May or June 1948 could be liable for repossession. Anyone who fled their 
property during this brief time period and returned could still have their property classified as 
absent, and be subject to eviction.  
Once again, the JNF played a significant role in this process, as it reached an unwritten 
agreement with David Be’eri, former deputy commander of the Duvdevan Special Forces Unit, 
and Hermanuta, a subsidiary branch of the JNF, to transfer Palestinian property in Silwan to 
Jewish families. Be’eri identified property occupied by Palestinian tenants, which was owned 
by Jewish families in the early part of the 20th century. The JNF would then act to evict these 
Arab tenants, and Elad would be able to rent or lease the exact same properties for an unlimited 
period of time. Furthermore, the Custodian of Absentee Property can declare properties as 
absent on the false accounts of settler organisations, which would then be transferred to the 
ILA and then onto a Housing ministry to be exchanged with Elad for well under the market 
value.246 Israel’s first prime minister encapsulated the dual purpose of these Zionist institutions 
244 Ibid 
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when he praised their ability “to achieve what is beyond the power and competence of the 
state.”247 Essentially, to acquire and redistribute land solely for the purpose Jewish settlement. 
Israel’s exclusionary land regime is a contemporary continuation of the Zionist political 
objective to Judaize Palestine. Its current policy of discrimination towards Arab citizens is 
draconian, yet simultaneously reminiscent of Jabontinsky’s call to “proceed and develop only 
under the protection of a power that is independent of the native population – behind an iron 
wall.”248 This iron wall is buttressed by three pillars: physical dispossession, the amalgamation 
of non-profit organisations and governmental institutions in administering ownership of public 
land, and an extremely complex bureaucratic system to oversee land use and development 
regulations.249 However, despite the blatant discrimination embedded within the Israeli legal 
and institutional apparatus, Israeli-Arabs are well aware they remain better off than their 
counterparts in the occupied territories, as evidenced by the fact more than half would prefer 
to retain their Israeli residency than become citizens of a prospective Palestinian state.250 This 
is in complete contrast to the West Bank, where two sets of people answer to two sets of laws 
and the full extent of the Israeli apartheid machine is palpable.   
4. 2 The West Bank- Israeli Apartheid?
Asked whether accusations Israel was an apartheid state were justified, former official of the 
British Council to Israel, Robin Twite, considered the allegations over exaggerated. Referring 
to the corporeal aspects of petty apartheid, Twite argued within Israel’s 67 borders, people of 
any ethnicity are able to use the country’s exceptional transport networks. However, he also 
conceded the West Bank presently resembled “a no man’s land; a kind of Wild West.”251 This 
charge has recently been echoed by U.S. ambassador to Israel, Daniel Shapiro. Speaking at the 
9th INSS international convention in Tel Aviv, Shapiro stated:  
247 Ben-Gurion, D., as quoted in White, B., Israeli Apartheid: A Beginner’s Guide, Pluto Press, London, 2009, pp. 
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“Too many attacks on Palestinians lack a vigorous investigation or response by Israeli authorities; too 
much vigilantism goes unchecked; and at times there seem to be two standards of adherence to the 
rule of law: one for Israelis and another for Palestinians.”252 
Although the diplomat refrained from brandishing the current state of affairs in the West Bank 
an outright Apartheid, the very hint of a dual legal system, from an official envoy of Israel’s 
staunchest ally, is testament to how serious the charge is. Shapiro’s reference to attacks on 
Palestinians in the quotation above is a reference to the apparent mishandling, and purposeful 
incompetence, on part of the Israeli authorities to fully investigate those responsible for 
firebombing the Dawabsheh family home in the Palestinian village of Duma; an incident which 
resulted in the death of an eighteen month old infant. Despite the attack being condemned, 
uncharacteristically as a form of Jewish terrorism by Prime Minister Netanyahu, the incident 
does not represent a break from the norm. Rather, it forms part of a larger, uglier picture, 
whereby routine, radical settler violence against Palestinians is habituated.253 
“It’s a further deterioration of a terror which is not the burning of children alive but of uprooting olive 
trees and throwing firebombs, that has happened before without having such disastrous results.”254 
The bigger picture is “the creation and development of an official and institutionalized legal 
regime of two separate legal systems on an ethnic-national basis.”255Its roots are traceable to 
when Israel occupied the territory in the wake of the 1967 war. Military rule was established 
when the commander at the time declared himself sovereign, granting himself governance and 
legislative powers. Theoretically, all subjects within the territory are answerable to the laws 
legislated under the military’s authority, including Israelis living in and visiting the area. Israeli 
lawmakers, however, created a de facto dual system by extending multiple elements of Israeli 
law, including criminal, tax and health insurance to Jewish nationals residing in the West Bank 
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on an extra-terrestrial basis. In tandem with a host of other Israeli legislative articles, these laws 
were applied to Jewish communities only, creating a legal schism based along ethnic lines.  
According to Article 2 of the UN’s International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, ratified by United Nations General Assembly, 
resolution 3068 (XXVIII) of 30 November 1973, the crime of apartheid constitutes “similar 
policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in southern 
Africa.”256 In relation to the West Bank specifically, the accusation Israel is committing 
apartheid is beyond doubt considering the segregating of the legal system governing the 
territory creates two distinct communities: The Palestinian villages and cities “subject to Israeli 
military orders, and Jewish local and regional councils, which are subject to Israeli law and 
enjoy the benefits and budgets granted by Israeli legislation.”257 
Contrary to their perceived purpose, the Oslo Accords have provided an internationally 
supported framework to exacerbate this process of segregation through physical displacement. 
The lasting consequences of this is not only the legitimate division of Jews and Arabs but the 
fragmenting of the Palestinian people into isolated enclaves. Article XI of the Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip divided the territory of the West Bank into three 
legislative areas: A, B, and C. The Palestinian council was assigned full legislative and 
governance control of area A. Both Israel and the Council were to share control of area B. 
Finally, Israel was assigned full administrative control of area C, which was supposed to be 
gradually “transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in accordance with this Agreement.”258 Area 
A is approximately 18% of the West Bank, area B 22% and area C 60%. Thus, Israel still 
maintains control over the vast majority of the West Bank, with the PA in full administrative 
control of only 18%, which approximately equates to a mere 3.9% of historic Palestine.259  
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Area C incorporates the vast majority of Israel’s illegal settlements, which are scattered 
throughout the West Bank. Alongside the forbidden roads regime, Israel’s settlement enterprise 
dissects the Palestinian territory into a patchwork collection of fractured semi-autonomous 
islands, undermining the possibility of any territorial contiguity. Palestinian controlled areas 
such as Bethlehem, Nablus, Jericho, Jenin and Hebron are cut off from one another, seriously 
restricting people’s ability to travel between these areas. Moreover, for the 150,000 Palestinians 
residing throughout area C, Israel’s exclusive control over planning and construction means 
the PA is powerless in providing adequate protection, rendering them subject to the 
purposefully discriminating Israeli legal code. 
The Palestinians within area C are outnumbered by more than two to one as 341,000 Israeli 
settlers also reside in the area in violation of international law. 70% of area C is off limits due 
to the Israeli settlement boundaries delineated by the regional councils. Of the remaining 30%, 
only 1% has been set aside for Palestinian development.260 Within the remaining 29% 
accessible to Palestinians, construction work is heavily restricted. In 2013, 565 Palestinian 
structures, of which 208 were residential, were demolished on the grounds they lacked Israeli 
permits. 805 people in total were displaced as result of these demolitions, almost half of them 
children. In addition, 38 communities reside in a number of officially designated firing zones 
used for military exercises, putting over 6,000 Palestinians in serious danger.261  Thus, 
notwithstanding the Oslo Accords stating area C was to be eventually transferred to Palestinian 
control, “Israel’s policy…is anchored in a perception of the area as meant…to serve Israel’s 
own needs.”262  
The most recent and internationally covered example of Israel’s draconian planning and 
building policies in area C is the village of Susiya. Located in the South Hebron Hills, the 
ramshackle village, home to 55 nuclear families and consisting of little more than a few tents 
and animal pens, was subject to major international media attention in the summer of 2015, as 
Israeli authorities deemed it illegal and moved to demolish it. Susiya presents a textbook 
example of how Israel’s legal system and planning policy are combined to eradicate Palestinian 
villages and intimidate people to move away from significant religious sites and illegal 
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settlements. A 1982 internal opinion by the head of Civil Division in the State Attorney’s 
Office officially recognised Arab ownership of the 3,000 dunams of land the village was built 
upon. Just 4 years later, IDF soldiers appropriated the land and expelled its Arab residents for 
the first time, declaring the village an archaeological site due its construction on top of an 
ancient synagogue. Expelled from the village, the inhabitants moved to the nearby caves and 
set up tents elsewhere close to the original site until the military forced them to move again, in 
1991, for no discernible reason. Having their land confiscated twice, the villagers relocated 
further away from the original site of the village where the Israeli authorities attempted to expel 
them a third time, in 2001, as a form of collective punishment for the murder of a Jewish settler 
by Palestinians who were not residents of the village. Military personnel again demolished their 
makeshift homes, forcing them to leave until an Israeli Supreme Court ruling ordered the 
residents be allowed to return.  
To date, the Civil Administration (CA) which oversees planning and construction in Area C, 
blatantly ignores its duties to the local Arab population as it has allocated hundreds of 
thousands of dunams to Israeli settlements, and a paltry 18,000 to Palestinian developments. 
The CA’s stranglehold on construction rights and monopoly on planning permits mean many 
Palestinians resort to building illegally. When they do, the CA deems the structures illegal in 
accordance with their planning laws and issues a demolition permit.263 Currently, all Susiya 
residents are at imminent risk of being forcibly displaced for a third time, since every structure 
in the village has been served a demolition order, all of which have no strict implementation 
date.264  
At the time of writing, there is no evidence or reports of the IDF moving to completely expel 
the villagers. However, two tents in Susiya have been demolished three times since January 
20th, 2016.265 In addition, UN human rights commissioners on the ground, such as Hamed 
Qawasmeh, argue since the international success of Susiya, Israel and the IDF have reacted by 
stepping up the frequency and severity of house demolitions in other parts of area C. 
“Susiya has become a symbol of defiance. To the point that the Israeli army was prevented from 
carrying out this demolition because of the American position or whatever. That actually has caused 
263 B’Tselem., A Chronicle of Dispossession: Facts About Susiya, 
http://www.btselem.org/south_hebron_hills/201507_facts_on_susiya, 29th July, 2015 
264 UN., Susiya: A Community at Imminent Risk of Forced Displacement, 
https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_susiya_factsheet_may_2015_english.pdf, June, 2015 
265 Qawasmeh, H., Internet Interview, 8/2/16 
Charles Elkins  
Conflict Transformation and Human Rights in Israel-Palestine 
70 
some amount of frustration among some ranks of the IDF to the point where they say, ‘Ok. We cannot 
demolish Susiya, so let’s go somewhere else.’… If you look at a week before August until now, you will 
see a sharp increase in demolitions, including in Hebron. In one day they demolished 18 structures. 
They are taking out their frustrations in some sort of defiance.”266 
More worryingly, from a humanitarian perspective, is the perception that Israel’s demolition 
policy in area C is beginning to represent a covert form of ethnic cleaning. Careful not to 
implicate the United Nations Human Rights Council in his personal assessment of the situation 
on the ground, Qawasmeh fears Israel’s planning and construction laws in area C are being 
exploited to force its Palestinian citizens into areas A and B where the PA have full and joint 
control respectively. 
“I would say Israeli policy in Area C is aimed to pressure as much as possible, through administrative 
means, all the Palestinians in that area to move to some other areas, preferably Areas A and B. That 
would then leave much more space for the Israelis for future annexation of Area C…Area C is about 
60% of the West Bank, where most of the natural resources are located like water and aquifers. All of 
the settlements are located in Area C. So through the issue of masterplans and the issue of building 
permits, measures which limit any basic infrastructure to discourage Palestinians to stay there. A lot 
of these measures are designed so Palestinians will find life so horrible in that area that they will pack 
up and leave. This makes it easier for the Israelis to declare that they can take the land over in order 
for settlement expansion.”267 
Although Qawasmeh’s theory is based purely on his own observations and conjectures, from 
the situation on the ground over the last twelve years, statistical data unequivocally shows the 
rate of demolition orders has sky rocketed since the Oslo agreements. In 1992, the year before 
the famous Rabin-Arafat handshake on the White House lawn, a total of 59 demolish orders 
were issued in the areas which today constitute area C. Only two years later, the year the interim 
agreement was actually signed, this number rose 300% to 211 orders, and increased once again 
in 1996 to 391. Over the 5 years when area C was supposedly being prepped for transfer into 
PA control, Israel issued 2197 demolition orders, at an average of 366 per year.268 At precisely 
the time Israel was supposed to be preparing to transfer control over to the PA, it was, in fact, 
engaged in its most vigorous assault on Palestinian property, using the guise of the Oslo 
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Accords to justify its agenda. Since the expiration date on the agreements passed in 2000, this 
pattern has for the most part increased, reaching a high of 1,263 in 2013.269 
Exasperating the situation is the fact some of the outstanding demolition orders affect 
Palestinians residing in areas A and B. Given the plethora of mini Palestinian statelets dispersed 
across the West Bank are completely surrounded by Israeli controlled area C, the borders for 
the separate administrative areas operate on fine margins, which fail to correlate with the 
natural expansion of both populations in the territory. Approximately 60% of outstanding 
demolition orders issued against structures in area C effect families in area A and B. This is a 
direct consequence of the Oslo process, since only areas already built-up and heavily populated 
were designated as areas A and B, whilst the open spaces available for future developments, 
such as the entire Jordan Valley were incorporated into area C.270 What the agreements 
effectively did in this sense was to set the limits for possible Palestinian development, as the 
already densely populated areas were given little possibility for natural economic and 
population expansion. Considered alongside Qawasmeh’s suspicions, it seems Palestinians 
throughout the West Bank are being herded out of area C into strictly demarcated zones 
reminiscent of Apartheid South Africa’s Bantustan strategy. 
The Bantustans were a grand Apartheid initiative that set aside a collection of autonomous 
territories for black inhabitants across South Africa. In total, ten were established as part of the 
government’s policy to separate blacks, both politically and territorially, from whites. Looking 
at the division of the West Bank into sporadic enclaves labelled A, B, and C, it is easy to 
understand how the analogy arose, for when paralleled to the map of the South African 
Bantustans the similarities are striking (Fig 2 & 3).271  
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(Fig. 2, South African Bantustan Map, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
http://global.britannica.com/topic/Bantustan) 
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(Figure 3, Area C West Bank Map, OCHA, 
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Charles Elkins  
Conflict Transformation and Human Rights in Israel-Palestine 
74 
Comparing the two maps, it is easily noticeable how the Bantustans and the Palestinian areas 
of autonomy are both completely enmeshed within the larger landscape of their respective 
adversaries. Just as the Bantustans were completely enmeshed and surrounded by white 
controlled land, so Areas A and B are totally swamped by Israeli-controlled Area C. Both sets 
of enclaves are also completely cut off from one another, preventing any possibility of 
territorial continuity, which is a prerequisite to forming a mainland state. More importantly, it 
is the legal structure of the Oslo accords which most resembles the Bantustan system. For 
although the agreements formally devolved Israeli control, granting political autonomy to those 
in these enclaves, the true reins of power remain beyond the reach of the Palestinian leadership. 
Fasakh specifies three legal consequences the Oslo Accords share with the South African 
Bantustans.272 First, it failed to guarantee Israel’s complete withdrawal from the occupied 
territories. The native population are still subject to the Knesset’s overriding authority, like the 
Bantustans which did not remove the omniscient presence of South Africa’s National Party 
(NP). The agreements established the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and a Presidency to 
be the democratic representatives of the Palestinian people, but their jurisdiction was not 
limited to the national electorate. “Rather it remained dependent on the Israeli military 
authority…together with the Israeli Civil Administration, which were not dismantled.”273 
Transferring governmental oversight to the fields of education, culture, health, social welfare, 
taxation and tourism, the Israeli military effectively only outsourced the trimmings of political 
power to the PNC.274 Importantly, they were not granted full territorial jurisdiction, but only 
delegated civilian jurisdiction over 93% of the Palestinian population. The remaining 7% 
remained subject to Israeli military law since they resided in Israeli-controlled Area C. Nor 
were they bequeathed any sovereign identity, with core issues concerning borders, Israeli 
settlements, and Jerusalem set aside for a later date.275 
Second, Oslo paid no credence whatsoever to the superiority of international law. Neither UN 
General Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 181, which provides the main source of international 
legitimacy for the formation of an Arab state in historic Palestine, nor any UN Security Council 
resolutions (UNSCR) asserting the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination were 
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referenced in any of the agreements. Only UNSCRs 242, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli 
armed forces from territories occupied in 1967, and 338 affirming the former, are fleetingly 
referred to as forming the basis of a possible final settlement. 276 The refugee dilemma is given 
minimal attention, recognised only as requiring a humanitarian situation, despite the 
international community reaffirming the Palestinian right of return in accordance with UNGAR 
194 (III) over 135 times.277 
 Third, the agreements dictated close cooperation between Israeli and Palestinian authorities in 
transferring security responsibilities, mirroring the transferal of authority to the Bantustans 
from white South Africans. Joint Israeli-Palestinian committees were formed to coordinate 
over security concerns. Finkelstein labels these joint committees as mere PA protection of 
Israeli interests.278 On paper they appear a logical and sensible idea, but in practise, they have 
been a major source of Palestinian embarrassment and frustration. Israel continues to hold the 
upper hand in security matters, much like the security dynamic between the Bantustans and the 
apartheid regime. For instance, Prof. Ahmed Hamad of Birzeit University recanted the 
following story to illustrate how this security cooperation completely undermines any sense of 
Palestinian sovereignty: 
“This time last year during the Gaza war, in Ramallah, I remember I went to withdraw money early in 
the morning from a bank with only one ATM machine; a very crowded place. I decided to go early, 
around 6am before the city was busy. When I arrived in the centre of Ramallah I found something like 
an earthquake. A huge number of rocks spreading for kilometres. I didn’t know what happened. I 
didn’t imagine this was a confrontation with the Israelis. When I asked, what happened was the Israeli 
soldiers came in the night to arrest some young Palestinian men. And the place is just ten metres, 
twenty – maximum - from the headquarters of the Palestinian policemen. So the Israelis told the 
Palestinian policemen they are coming so hide, disappear in your headquarters. They came and tried 
to arrest the men while the policemen are just watching from the windows. There was a large number 
of Palestinian young men who come out to confront the Israelis. They started stoning the soldiers. It 
ended by one of the Israeli soldiers killing the men. When the Israeli soldiers left after a few hours of 
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confrontations, the young men went to the Palestinian police station and started throwing stones at 
it. People think all the time that this is a very humiliating situation. When an Israeli soldier can come 
at any time, and do anything while the Palestinian security men, who are supposed to protect them 
are hiding.”279 
Hamad points out the most humiliating, yet illuminating aspect of this story is the fact it 
occurred in Ramallah; the supposed political hub of the PA, and a city well within the confines 
of Area A, which according to the Oslo agreements are supposed to be under complete 
Palestinian control.280  
The Bantustanization of the West Bank is a process by which the Palestinian territories are 
transformed into manageable population reserves. Oslo enabled Israel to construct a legal 
framework to limit the Palestinian access to movement and prospects for natural development, 
in addition to outsourcing the main duties of governance by creating a semi-autonomous 
representative body in the PA. As a result, the Palestinian leadership over the past twenty-three 
years has had to carry the burden of running a country without the resources and capabilities 
of a modern, self-governing state.281 In connection to the relational aspects of the conflict 
discussed in the previous chapter therefore, “these ‘reserves’ have remained dependent on the 
Israeli economy, but at the same time unable to gain access to it, nor capable of evolving into 
a sovereign independent entity.”282  The apparatus by which this state of affairs is sustained is 
indicative of a “widespread and oppressive regime that is both institutionalised and 
systematic.”283  
4.3 Gaza the Open Air Prison 
Despite the pronounced emergence of a formal Apartheid regime more severe than its South 
African predecessor, Palestinians in the West Bank are philosophical about their predicament. 
As one unnamed Palestinian from the territory described, “Gaza is even worse than what we’ve 
experienced.”284 The current humanitarian disaster unfolding in the Gaza Strip stems from 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s decision to unilaterally disengage from the territory in 
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2005. The IDF’s forced withdrawal of Israeli settlers, without the coordination of the PA, left 
a power vacuum Hamas swiftly filled, only a year later, in the legislative election of 2006. 
Israeli and American refusals to recognise the election of a "terrorist organisation" led the 
Knesset to lock the territory down and decide when, who and what entered or exited. Israel 
continues to hold decisive control over the Gaza Strip in five crucial ways: people, goods, 
airspace and territorial waters, population registry, and the tax system.285 
 4.3.1 People 
Israel still maintains complete control of the border crossings despite forcefully evacuating 
Jewish settlers from the Gaza Strip and withdrawing its military presence over a decade ago. 
Gaza has 7 border crossing points in total; 6 of which are shared with Israel. Erez crossing, on 
the northern border of the territory is the primary crossing used for the movement of people to 
the West Bank or Israel. Since disengaging from the territory, Israeli forces have imposed a 
number of restrictions on movement at the crossing, limiting the number of people eligible to 
pass to only a few select categories: patients with serious diseases, Arabs with Israeli ID’s, 
international journalists, humanitarian workers, and elderly people to visit religious sites.286 
This leaves the vast majority of Gaza’s 1.8 million residents at the mercy of the Israeli 
authorities if they wish to travel to hospitals, universities, holy sites, or even visit relatives in 
either Israel or the West Bank. One of the most gruesome consequences of this in the last Gaza 
offensive in 2014 was the fate of Anas Qdeih, aged 7, who subsequently died due to delays in 
his medical evacuation after being found clinging to his own intestines.287  
Even though under the Oslo accords Israel recognises the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
comprise a single territorial unit, travelling between the two areas is almost impossible. Since 
transiting through Israel is an unavoidable condition of passing between Gaza and the West 
Bank, Palestinians must obtain a permit prior to travelling in order to pass through the country. 
Only a miniscule number of permits are issued, seriously limiting the flow of human mobility 
between the Palestinian territories. Over the course of December 2015, only 1,097 patients, and 
an additional 1,009 attendees were permitted to pass through Erez crossing to receive urgent 
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medical attention at hospitals in Israel or the West Bank. In the same period, Israeli forces 
obstructed other patients under a number of different pretexts, whilst also arbitrarily closing 
the crossing for 8 days without explanation.288 Before the outbreak of the second Intifada, an 
average of 26,000 people per day were allowed freedom of movement between Gaza and Israel. 
In 2013, the UN reported an average of 200 a day were permitted to leave.289  The only other 
crossing available to Gazans is Rafah along the Egyptian border, which also has stringent 
restrictions since Morsi’s ousting three years ago. In 2012, 420,000 Palestinians used the Rafah 
terminal to cross in and out of Egypt. Only 6,800 people in comparison crossed during the first 
5 months of 2015.290 The Gaza Strip, at the current juncture, represents a burden both for Israel 
and Egypt, with the former hoping the latter will annex it completely.291 Egypt has refrained 
from succumbing to Israel’s suggestions and “succeeded in pushing responsibility for Gaza 
entirely onto Israel, through which Gazan goods and nearly all persons now travel.”292 
4.3.2 Goods 
Karni, Sufa, and Kerem Shalom are the designated crossing points for the transfer of goods. 
Operating nowhere near its full capacity, only Kerem Shalom is currently open. The crossing 
was sporadically closed for a total of 52 days in the first four months of 2013 alone.293 In the 
wake of Operation Protective Edge, the territory is in severe need of building materials to begin 
reconstruction of important infrastructure. Yet, at present, “less than 1% of construction 
materials required to build houses destroyed and damaged during hostilities, and to address 
natural population growth, have so far entered Gaza.”294  
The asymmetrical dynamic which defines the conflict means Israel is able to dictate what and 
when Gazans are allowed access to building materials. In 2010, Israel’s Security Cabinet took 
the decision to categorise a number of goods and items as “dual use.” These are products which 
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are “liable to be used, side by side with their civilian purposes, for the development, production, 
installation or enhancement of military…and terrorist capacities.”295 Reconstruction of Gaza is 
perpetually impeded since Israel classifies basic building materials such as gravel, steel bars 
and cement as “dual use” items, severely restricting their importation.296   
The UN has also been accused of being complicit in this logjam, as it refuses to reveal any 
details of the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM)297. According to the UN, the GRM is a 
temporary agreement it brokered with the governments of Palestine and Israel “to enable 
construction and reconstruction work at the large scale now required in the Gaza Strip.”298 The 
treaty was drawn up after the ceasefire which saw the end of Israel’s 50 day assault in the 
summer of 2014, and was expected to enable the PA to kick start the reconstruction effort, 
develop Gaza’s private sector, assure donors their investments will contribute to an immediate 
rebuilding effort and address Israel’s security concerns over “dual use” items.299 In reality, the 
GRM is more a surveillance mechanism which gives Israel’s occupying forces even more 
intrusive control over the reconstruction of Gaza as the deliverance of building materials to 
desperate families is subject to Israeli pre-approval. Under the guise of reconstruction, 
homeless Gazans are monitored by the UN and their private information is passed onto Israel, 
which has “a veto over which families get aid to rebuild their homes.”300 Ordinary Gazans are 
used to accrue political leverage since the PA, who hold no administrative power in Gaza, also 
collect their own data on their own brethren in the territory in aiming to appease Israel and 
present itself as a legitimate partner for peace.301 The tragic repercussion of the UN and PA’s 
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collusion with Israel in monitoring the supply of building materials is that only a single home 
had been reconstructed a full 18 months after the attacks on Gaza.302 
  4.3.3 Airspace and Territorial Waters 
The third means by which Israel is able to preserve complete oversight of the Gaza Strip is by 
controlling the airspace and territorial waters. Control over the airspace enables Israel to 
conduct intelligence gathering missions on a daily basis, allowing it to monitor “activity on the 
ground and attack targets whenever it wants.”303 The most horrifying illustration of this 
capability was manifest when a UN fact finding mission into the Operation Cast Lead found 
countless examples of Israel’s ability to collectively punish the population through its control 
of the airspace. The first attack, for example, which took place at 11:30am on a weekday when 
school children were returning from school, was judged to be a calculated effort “to create the 
greatest disruption and widespread panic among the civilian population.”304 In the same report, 
Israel was found in breach of Articles 18 and 19 of the Fourth Geneva Convention when it 
intentionally shelled “al-Quds hospital using high-explosive artillery shells and white 
phosphorous.”305  The mission also drew attention to evidence suggesting the Israeli armed 
forces unnecessarily destroyed a number of food producing facilities including mills, farms, 
greenhouses and drinking water installations, with the “purpose of denying sustenance to the 
civilian population.”306  
Israel’s ability to wilfully stifle Gazans and their economy includes control of the territory’s 
coastline. Gazan fishermen require a permit from Israel. If obtained, permit holders are 
restricted in how far out to sea they can travel. At their most severe, Israeli imposed limitations 
have restricted fishermen to only 3 nautical miles. These arbitrary restrictions completely 
breach the Oslo Accords. Though the agreements enforce some restrictions on Palestinian 
maritime activity, they allowed fisherman to travel 20 miles from the coast.307 Currently, 
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fishermen are permitted to travel 9 nautical miles with the boundary being extended from 6 
miles this year as part of a programme to improve stability.308 Nonetheless, this restriction does 
not necessarily entail fisherman are able to travel this far with reports of the Israeli Navy firing 
at fishing boats just 4 miles from the shore309 and is nowhere near the 20 mile limit agreed in 
Oslo.310 More importantly, 9 miles still cripples the small fishing industry many families in 
Gaza rely on as the diagram below shows how the more abundant catches are beyond these 
enforced limits (see diagram below). 
In 1999, Gaza’s fishing industry caught 3,650 tonnes of fish. A year after Israel restricted 
fishing access to 3 nautical miles, this dropped to 2702 tonnes, and by the end of 2011, totalled 
only 1308 tonnes, nearly a third of the produce in comparison to 12 years prior.311 Reaffirming 
Israel’s restrictions were behind this steep decline, the Food and Agricultural Association 
(FAO) found similar evidence the averaged catch between 2009-2011 was less than a quarter 
of the average size catch between 2006-2008.312 Over $600 million was absent from the Gazan 
economy over a twelve year period as the potential catch lost due to access restrictions from 
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2000 to 2012 was estimated at approximately 1,300 metric tonnes (mt) per year.313 This ability 
to capriciously constrict the Gaza Strip from both the air and sea renders all 1.8 million Gazans 
and their industries at the mercy of a regional global power. 
4.3.4 Population Register 
Israel’s control of the Gaza Strip extends beyond its natural boundaries and encompasses 
administrative authority over the population register. The Oslo II Agreement transferred 
jurisdiction of the joint Gaza Strip-West Bank population register to the newly formed PA, and 
gave the interim government oversight over documentation and files detailing information 
about residents in the occupied territories. Although Israel maintained some veto powers, the 
purpose the agreement was to create a joint committee to oversee a host of issues pertaining to 
Palestinian movements between the occupied territories.314 Under the terms of the agreement 
the PA was expected to inform Israel of any updates regarding each resident’s place of 
residence. Since 2000, Israel has failed to update its copy of the register, and refused to 
acknowledge any changes by the PA, generating a sub-set of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip 
without any formally recognised status.315   
After the outbreak of the second Intifada, Israel froze all registry updates except for exceptional 
circumstances, and children born to a Gaza resident under the age of sixteen. The knock on 
effect is that for the past decade and a half there are no administrative mechanisms in place for 
relatives and spouses in the West Bank to obtain any residency status in the Gaza Strip, despite 
it being formally recognised as composing a unitary component of a future Palestinian state. 
Unregistered Palestinians are severely limited in their ability to exercise their most basic rights, 
since registration is a prerequisite for attaining identification cards and passports which are 
needed to travel internally to schools, jobs, hospitals and to visit family. Registered persons in 
Gaza are even more restricted, as Israel has effectively frozen the ability of residents to enter 
or exit the West Bank on a temporary or permanent basis; denying people the basic right to 
visit family, maintain businesses and attend university. Those registered as Gaza residents 
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living in the West Bank are under constant threat from being transferred back to the strip, since 
Israel deems them illegal infiltrators and refuses recognise their right to live there.316  
As mentioned above, Israel’s veto powers over the maintenance of the population registry, its 
refusal to update its copy of the register and its complete control of Gaza’s borders seriously 
curb the ability of people to reunify with family members in Israel, the West Bank and abroad. 
Under the pretence of security, Israel flagrantly denies the right to family life in order to isolate 
Gaza residents from the outside world and purposefully seclude the territory. According to 
Israel’s Ministry of Justice, the Gaza Strip is a “hostile territory controlled by a murderous 
terrorist organisation,” which wishes “to shift their war against Israel to the West Bank, through 
inter alia, the transfer of knowledge, military capabilities and explosive experts.”317 This 
justification sustains Israel’s drastic measures towards the Gaza Strip, resulting in a view that 
the right to family life “does not include a couple’s right to choose where to live and that the 
state holds the power to make the decision.318 Steinberg echoes this justification, contending 
no country permits unfettered immigration.319 Yet, Israel appears to contradict its own 
arguments with regards to Palestinians in the West Bank wishing to relocate permanently to 
the Gaza Strip. For it easily permits such passage, raising questions as to whether this access 
masks a more illegitimate concern with altering the demographic balance of the former in 
favour of a Jewish majority.320 Control over the register, therefore, is an additional means to 
constrain multiple aspects of the average Palestinian’s existence, including the rudimentary 
right to marry and live with someone from the same territorial unit.  
4.3.5 Tax Collection 
The final way Israel is able to control the Gaza Strip without directly occupying it is by 
withholding tax revenues generated by everyday goods from the PA. Under the Protocol on 
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Economic Relations, signed in Paris, April 1994, except for a limited number of goods 
produced locally in Egypt and Jordan, both sides agreed to  
“Maintain the same import policy and regulations including classification, valuation and other customs 
procedures, which are based on the principles governing international codes, and the same policy of 
import licensing and of standards for imported goods, all as applied by Israel with respect to its 
importation.”321 
The aim of the protocol was to establish an economic framework to regulate Palestinian-Israeli 
economic relations. In reality the agreement’s chronic structural biases placed trade relations 
into a unilateral, semi-customs union.322 It assigned Israel the task of setting VAT and customs 
rates on goods intended for Gaza, as well as collecting taxes on behalf of the PA, and 
transferring these tax monies to them on a monthly basis.323 In practise, the agreement has been 
brazenly manipulated to further strangle the Palestinian people and economy, as Israel 
frequently refuses to transfer tax revenue to the PA. “This gives the Israeli Government a 
disproportionate influence on the collection of Palestinian fiscal revenue.”324 The customs 
union outlined in the agreement was intended to preserve the status quo in the Israeli-
Palestinian economic relationship. That is, to keep both economies integrated but maintain the 
Palestinian economy’s dependency on Israel’s. 90% of Palestinian trade, both import and 
export, between 2007- 2011 was with Israel. At the same time, Palestine’s trade deficit with 
Israel during this period increased approximately 40% from $2.3 billion to $3.2 billion.325 The 
current state of Palestinian-Israeli trade, alongside the terms of the economic agreements has 
huge repercussions for the average Palestinian. For under the terms of the agreement, a 
merchant in Gaza who purchases clothes from an Israeli manufacturer pays VAT at a rate 
determined by Israel, for which the Knesset is then responsible for transferring to the PA.326 If 
90% of Palestine’s imports originate from Israel this essentially means Israel is responsible for 
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transferring 90% of Palestinian VAT to the PA, making the latter entirely dependent upon the 
former. Thus, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Palestinian economy is held hostage to 
Israeli unilateralism, exacerbating the structural dimensions of the conflict which ultimately 
manifest themselves in the stark relational dynamics between ordinary Palestinians and Israelis. 
The five means Israel exerts its influence over Gaza have led some commentators to compare 
the territory to an open prison.327 Israel disputes its disengagement means it no longer has any 
legal obligations towards the territory. However, this argument presumes the withdrawing of 
troops and settlers equates to complete Palestinian sovereignty. This rationale is similar to those 
who refer to the PA rejecting Israel’s generous offer at Camp David in as evidence of its 
unwillingness to make peace. The assumption is that since Israel offered 95% of the West Bank, 
this would equate to 95% of the sovereignty. Jeff Halper, the coordinating director of the NGO 
Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD), contends it is more helpful to 
conceive this 95% in terms of a prison. For all intents and purposes, the vast majority of the 
prison is for prisoner usage, whereas the remaining 5% is set aside for the guards who maintain 
control.328 The same analogy is applicable in regards to Gaza as Israel controls when, who and 
what go in and out the territory, and retain a firm grip on Gaza’s tax revenues, as well as, its 
coast and aerospace. The only exception to the West Bank comparison is Israel refuses to 
acknowledge that, despite the lack of military or civilian presence on the ground, its political 
and security presence is still very much perceptible.  
4.4 Parlevliet’s Human Rights as Structures Dimension 
By compartmentalising the structural undercurrents perpetuating the conflict into the separate 
spheres of Israel, West Bank, and Gaza Strip, the Palestinian experience of occupation differs 
in levels of severity depending upon where one is located. Moreover, the bodies of laws and 
institutions utilised to exert pressure on the Palestinians goes beyond these geographic 
locations as shown above, since where, or even if, an Arab is registered as a Palestinian by 
Israel goes a long way in determining the extent to how one is restricted within Israel’s 
occupation. Situated in the context of Parlevliet’s article, drawing attention to the various laws, 
institutions and methods underlying the conflict sheds more light on the functioning of the 
state.   
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“Without paying attention to the institutions, mechanisms and processes that are supposed to 
generate effective participatory governance and order, it is very hard to address the core issues of 
structural violence, political marginalisation and socio-economic injustice.”329 
All three core issues in the quotation above have not only been highlighted in the current 
chapter but have been shown to filter down through Parlevliet’s other dimensions discussed in 
the preceding chapters. Galtung, for instance, argues structural violence is rarely if ever, 
corporeally visible, but manifests itself in sustained forms of inequality and social injustice.330 
Whenever groups of people are distinguishable, not only along national, ethnic or religious 
denominations but by the disparity that exists between each group’s access to goods, education, 
and job opportunities, structural violence exists. “The violence is built into the structure and 
shows up as unequal power and consequently life chances.”331 In its independent commission 
report into the 2014 Gaza offensive, the UN alluded to this interrelation between direct and 
structural violence by concluding, “The impact of hostilities in Gaza cannot be assessed 
separately from the blockade imposed by Israel.”332 
In 2013, figures from the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel (CBS) revealed the average life 
expectancy of Jewish Israelis exceeded that of the Arab Israeli counterparts by more than 3 
years (3.7 years for men and 3.3 for women).333 When comparing current statistics between 
Israel and the occupied territories, the disparity in these figures are more than doubled. Israel 
has the 11th best life expectancy from birth rate in the world, at an average of 82 years. The 
West Bank comes in at 92nd place with a life expectancy of 75.9 years, and the Gaza Strip a 
110th with 74.8 years.334 Similarly in 2015, Israel’s unemployment rate stood at 5.1%, better 
than France, Sweden and Germany. Yet, dissecting these statistics further reveals Israeli-Arabs 
are far less participatory in the labour market and have a higher than average unemployment 
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rate at 7.8%.335 Given Israeli-Arabs only constitute 20% of Israel’s total population, this figure 
uncovers the institutional, economic disparity between the country’s Jewish and Arab citizens.  
A report co-authored by Tel Aviv University and the Bank of Israel highlighted Israeli Arabs 
as one of the country’s poorest population sectors. The report highlighted employment and 
wage discrimination as the main catalysts intensifying a variety of issues linked to their plight, 
including low education, inadequate resource allocation and cultural difference. 336 The World 
Bank locates the root of Gaza’s decline to the damage caused by repeated armed conflicts and 
the blockade. In a report last year, it found Gaza’s once significant manufacturing industry had 
shrunk 60% and its exports rendered practically non-existent since Israel’s disengagement.337 
Galtung points out structural violence, unlike direct violence, manifests itself indirectly. 
Although these figures on their own reveal little epistemological evidence for its existence, 
considered alongside the set of laws, institutions, mechanism and tactics which actively 
discriminate against and collectively punish Palestinians, it is evident the existence of structural 
violence is not only present and exacerbating the conflict, but that its ramifications are palpable 
at the personal and relational levels. The holistic nature of structural violence and its 
repercussions for the conflict are illustrated by fact: 
“These problems create a vicious cycle: when the population is poor and its labour market 
participation is only partial (women) and subject to barriers (men), it is difficult to invest in basic and 
higher education and to develop employment opportunities; this in turn leads to continued poor 
performance in the labour market. The physical and cultural distance from Jewish employment and 
residential hubs intensifies feelings of alienation and poses an obstacle to efforts that may reduce 
discrimination. When these problems compound each other over the course of time, the incentive 
and willingness to change the situation are negatively affected.”338 
The uneven distribution of power legitimates and solidifies an abhorrently discriminate social 
structure which conspires with the micro and macro-economic structures to seriously limit the 
agency of the average Palestinian, whether they be in Israel, the West Bank, or the Gaza Strip. 
335 Bassock, M., Israel’s Unemployment Rate Declined in 2014, Fourth Quarter, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/business/.premium-1.639789, January 30th, 2014 
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337 The World Bank., Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, http://www-
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Put simply, it is “a harsh reality masked under illegitimate laws in order to justify human rights 
violations towards Palestinians.”339 At the grassroots level, the situation which transpires as 
result of the structural mechanisms sustaining the conflict bridge the gap between Galtung’s 
theory and the UDHR, since once one’s basic needs cannot be met then “structural violence 
becomes a structural violation of human rights.”340 In Israel and Palestine, the economic 
disparities between Jews and Arabs, as shown by the figures above, highlight the 
interconnectivity of Lederach’s modes and Parlevliet’s dimensions analysed thus far, since the 
additional and multiple layers of structural violence are built upon this fundamental 
inequality.341 This systemic inequality creates the ideal breeding ground for future violent 
reactions, which may manifest themselves in suicide bombings, or the current spate of sporadic 
knife attacks occurring at the time of writing; a view Richard Goldstone concluded in his 
investigation into Operation Cast Lead in 2009:  
“Israel’s failure to acknowledge and exercise its responsibilities as the occupying power further 
exacerbated the effects of the occupation on the Palestinian people and continue to do so. The harsh 
and unlawful practices of occupation, far from quelling resistance, breed it, including its violent 
manifestations.”342 
More importantly from the perspective of this thesis, the conclusions of the Goldstone report 
also refer to the cultural processes of dehumanizing and demonizing of the significant other 
within Israeli society, which augments a state of paranoia.343 These insights link seamlessly 
with Lederach’s final mode which considers the cultural contours of the conflict in both 
societies. 
339 Barghouti, M., in Palumbo-Liu, D., “They Think They Have Nothing More to Lose”: Young Palestinians on the 
Frustration and Oppression Fuelling the Current Wave of Protests in Israel, 
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on_the_frustration_and_oppression_fueling_the_current_wave_of_protests_in_israel/, November 6th, 2015 
340 Ho, K., Structural Violence as a Human Rights Violation, Essex Human Right Review, Vol. 4, No. 2, 
September 2007, pp. 15 
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Chapter 5: Cultural Mode 
Lederach’s cultural mode considers how cultures and their cognitive perceptions fluctuate 
according to the ebb and flow of the conflict. In terms of conflict transformation, it seeks to 
understand how groups of people react to developments within the confines of the conflict, and 
how those accumulated and shared patterns dictate the way people, in a given context, 
understand and respond to the conflict phenomenologically.344 The Goldstone report 
referenced in the previous chapter, for instance, concludes the cultural processes in both Israeli 
and Palestinian society are disturbingly similar in their demonization of the other.  
“As Palestinians, ‘we look in general to the Israelis as demons and that we can hate them, that what 
we do is a reaction, and we say that the Israelis can only understand the language of power. The same 
thing we say about the Israelis they say about us, that we only understand the language of violence or 
force.”345 
This outlook ultimately generates an increasingly tenser and febrile cycle of hatred, which 
consequentially results in more acts of reactionary violence on the Palestinian side, and more 
severe, more exasperating structural violence from the Israeli side. In accordance with the aims 
of this thesis, this chapter will parallel Lederach’s cultural mode with Parlevliet’s fourth 
dimension of human rights as process, which is concerned with how “issues of access, 
protection and identity are addressed.”346 As Lederach’s cultural mode aims to uncover the 
social patterns that contribute to violence, Parlevliet’s process dimension highlights the need 
to validate and consolidate human rights principles into conflict transformation processes 
throughout society.  Though the parallel between these aspects of each authors’ edifices are not 
as obvious as those in the previous chapters, the theoretical justification linking the two 
together is based on the recognition that the possibility and sustainability of peace is based on 
its substance. If the overwhelming majority in either party is content with the current status quo 
or intent on escalating poor relations by advocating the continuation of policies which 
aggravate central issues for the other, then the conflict will only intensify. Currently, the Israeli 
344 Lederach, J., Conflict Transformation, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/transformation, October 
2003 
345 Goldstone, R., Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations 
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government’s settlement enterprise in the West Bank does exactly that. It purposefully 
undermines the possibilities of implementing a two-state solution and sabotages any possibility 
for a viable Palestinian state. The Israeli government’s justification for this inflammatory 
policy stems from a significant portion of the Israeli electorate on the right of the political 
spectrum. 
In the following chapter, the viability of the Palestinian state will be considered alongside the 
cultural justifications advocating the continuing settlement of the West Bank and the overall 
occupation. The perceived failure of the two-state solution amongst Palestinians, in conjunction 
with a brutal realism concerning the possibility of the alternative one-state solution, is shown 
to explain the current switch to a human rights discourse. In addition, the current trends in 
Israeli politics will be analysed to demonstrate the gradual, yet drastic switch towards the far-
right amongst the Israeli electorate. At this stage, a brief discourse analysis will be employed 
to link a growing number of Israeli politicians with discursive practices manifesting the onset 
of verbal dehumanization. These discursive practices from the higher echelons of Jewish-
Israeli society and politics will then be connected to the continuation of the settlement 
enterprise, and the growing phenomena of settler violence towards Palestinians, thus 
completing the cycle set out in the introduction from Lederach’s personal to cultural mode.  
5.1 Two State Solution? 
The crucial starting point for this chapter is found in Parlevliet’s contention that “if local or 
national stakeholders consider a process as flawed, this will contaminate the peace (or 
outcome) resulting from that process and undermine its legitimacy and sustainability.”347 
Presently, the two-state solution is considered the most desirable outcome for this protracted 
conflict. The notion of two-states for two peoples has been the mantra for the leadership of the 
PA, Israel and the international community since the signing of the Oslo Accords. Whenever 
the conflict inevitably flares up, world leaders automatically endorse the solution and advocate 
for its immediate implementation. In his address to the UN General Assembly in 2013, 
President Obama championed the idea that “Israel’s security as a Jewish and democratic state 
depends on the realisation of a Palestinian state.” “Stability,” he stressed, “will only be served 
through a two-state solution.”348  A year later, he reiterated this predilection, maintaining, 
347 Parlevliet, M., Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective, http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/parlevliet_handbook.pdf, September 
2009, pp. 10 
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“Israelis, Palestinians, the region and the world will be more just and more safe with two 
states living side by side, in peace and security.”349 On a stately visit to Israel and the 
Occupied Territories in 2014, British Prime Minister David Cameron lauded the rewards of 
a two state solution in his address to the Knesset.  
“Imagine what this land would be like if a 2 state solution was actually achieved. Think of all the aspects 
of life that would change: Israel’s relationships with the world, its security, its long-term prosperity 
and the quality of life for all of its people.”350 
During Operation Protective Edge, along with condemning the escalating violence, a European 
Parliament (EP) resolution underscored “its strong support for the two-state solution on the 
basis of the 1967 borders.”351At a joint news conference in Berlin with Netanyahu, during the 
time of writing, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated, “We believe…that we have to 
advance a process of peaceful co-existence, and this according to our opinion, is ultimately 
built on a two-state solution.”352 
This political consensus amongst world leaders completely overlooks the current state of affairs 
on the ground; where Palestinians in the West Bank question how a contiguous Palestinian 
state is possible when a network of Jewish only roads and settlements dice Arab land into 
nothing more than a few densely populated, stranded islands. For instance, asked whether the 
two-state solution was still possible, Bethlehem shopkeeper Claire Anastas responded: 
“Maybe in the past. If they did it before they built all of these settlements. We have hundreds of 
thousands of Jewish settlements inside Palestine. We always wondered, how come they want to make 
two states? Or build our own Palestinian state within these walls, surrounded and caged inside, while 
we are having Palestinian cities surrounded with settlements, like Bethlehem.”353 
Founder of the Stop the Wall campaign Jamal Juma echoed this view: 
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“Now we are talking about 650,000 settlers in the West Bank. This has occurred over the last 23 years 
while we are supposed to be making peace and two states according to Oslo. Israel has no intention 
of allowing a Palestinian state. They put all sorts of obstacles to destroy the two-state solution.”354 
Former PA Minister of State, Ziad Abu Zayyad, also concurs on this point. Questioned on the 
remaining viability of the two-state solution Abu Zayyad admitted:  
“I think it is, in theory, the best solution. Practically speaking, I think we are missing that opportunity 
because the whole idea of the two state-solution is of a Palestinian state alongside an Israeli state 
along the 67 borders. But because of the Israeli settlement activities in the West Bank, they did not 
want a Palestinian state and the two state solution is becoming unrealistic, especially when we realise 
there are no politicians in Israel who will have the courage to evacuate the settlers from the Palestinian 
territories.”355 
Abu Zayyad’s comments are particularly controversial when considered alongside those of 
Saeb Erekat who steadfastly maintains there is any no “other option other than the two-state 
solution.”356  The former Minister of State accused the PA of not only being out of touch with 
the situation currently unfolding on the ground, but also of being too stubborn to realise the 
futility of the two-state cause. 
“I think the PA leadership are becoming outdated. They are not living the situation on the ground. 
They are still fooling themselves that there is a possibility for a political solution. I say this to many of 
them. What they say to me in private is completely opposite of what they say publically…But this is 
their life. They have sacrificed everything in their life for this. They are not capable of saying, “We 
failed.” Sure when they speak to you or journalists they become a diplomat. They will talk about peace, 
a solution and all these things, which are not realistic. But when I sit with them together drinking 
coffee, we speak frankly. Many members of the central committee of Fatah or of the PLO are not going 
to say it failed in public. But the reality is it is a lost cause. There is no hope for a solution along this 
consensus.”357 
Ilan Pappe also attests to these claims, stating that leading PA members recognise the end of 
the two-state solution and the institution itself but are politically restrained in their ability to 
denounce its viability publically: 
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“In private to me they are thinking about plan B. They don’t know exactly how to do it, but they are 
thinking about plan B. Privately, they are preparing to make a move to give the keys to the Israelis, 
dismantle the PA and say to them you are responsible for this. We are not part of the game.”358 
At this point, it is very important to note that even though comments by former PA members 
appear to contradict those of the current cabinet, these quotations are taken from interviews 
conducted for this thesis, and as such, it is important to bear in mind that they can never be 
completely verified. Nevertheless, in regards to the overall objectives of this thesis, these 
comments illustrate how the two-state solution is considered a failed and unviable solution 
right the way through Palestinian society, at ground, civil and political levels. As Jamal Juma 
pointed out, along with the settlement and road enterprise, a major stumbling block is the 
political unwillingness of the Israeli leadership to not only halt the expansion of settlements, 
and see through its commitments to the two state solution, but transfer all existing Jewish 
settlers in the West Bank behind the Green Line.359  
The 2005 disengagement from Gaza has already left an undeniable scar on the Israeli psyche.360 
Photographs of IDF soldiers forcefully evacuating Jewish settlers from the territory still invoke 
rage amongst a large portion of the Israeli public today. Over a ten-day period, the IDF 
relocated some 8,000 settlers from 21 settlements. The images taken during this process 
shocked the nation and have since been immortalised in Gush Katif Museum in Jerusalem. 
Estimates of the settler population in the West Bank range from a conservative of 400,000 to a 
high of 650,000. The obvious problem is if the transfer of 8,000 settlers was so difficult and 
traumatising, how is the Israeli government going to be able to transfer some 60-80 times that 
amount? Put into its base logistics, the practicalities of this task demonstrate its impossibility.361 
Theoretically, if all 500,000 settlers refused to leave willingly, this would require at least 2-4 
soldiers to physically remove 1 settler from the West Bank. Israel’s reserve force of 630,000 
troops would have to be tripled, if not quadrupled to undergo such a monumental task. 
The only real historical precedent in this regard is the France-Algerian case in 1962. For many 
in France, before Algerian independence, vast amounts of modern Algeria were considered a 
sovereign and natural extension of French territory. Approximately 1.5 million settlers, some 
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with genealogies stretching up to five generations inhibited this land under the assumption it 
was France. After independence in 1962, French settlers were given the option to return to 
France or remain in the newly formed state of Algeria either as French, Algerian or dual 
nationals.362 Apart from the obvious discrepancy in this historical comparison being the fact 
Palestine is far from being declared an independent state, academics argue the France-Algerian 
case demonstrates that co-existence only begins once violence has ceased to be justified.363  
At present, though direct violence is not publically justified by the Israeli leadership, there is a 
case to be made that comments from Israeli Knesset members encourage overt forms of 
structural violence which further undermine the possibility of a two-state solution. Current 
Israeli Minister for Education, Naftali Bennet, for instance, is unhinged in his conviction that 
the Palestinians will not find their own state. At a political rally in Tel Aviv, the New Yorker 
reported him promising unequivocally, “I will do everything in my power to make sure they 
[Palestinians] never get a state.”364 Reuters also has previously quoted the minister as saying, 
“The idea of Jewish settlements under Palestinian sovereignty is very dangerous and reflects 
an irrationality of values.”365 In 2013, just days after the resumption of peace talks were 
announced, he stated, “It is our duty to encourage the continued settlement in Judea and 
Samaria.” 366 More recently, he called for Israel “to go from strategic defence to a process of 
initiating the implementation of Israeli sovereignty over the territories under Israeli control.”367 
Other Knesset members and prominent cabinet ministers are just as guilty of this inflammatory 
rhetoric, which completely contradicts the very notion of the two-state solution. In an interview 
with Spiegel, Justice Minister, Ayelet Shaked, recently echoed Bennet’s calls to annex parts of 
the West Bank within area C and maintained Israel has “no other choice but to go on managing 
the conflict.”368Asked whether she believed in a two-state solution in an interview with Al 
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363 Le Sueur, J., in Weiss, P., The Algeria Model – A Conversation with James D. Le Sueur, 
http://mondoweiss.net/2014/05/algeria-conversation-james/, May 3rd, 2014 
364 Bennet, N., as quoted in Remnick, D., The Party Unfaithful: The Settlers Move to Annex the West Bank- and 
Israeli Politics, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/01/21/the-party-faithful, January 21st, 2013 
365 Ibid., as quoted in Reuters, Netanyahu Would Let Israeli Settlers Live in Future Palestine: Report, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-palestinians-israel-idUSBREA0P0S120140126,  January 26th, 2014 
366 Ibid., as quoted in thealgemeiner.com, Livini, Bennet Clash on Benefits for Judea and Samaria Communities, 
http://www.algemeiner.com/2013/08/05/livni-bennett-clash-on-benefits-for-judea-and-samaria-
communities/, August 5th, 2013 
367 Ibid, as quoted in Newman, M., Bennet Urges Israeli Annexation of West Bank, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-urges-israeli-annexation-of-west-bank/, December 28th, 2015 
368 Shaked, A., as quoted in interview with Abe, N., & Bergman, R., Israel Justice Minister Shaked: ‘We Will Not 
Commit Suicide,’ http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/israeli-justice-minister-shaked-we-will-not-
commit-suicide-a-1074653.html, January 30th, 2016 
Charles Elkins  
Conflict Transformation and Human Rights in Israel-Palestine 
95 
Jazeera, Shaked replied, “I don’t think it is a valid solution right now.” More shockingly, 
Shaked maintained, “Right now the status quo is the best option for everyone.”369 
Such comments have left Israel’s allies in Washington confused as to its intentions for 
resolving the conflict. Secretary of State John Kerry recently admitted he has no idea how the 
conflict will unfold and argued, more worryingly, that neither do the Israelis.370 America’s 
growing discontent with Israeli reluctance to resolve the conflict is seen by some within Israel’s 
media as a small victory on the road to peace, since now leaders in Washington are beginning 
to understand Israel does not intend to seek the establishment of a Palestinian state but seek a 
1.5 solution where it “controls most of the West Bank and the Palestinians have an autonomous 
zone comprised of several cantons.”371 
Cynical journalism aside, it is not difficult to locate the substance of the 1.5 solution idea in 
mainstream Israeli political discourses. In an interview with the Jewish Telegraphic Agency 
(JTA), Bennet outlined a solution to the conflict, which resonated with the above criticism: 
“My vision is for the Palestinians to have autonomy on steroids while we apply Israeli law on the Israeli-
controlled parts of Judea and Samaria [the West Bank]. What does that mean? The Palestinians vote 
for themselves. Barring security, they govern and control almost all aspects in their areas: education, 
economy, infrastructure. They have full freedom of movement within the entirety of Judea and 
Samaria. At the same time, we lead an international effort of massive infrastructure investment. What 
I’m suggesting is less than a Palestinian state primarily in the sense that sovereignty indicates security 
control and freedom to bring in any weaponry, and that’s something we simply can’t accept.”372 
An interesting point about Bennet’s comments above is the apparent recognition of Palestinians 
to have freedom of movement within the West Bank, but not Israel itself; a stipulation which 
it is safe to assume will not be applied to Israel’s illegal settlers. The above quotation is also 
illustrative of two major milestones in the trajectory of the conflict. Firstly, despite Netanyahu 
paying lip service to the two-state solution, significant ministers within his cabinet are willing 
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to completely contradict his position in public, demonstrating that even the most right-wing of 
Israeli politicians are realising the continuation of the occupation is untenable. Secondly, it 
signifies a re-introduction of ideas of a single state, albeit under a nuanced ideal.  
Prominent academics like Pappe have previously argued the idea of a single state, consisting 
of the land between the sea and the river, was once considered a feasible solution to the conflict, 
and should be reintegrated into mainstream discourses.373 Pappe, himself, acknowledges there 
has been an incremental change in this regard, with separate groups emerging with different 
conceptualisations of the single state.374 The first being the PA leadership themselves, who, as 
discussed earlier are becoming increasingly disillusioned with the state of Israeli politics which 
presents itself as “a system that will not produce a leadership that is even interested in a two-
state solution, not only in the near future but the near distant future.”375 Obviously, Erekat’s 
remarks above illustrate the PA are fully committed to the two-state solution. But Pappe argues 
they are “much more willing to consider alternative strategies.” 
The second group are made up of Jewish communities in the U.S. and those within Israel on 
the Zionist left, who believe strongly in the pragmatism of the two-state idea and are attached 
to the notion of Israel maintaining a Jewish majority, but realise the growing impossibility of 
the idea.376 The likes of Oren Yiftachel personify this group who have label Israel an 
ethnocracy; a regime which “privileges ethnos over demos over a contested territory seized by 
a dominant group.”377 Yiftachel, along with the likes of LeVine and Mossberg have advocated 
for the nuanced bi-nationalist notion of two states in a single homeland, rather than one state 
in the truly singular sense.378 Convinced geoeconomics and geopolitics have detached the 
exercise of power from the control of territory, they contend the parallel states framework 
overcomes the two-state-one-state dichotomy by addressing the underlining flaws in each.379 
According to other advocates, it also addresses the refugee dilemma by granting the right to 
return as citizens of the state of Palestine and offering freedom of movement rights to all 
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Palestinians between the proposed confederacy.380 Nevertheless, Yiftachel himself admits that 
although the movement has grown exponentially, from 6 founding members to hosting 
conferences of 400 people in just two and a half years, it remains largely on the fringes of 
serious political discourse. He concedes it requires a prominent figurehead to break through 
the deadlock of Israeli politics in order for prominent policy makers to listen; a development 
which remains a contingency. As Yiftachel, himself, puts it, “It could be a year or ten years 
before anybody talks about us, so it is sort of a question mark.”381 
The final group are located on the right of Israeli politics and are imbued with an intellectual 
core personified by current Israeli President Reuven Rivilin. This group discusses the idea of a 
single state in a closer manner to that of the first group but ultimately run into considerable 
constraints trying to navigate Zionist ideology which espouses the necessity of a Jewish 
majority for the continued survival of the Israeli state. In his speech at the Herzilya Conference 
last year, Rivilin was pragmatic in his assessment, arguing it was time for people in Israel to 
look beyond “the accepted view of majority and minorities, and move to a new concept of 
partnership between the various population sectors in our society.”382 On the issue of equality, 
the President acknowledged the current status quo was beyond sustainable and even referred 
to the structural architecture which perpetuates this inequality: 
“The current situation of structural gaps between the partners, whether in budgets, infrastructure or 
land is intolerable. There are clear tribal aspects to poverty in Israel, and the majority of senior 
positions in the economy are held by the members of one or two sectors.”383  
Yiftachel claims Rivlin has privately endorsed his solution to the conflict.384 However, the 
President’s public comments fuel speculation as to the sincerity of his endorsement and widens 
the perception amongst Palestinians that the two-state solution is, not only dead and buried, but 
has never been taken seriously by Israel. In the minutes to a government meeting with the 
regional and municipal heads of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, the President was 
resolute in stating, “We are fighting…for the continued growth of the settlements, a struggle 
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for development, prosperity and growth.”385 Rivlin offers a fresh perspective to Israel’s current 
trajectory and is honest about the settlement enterprise. Arguing in the same meeting,  
“It is a basic fact of modern Zionism. We must not give anyone the sense that we are in doubt about 
our right to our land…The settlement of the land of Israel is an expression of that right.”386 
Rivilin’s view is not rogue or counter to large portions of Jewish-Israeli society who consider 
the West Bank a liberated rather than occupied territory; a dominant societal belief which 
undoubtedly rejects any notion of compromise on the land.387 As Bennett argues, “If we hand 
over the West Bank to the Arabs, life here will be miserable and in constant conflict for the 
next 200 years.”388 The most illuminating aspect of Bennett’s view is the use of the phrase, 
“Give back,” since it already assumes the West Bank is an integral and rightful territory of 
Israel, even though international law states otherwise. What is more disconcerting from a 
Palestinian perspective is Rivlin’s argument that the settlers have, to date, upheld the strictest 
moral and legal codes in resettling the west bank.389 This view completely ignores the 
numerous reports of increasing settler violence against Palestinians,390 fuelled by the lack of 
restraint on the part of the Israeli authorities in upholding the law.391  
At the more extreme end of the spectrum of this final group are the likes of far-right Jerusalem 
Post journalist, Caroline Glick, who argues Israel should unilaterally annex the West Bank and 
impose Israeli law on those who will inevitably become consumed by the newly expanded 
state. The rationale for this drastic action are both strategic and cultural. Strategically, she 
contends Israel needs to defend itself from Palestinian terrorism and external threats. 
Culturally, renouncing the right to settle in Judea and Samaria would be to deny Jewish history 
and heritage, negating the idea of a Jewish state of any intrinsic value.392  
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Glick’s latest book, The Israeli Solution, is a populist manifesto steeped in pro-Israel and anti-
Palestinian rhetoric and brushes across a host of major issues fundamental to the conflict. For 
instance, Glick argues the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria was an economic 
and civil rights “boon” for Palestinians.393 And that the PA had purposefully refrained from 
developing functional social institutions to build the “most widespread and sophisticated 
terrorist infrastructure in the world (own emphasis).”394 More disconcertingly, Glick spends a 
mere two pages justifying the exclusion of Gaza in this one state formula; on the basis Israel 
has no legal obligations to its citizens since its disengagement in 2005, (despite legal scholars 
contradicting this view395), and the fact it secures a Jewish majority.396  
The book, in essence, is one of the first major academic attempts to naturalise a growing 
cultural tendency towards annexation of the West Bank. Popularity for the idea is easily located 
at the grassroots, civil and political levels in Israel. A survey conducted by Tel Aviv’s 
University’s monthly Peace Index in 2014 found the Israeli public were largely split on the 
idea of annexation, with 49% opposing and 43% in favour. More tellingly, those on right of 
the political spectrum were overwhelming in favour of the idea with 55% in comparison to 
only 21% with those who identified as on the left.397 NGOs such as the Women in Green are 
also found in the West Bank who to advance “a grassroots, apolitical, historical initiative to re-
apply Israeli sovereignty over Judea and Samaria.”398 Finally, the idea has even been seriously 
debated in the Knesset, with Netanyahu boasting he has the support of both the political left 
and right in Israel to go ahead with annexation.399 
These societal developments have raised suspicion amongst Palestinians on the ground and 
initiated the switch in discourse from nationalism to human rights. For the average Palestinian 
on the street, the two-state solution is beyond saving because of the settlement expansion, and 
the will of settlers to continue this practise as a religious and historical right. However, there is 
a brutal realism that the one-state is also not a viable option either, since its very conception 
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completely contradicts the objectives of Israeli policy since 1948. That is, to acquire as much 
land as possible, with at least Arabs as possible. Palestinians view the growing consensus and 
calls for Israel to annex either Area C or the entirety of the West Bank in Israeli society as 
extremely worrying and it explains their discursive shift to human rights.400 Qawasmeh 
highlighted the experience of Israel’s Palestinian residents as justification for this change in 
tactic.  
“The status of Palestinians inside of Israel is not an example for Palestinians here in the West Bank are 
striving to. Yes, they have some provisions in terms of national health insurance but these things are 
minimal in terms of what the Israelis have.” 
These sentiments are well founded when compared to various polls and statistics which reveal 
the entrenched racism towards Arabs in a disturbingly large proportion of the population, 
especially the younger generation.401 Along with the INSS poll early this year, which revealed 
only 20% of Israelis consider Arab Israelis equal,402 other human rights NGO polls conducted 
in 2012 found a staggering 69% of people objected to the idea of Israel granting voting rights 
to 2.5 million people if they were to annex the territory.403 Similarly, pressed on the unequal 
application of the law in the occupied territories, 50% of 600 respondents thought the practise 
was justified. In the same poll, 66% of Jews did not disagree with the claim that the 
continuation of the occupation compromises Israel’s status as a democracy.404  
The level of prejudice and inequality reflected in these statistics illustrate how structural and 
cultural forms of violence are entrenched within the average Israeli mind-set. The need to 
maintain the overall structure of the present Israeli regime, if it is transferred to the West Bank, 
is indicative a societal acceptance of unequal forms of treatment as standard and reveals the 
desire to preserve it when susceptible to what is commonly referred to as the demographic 
threat. “When the structure is threatened, those who benefit from structural violence…will try 
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to preserve the status quo so well geared to protect their interests.”405 The Palestinian attempt 
to achieve human and civil rights, therefore, stems from a recognition that they are universal, 
and as such are applicable to any future solution whether it be one or two states.406 
5.2 Politics and Society 
The expansion of settlements and the dwindling possibility of a two-state solution due to a lack 
of political will has coincided with a distinctive shift towards the far right in Israeli politics. 
Victory in last year’s Israeli election for Netanyahu’s Likud party was secured via a coalition 
with several centre to right wing parties: The Jewish Home, United Torah Judaism, Kulanu, 
and Shas. In the wake of this coalition, almost 80% of the Palestinian public are pessimistic 
about future Israeli-Palestinian relations.407 This pessimism is not misplaced given the 
formation of this coalition shows a recurring trend of dominance for the political right, 
alongside the soft-right parties that have drifted from the centre.”408 Shindler traces the origins 
of this contemporary shift towards the right to the election of Meir Kahane’s Koch party to the 
Knesset in 1984. Staunchly racist and undemocratic in its rhetoric, the party fully endorsed 
annexing the occupied territories and was one of many similar parties that had emerged as an 
angry reaction to the perceived treachery of the Israeli leaders at the Camp David Accords in 
1978.  Other far-right parties which emerged during the decade sprung from both the dominant 
Likud and Labour parties, which traditionally represented opposite ends of the political 
spectrum. The slow emerging influence of these far right parties began to atomise the 
dominance of the two party system, forcing both Likud and Labour to negotiate and forge ties 
with them.409 
The importance of this development to the following thesis lay within its ability to explain how 
a series of right-wing led Likud governments have been able to continue the development of 
settlements, despite evidence suggesting a large proportion of Jewish Israelis are not in favour 
of them ideologically.410 This anomaly represents part of a political trade-off between voters 
and leaders. The predominant wish to exit the quagmire Israel had driven itself into with the 
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Palestinians took a backseat, as protection and security became the electorate’s main focus. As 
a consequence,  
“A plethora of Israeli parties which deeply believed in the ongoing Jewish settlement of the West Bank 
were elected by an electorate which did not, but regarded it as the price to pay for security and 
protection.”411 
The settlement enterprise should not be attributed solely to Likud and political figures like 
Netanyahu, however, since their expansion actually accelerated under the liberal governments 
headed by Barak and, hypocritically, the Oslo Prime Minister Rabin. They “reflect something 
deeper and more durable in Israeli politics.”412 For those who comprise most of the splinter far-
right parties, the settlements embody a national and religious quest to repopulate and reacquire 
long lost biblical territory, which God promised to the Hebrews. The acquisition of Judea and 
Samaria are not simply for their own sake, but the fulfilment of an ancient dream.”413 It would 
be unfair also to categorise all settlers in this nationalist religious bracket, since most are 
actually attracted to the settlements for pragmatic financial reasons. The road systems in the 
West Bank, discussed previously, connect generously subsidized housing to most workplaces 
in Israel.414 Nevertheless, both sets of settlers, along with Israeli society at large, vindicate 
Shindler’s depiction of the settlement enterprise as a political trade off with the far right, since 
42% of Jews consider them helpful to Israel’s security while only 30% thought they were 
unhelpful. Moreover, highlighting the trend in far-right religious nationalism, 62% of those 
who agreed the settlements offered security, identified as being ideologically on the right.415  
This trend to see the settlements as the price for securing Israel has huge implications on Israeli 
political discourse. In an interview with the Israeli news channel NRG, as part of the run up to 
the snap election last year, Netanyahu appealed to right wing voters by ruling out any 
possibility of a Palestinian state.”416 Justifying his position, he argued, 
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“I think that anyone who goes to create today a Palestinian state and turns over land, is turning over 
land that will be used as a launching ground for attacks by Islamist extremists against the state of 
Israel.”417 
Almost immediately after Netanyahu took office, he reneged on these comments, as President 
Obama threated to reassess Washington’s relationship with Israel if it was not committed to 
the two-state solution.418 What is revealing about Netanyahu’s backtracking is how the 
settlement enterprise, the threat of a Palestinian state, and security are all malleable enough to 
generate political points during elections. Alongside the religious nationalist quest to settle the 
land of Judea and Samaria as a fulfilment of God’s promise, and the majority of Israelis viewing 
the maintenance of a Jewish majority as prerequisite to the survival of Israel, the ability to use 
the internationally agreed solution to the entire conflict as a tool to swing voters represent gross 
manifestations of cultural violence.  
 Galtung contends cultural violence is exhibited when religious, ideological, and linguistic 
justifications are employed to substantiate direct and structural forms of violence.419 It 
“highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence are 
legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society.”420 Nowhere is this more clearly 
manifested than in Jerusalem’s old city, where Palestinians are prevented from passing through 
the metal detectors with any metal objects, whilst Israeli settlers pass unopposed with their 
firearms.421  The right of return presents another blatant example. Despite academic evidence 
confirming the Palestinian narrative that they were expunged from their lands in 1948,422 and 
the right of return being encapsulated by UNGA Resolution 194, the very notion of the refugees 
and their decedents resettling in the land of Israel, Gaza or the West Bank remains a completely 
taboo subject in Jewish-Israeli society.423 Theoretically, if all 5 million of the diaspora were to 
return, added to the 1.6 million Israeli-Arabs, they would outnumber Israel’s 6.5 million Jews 
in Israel and the West Bank. And this is before the 4 million Palestinians in the occupied 
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territories are considered. The possible return of some 5 million Palestinians, descended from 
the original 700,000 refugees over the years, represents a severe existential threat to how Israeli 
Jews perceive the state of Israel:  
“If you stop an ordinary Israeli on the street in Tel Aviv, and ask him, ‘What does it mean to you, in a 
completely, peaceful, non-violent way, 51% of Israel will be Arabs?’, then they will reply ‘this is a total 
disaster.’ It means Israel has ceased to exist. That is part of fundamental ideology in which Israel was 
created; Zionism.”424 
This attitude is easily located in Israel’s academic and social policy institutions: 
“The main demographic challenge of the state of Israel as the core state of the Jewish people is to 
preserve a clear and undisputed majority among the state’s population. This is a critical prerequisite 
to Israel’s future existence as a Jewish and democratic state (original emphasis).”425 
Similarly, in relation to the right of Jews to return to Israel, the marginalisation this policy 
creates is habituated by the overarching social norm to consider fellow Jews as a natural 
collective and more akin to one another than with Arabs. This notion extends to Jews in other 
parts of the world who are not yet citizens of Israel; creating a social paradox where one is 
supposed to feel a more meaningful connection with someone they have never met than with 
Arabs they share a state with. Aviv Tartarsky, a researcher for the NGO, Ir Amim, sums up this 
anomaly in the following:  
“I was born in Haifa, am living in Haifa and sharing the city with a large Palestinian population. I am 
supposed to feel more connected to a Jew from abroad than to the Palestinians living in Haifa in the 
neighbourhood right next to me. This is something very problematic, and this is the way we are raised 
in Jewish society, the way we are educated. And to say that Israel will be a Jewish state and will not 
be discriminatory, especially when there is a very big Arab population in Israel? The sentiment is: “We 
must take care that the Galilee has to be Jewish, and Haifa has to be Jewish and the Negev has to be 
Jewish, and of course, Jerusalem has to be Jewish.”426 
One other irregularity enshrined in this pattern of thought is the assumption that when a Jew 
visits the country for the first time they are automatically considered as returning home. This 
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peculiar idiosyncrasy is “very much connected to the religious-nationalist abnormality” of 
Israel.427  The rejection of a two-state or any compromise on dividing the land thus emanates 
from two socio-psychological sources. The first is a religious-national justification which 
synthesises both dogmatic and national-historical narratives, whilst the other is based in 
existential security perceptions.428  
Peled-Elhanan’s study into the representation of Palestine in Israeli school books traces the 
early and widespread dissemination of these justifications and sheds further light on the innate 
forms of cultural violence in mainstream religious, ideological and nationalist discourses. The 
objective of these Israeli-Zionist meta-narratives is “to create a homogenous identity to all the 
Jewish ethnicities in Israel, while attempting to erase – both physically and spiritually – traces 
of a continuous Palestinian life on the land.”429  Despite evidence to the contrary, Palestinian 
school books are often charged with promoting violence against Jews and failing to recognise 
Israel.430 However, Peled-Elhanan demonstrates Israeli school books provide the starting point 
by which the idea of Israel as the state of the Jews, and not its residual citizens, is cemented 
into mainstream political and socio-cultural discourses. Repeating this interpretation and 
moulding it to suit a particular historical narrative, in turn, constructs a ‘usable past’ that 
justifies the Israeli version of events and delegitimizes that of the significant other; 
encapsulated by the infamous mantra: “A land without a people for a people without a land.” 
“This narrative includes both the denial of 2000 years of Jewish life in ‘exile’ and the denial of 
any meaningful life in Palestine during the same period.”431 It assimilates cohesively with the 
Zionist creed “know your homeland;” forming a deeply engrained meta-narrative which 
dictates the forgetting of the last 2000 of habitation on the land and “seeing present Jewish life 
in Israel as a direct continuation of the biblical kingdom of Judea.”432 Once this message is 
comprehended at a societal level, it translates into the patterns of thought Tatarsky highlights; 
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whereby, Jews are automatically thought to share a more infinite attachment to one another 
than to others of different ethnicities, purely on the basis of their shared Jewishness.  
The naturalisation of these narratives enables politicians and policymakers in the Knesset to 
commit forms of cultural violence with little to no opposition. For instance, the Nakba Law, 
enacted in 2011, which permits the Israeli Finance Minister to reduce or halt funding to state 
institutions which refuse to recognise Israel as a “Jewish and Democratic State,” or 
commemorate its independence day.433 This amendment to Israel’s Budgets Foundations Law 
has been dubbed the Nakba Law since it is seen as an attempt to silence the Palestinian version 
of history, whereby Israeli Independence Day is simultaneously marked by Arab mourning for 
the Nakba.  Effectively, the law silences an important version of Palestinian history, 
perpetuating the cultural divide between Jews and Arabs. In 2012, Israel’s High Court rejected 
a petition, compiled by both Arabs and Jews rejecting the law, “citing the absence of the 
concrete factual foundation necessary to back the claims raised in the petition.”434 In 
accordance with Galtung, this blatant form of structural violence stems from a deep-seeded 
cultural violence, since what underlines this policy is an Israeli fear “that admitting the Nakba 
will destroy Israel as Jewish state…and give Palestinian citizens reason to rebel.”435 
The Nakba Law is but only one recent example of a whole strategy to extend the cultural and 
social chasm between Arab and Jewish youth; an issue which social commentators fear as the 
infiltration of Jewish fundamentalism into the Israeli school system.436 Considering most Israeli 
Jews are deprived of any meaningful contact with Palestinians, their perception of them is 
mostly formulated from school books, which, for the most part, represent them as nothing more 
than terrorists and a demographic threat; stripping an entire people of any redeeming or 
humanizing qualities. In turn, this begets “ignorance and hostility,”437 exemplified by the fact 
half of Israeli high school students reportedly oppose equal rights for their Arab counterparts.438 
The wider implication of this cultural tendency to negate the Palestinian experience and portray 
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them as inherently violent subjects through the use of school books, is that most Israeli high 
school students will then carry these prejudices with them into the military when they are 
drafted for their national service upon graduation. Testimonies from former IDF soldiers attest 
to these xenophobic attitudes being translated into dehumanizing actions. A former First 
Sergeant of the Kfir Brigade, for instance, describes how Palestinians were purposefully 
humiliated whilst in custody: 
“An Arab was taken to the bathroom to piss, and a soldier slapped him, took him down to the ground 
while he was shackled and blindfolded. The guy wasn't rude and did nothing to provoke any hatred or 
nerves. Just like that, because he is an Arab. He was about 15 years old, hadn’t done a thing.”439 
Another from a more recent collection of testimonies after Operation Protective Edge illustrates 
the culmination of Israeli political and educational culture of the past 30 years, which have 
bred an easily exploitable racist attitude. 
“As opposed to previous operations, you could feel there was a radicalization in the way the whole 
thing was conducted. The discourse was extremely right-wing. The military obviously has very clear 
enemies – the Arabs, Hamas. There is this rigid dichotomy. There are those involved [Palestinians 
involved in the fighting] and those uninvolved, and that’s it. But the very fact that they’re described 
as ‘uninvolved’, rather than as civilians, and the desensitization to the surging number of dead on the 
Palestinian side – and it doesn’t matter whether they’re involved or not – the unfathomable number 
of dead on one of the sides, the unimaginable level of destruction, the way militant cells and people 
were regarded as targets and not as living beings – that’s something that troubles me. The discourse 
is racist. The discourse is nationalistic. The discourse is anti-leftist. It was an atmosphere that really, 
really scared me. And it was really felt, while we were inside. During the operation it gets radicalized. 
I was at the base, and some clerk says to me, “Yeah, give it to them, kill them all.” And you say to 
yourself, ‘Whatever, they’re just kids, it’s just talk’ – but they’re talking that way because someone 
allowed them to talk that way. If that clerk was the only one saying it, I’d write her off – but when 
everyone starts talking like that…”440 
The military thus becomes a legitimate platform in which to physically activate culturally 
constructed prejudices in the name of protecting Israel and even works “in tandem with the 
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institutionalised culture of impunity that accepts the violent disciplining…of Palestinian 
children.”441 But in essence, what is being protected is not the state itself, but the very 
foundations of a structure which benefits one group at the expense of another. For as a people 
in their own right, the Palestinians pose a threat to the Jewish character of Israel, and “when 
the structure is threatened, those who benefit from structural violence…will try to preserve the 
status quo so well geared to protect their interests.”442 As journalist Amira Hass writes,  
“The Palestinians are fighting for their lives, in the full sense of the words. We the Israelis are fighting 
for our privilege as a nation of masters, in the full ugliness of the term.”443  
5.3 Discourse Analysis 
The ‘guilty by association’ depiction of Palestinians as terrorists is further propagated by the 
mainstream media in Israel, which along with the dominant meta-narratives justifying the 
current status quo,444 create legitimate space for Israeli politicians to publically demonize and 
dehumanize Arabs with little consequence. Performing a political discourse analysis on the 
Israeli coverage on the current waves of stabbings and sporadic attacks, which have occurred 
throughout Israel and the West Bank since September 2015 and continue at the time of writing, 
elucidate the corporeality of ethnic and racist bias in the media’s coverage during this spate of 
violent confrontations. To date, figures from various sources are unclear on the exact number 
of casualties and injuries on each side given the violence has yet to dissipate. The Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign claims 34 people have been killed and 394 injured, as a result of stabbings, 
shootings and vehicle rammings since September 13th.445 However these figures overlook IDF 
and Israeli violence, since the UN reported 69 Palestinian fatalities and 7,392 injuries resulting 
from direct conflict in October 2015 alone.446 Both Palestinians and Israelis have taken part in 
the violence as it has gradually spiralled out of control. The media reports the reciprocal nature 
of the violence, but its portrayal in Israel is overtly biased. In regards to the purposes of this 
441 Joronen, M., Politics of Precarious Childhood: Ill Treatment of Palestinian Children under the Israeli Military 
Order, Geopolitics, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2016, pp. 92 
442 Galtung, J., Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1969, pp. 179 
443 Hass, A., Palestinians are Fighting for their Lives; Israel is Fighting for the Occupation, 
http://www.haaretz.com/opinion/.premium-1.679129, October 7th, 2015 
444 Halperin, E., Oren, N., & Bar-Tal, D., Socio-Psychological Barriers to Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 
An Analysis of Jewish Israeli Society, in Bar-Simon-Tov, Y (ed)., Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_22213-1522-2-30.pdf?110316110504, 2010, pp. 49 
445 Ministry of Foreign Affairs., Wave of Terror 2015/2016, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Palestinian/Pages/Wave-of-terror-October-2015.aspx, March 
9th, 2016 
446 OCHA., Humanitarian Bulletin Monthly Report, 
https://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_the_humanitarian_monitor_2014_11_10_english.pdf, 
October 2015 
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thesis, a brief discourse analysis unravels the nature of this reporting to expose the prevailing 
social prejudices which are considered the norm. 
As discussed earlier, the methodology of political discourse analysis is primarily concerned 
with the interrelations between discourse, power, dominance and social equality.447It aims to 
provide “a detailed description, explanation, and critique of the textual strategies writers use to 
‘naturalise’ discourses” to make them “appear to be common sense, apolitical statements.”448 
A major aspect of this method is examining how racism is produced and reproduced through 
discourse.449 Obviously, an in-depth, detailed analysis is beyond the scope for the remainder 
of this thesis, but it is possible to present a sample of mainstream journalism covering the 
current wave of violence to disclose how overt forms of prejudice are readily dispersed through 
the media. Below is a table which formed a prominent visual fixture as part of Ynetnews.com’s 
story relating to the unfolding violence on the 9th October 2015.450  
447 Van Dijk, T., Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis, Discourse & Society, Vol. 4(2), 1993, pp. 249 
448 Van Dijk, T., as quoted in Higgins, S (ed)., The Rhetoric of Othering, as part of The Language and Politics of 
Exclusion: Others in Discourse, Thousand Oaks, London, 1997, pp. 2 
449 Van Dijk, T., Political Discourse and Racism: Describing Others in Western Parliaments, in Ibid, pp. 31 
450 Yanovsky, R., Freidson, Y., Kimon, E., Levy, E., Raved, A., Several Wounded as Attacks Continue Across Israel, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4708934,00.html, October 9th, 2015 
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The assimilation of Arabs with terrorism in Peled-Elhanan’s study of Israeli school books is 
unapologetically evident in this visual fixture. A distinct lack of subtlety in the Orientalising 
overtones associating Arabs with acts of terror parallel attempts to exonerate or humanize 
Jewish acts of violence. The most discernible evidence is the first two rows which refer to 
Jewish violence towards Arabs. In neither case is the Jew(s) in question referred to as a terrorist. 
Rather, they are categorised purely by their ethnicity, humanizing their actions. In the first row, 
the author refrains from using the term “Jews” to disassociate the act of Arab lynching with 
Jewish perpetrators. Furthermore, the verb “attempted” is employed to downplay and 
understate the severity and brutality of the act of violence. Arab acts of violence on the other 
hand, are presented more straightforward with affirmative verbs like “stab” and “steal.” In the 
second row, the verb “stab” is also used to report Jewish violence, but the difference lies with 
the denominating term “man,” used to humanize the crime, whilst Arabs are only referred to 
by their ethnicity when the victims, but are simply labelled “terrorist” when perpetrating. 
Another interesting aspect of the fixture is its allusion to separate policing practises for Arabs 
and Jews. Clear structural differences between how both ethnicities are policed are apparent 
from the fixture. The Jew responsible for stabbing 4 Arabs at 9:23 am was "arrested," whilst 
the “female terrorist" attempting to stab a security guard at 1:36 pm was "shot." Considered 
alongside each other, the two incidents illustrate the clear imbalance in law enforcement. From 
a discourse analysis perspective, the nonchalant manner in how this is reported naturalises an 
ethnic disparity in the state’s monopoly on violence. Lastly, the final act of terror reported at 
3:32 pm refers to “Palestinians” killed by IDF soldiers in Gaza. The use of the term 
“Palestinians” instead of Arabs is a reference to the 2005 disengagement of Gaza, and reflects 
the governmental and societal attitude that the territory is no longer the responsibility of Israel. 
All the crimes and attacks inside Israel and the West Bank, on the other hand, employ the term 
Arab to prevent any legitimation of Palestinian nationalism with the land. It represents a 
naturalised manifestation within mainstream culture of the Israeli government's continued 
policy to refrain from recognising a Palestinian people.451  
This single sample of Israeli journalism by no means represents an exhaustive study into the 
intricacies of Israeli racial discourse, but considering Ynetnews is the English online version 
of Israel’s most popular newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, it provides an invaluable glimpse into 
the standard representation of events for the average Jewish Israeli. Analysed alongside the 
451 Gild, E., What Israelis Call Palestinians and Why it Matters, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-
1.687147, November 19th, 2015 
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stereotypes disseminated throughout Israeli schoolbooks, and the prevailing attitudes amongst 
Israelis towards their Arab counterparts, in addition to the various forms of cultural violence 
exercised throughout the state and the occupied territories, these phenomena, as a collective, 
amalgamate to create a political environment where it is culturally acceptable to publically 
dehumanize Palestinians to mainstream audiences. Chomsky refers to this as the 
“manufacturing of consent.”  The process by which the political class instil the required beliefs 
by infiltrating the media, schools, and popular culture.452 Naftali Bennet, for instance, 
previously referred to Palestinians as “monkeys” who were living in trees while the Jews had 
their own state.453 Minister for Justice, Ayelet Shaked, has previously been accused of inciting 
genocide454 for her remark that the “entire Palestinian people are the enemy” during the 2014 
assault on Gaza, as well as posting controversial articles comparing Palestinian children to 
snakes on her Facebook page in July 2015. What is most notable about the post is the stereotype 
of Palestinians being naturally affinitive towards terrorism purely from being born to a 
Palestinian mother: 
“They are all enemy combatants, and their blood shall be on all their heads. Now this also includes the 
mothers of the martyrs, who send them to hell with flowers and kisses. They should follow their sons, 
nothing would be more just. They should go, as should the physical homes in which they raised the 
snakes. Otherwise, more little snakes will be raised there.”455 
In reaction to images of an unarmed Palestinian mother wrestling her young son from the arms 
of an IDF soldier trying to arrest him in Nabi Selah the West Bank, cultural minister, Miri 
Regev, called for measures to allow soldiers to retaliate with gunfire.456 In a statement also 
written on her Facebook page, she stated, “Anyone who tries to harm Israeli civil groups and 
452 Chomsky, N., Media Control: The Speculator Achievements of Propaganda, Seven Stories Press, New York, 
1991, pp. 18 
453 Sheizaf, N., Right Wing Leader Bennet: ‘When Palestinians were Climbing Trees, We Already had a Jewish 
State, http://972mag.com/right-wing-leader-bennett-when-palestinians-were-climbing-trees-we-already-had-
a-jewish-state/63157/, January 1st, 2013 
454 Abunimah, A., Israeli Law Maker’s Call for Genocide of Palestinians gets Thousands of Facebook Likes, 
https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/israeli-lawmakers-call-genocide-palestinians-gets-
thousands-facebook-likes, 7th July, 2014 
455 Abunimah, A., Israeli Law Maker’s Call for Genocide of Palestinians Gets Thousands of Facebook Likes, 
https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/israeli-lawmakers-call-genocide-palestinians-gets-
thousands-facebook-likes, July 7th, 2014. The original status was deleted by Shaked however, Abunimah’s 
article attaches a copy of the original post in Hebrew. 
456 Deger, A., & Weiss, P., Israeli Minister Says IDF Should Have Fired on Unarmed Palestinian Protestors for 
Humiliating Soldier, http://mondoweiss.net/2015/08/soldiers-protesters-occupied/, August 30th, 2015 
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the IDF should know his blood is in his head.”457 Moreover, Regev previously referred to 
African migrants in Israel as a “cancer,” only to sarcastically renege on these comments by 
apologising for comparing Africans to humans.458 Knesset MP, Moshe Feiglin, was also quoted 
in The Atlantic as saying non-Jews have no say in the policy of the Jewish state. In the same 
interview, Feiglin stated, “You can’t teach a monkey to speak and you can’t teach an Arab to 
be democratic.”459  In addition, former head of Israel’s National Security Council, Giora Eiland, 
wrote an article for Ynetnews.com entitled In Gaza, There is no such Thing as ‘Innocent 
Civilians.’460 Prominent religious leaders pay homage to this line of thinking, with Rabbi Dov 
Lior posting a Halakhic ruling authorising the killing of civilians during the latest Gaza war.461 
Potentially contributing to the IDF’s disturbing pattern of extra judicial killings during recent 
confrontations,462 Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef decreed the Torah commands Jews to kill any 
knife wielding terrorists.463Prime Minister Netanyahu is not shy in resorting to such incendiary 
rhetoric. While on tour in Jordan in February of this year, the Prime Minister stated his 
intentions to surround the entirety of Israel with a security fence to protect it from “wild 
beasts.”464 Netanyahu went so as far as to publically contradict his own IDF intelligence chief 
to uphold the cultural conflation between terrorist and Palestinian concerning the recent violent 
outbreaks. Head of Military Intelligence, Major General Halevi, said feelings of rage and 
frustration explained the terror attacks. Netanyahu, however, not only refuted this view outright 
but eradicated any reasonable rational behind the acts of terror and equated them purely with 
457 Regev, M., 
https://www.facebook.com/miri.regev.il/photos/a.538483556248464.1073741833.118410851589072/861873
283909488/?type=1&theater, August 30th, 2015, יתעזעדזה תוארל רקובה תא ןוטרסה לש תוינטסלפ תוכמ לייח 
הצ"ל. אל ןכתי םילייחהש ונלש וחלשי תומישמל םע םיידי תורושק ירוחאמ בגה, הז טושפ ןויזב! לכ ימ הסניש עוגפל יחרזאב 
לארשי ילייחבו הצ"ל ךירצ תעדל ומדש ושארב. ךירצ עובקל דימ לייחש ףקתומש יאשר בישהל שא הדוקנ.  
ינא תארוק רשל ןוחטיבה םישל ףוס הלפשהל תונשלו תא ילהנ החיתפה שאב ןפואב ידיימ! 
458 Abunimah, A., Israeli Law Maker Miri Regev: “Heaven Forbid” We Compare Africans to Humans, 
https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/israeli-lawmaker-miri-regev-heaven-forbid-we-compare-
africans-human-beings, May 31st, 2015 
459 Feiglin, M., in Goldberg, J., What the Likud’s 14th Ranked Knesset Candidate Thinks of Arabs, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/what-the-likuds-14th-ranked-knesset-candidate-
thinks-of-arabs/266766/, January 2nd, 2013 
460 http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4554583,00.html, August 5th, 2014 
461 Kaufman, A., Israeli Rabbi: It’s Okay to Kill Innocent Civilians and Destroy Gaza, 
http://972mag.com/nstt_feeditem/israeli-rabbi-its-okay-to-kill-innocent-civilians-and-destroy-gaza/, July 22nd, 
2014 
462 Amnesty International., Amnesty International Report 2015/6: The State of the World’s Human Rights, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/israel-and-occupied-palestinian-
territories/report-israel-and-occupied-palestinian-territories/, 2016, pp. 200 
463 Ynet., Chief Rabbi: It is a Commandment to Kill a Knife-Wielding Terrorist, 
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4777650,00.html, March 13th, 2016  
464 Ravid, B., Netanyahu: We’ll Surround Israel with Fences ‘To Defend Ourselves Against Wild Beasts,’ 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.702318, February 9th, 2016 
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overt anti-Semitism, nullifying any constructive debate regarding the subject: “Terrorism 
doesn’t stem from frustration or from a lack of progress in the peace process – terrorism stems 
from the will to have us exterminated.”465 It is these public displays of dehumanization within 
the most significant domains of society that have led critics, like Gideon Levy, a former 
spokesperson for Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, to denounce the current regime as 
exhibiting the first signs of unapologetic fascism; the consequences of which are nourishing an 
increasingly intolerant social atmosphere.466 
Van Dijk contends when European parliamentarians disguise their elitist racism towards 
refugees and migrants, they do so via several subtle methods: referencing the lack of social 
resources to accommodate them, projecting a sense of apparent sympathy, or defending 
policies with negative impacts as “being for their own good.”467 The examples of Israeli 
Parliamentarians and religious leaders on the other hand, are far more candid in their depiction 
and attitudes towards Palestinians. Comparisons to animals like snakes and monkeys serve only 
to dehumanize Palestinians and are characteristic to the onset of genocidal behaviour. 
According to Genocide Watch, dehumanization is synonymous with equating members of a 
socially constructed outgroup with animals to overcome the natural human revulsion for 
murder and is considered a third stage characteristic of genocide.468 This comparison is not to 
suggest Israel is on the cusp of actually committing genocide, but along with photos of ordinary 
Israelis sitting by the beach, apparently revelling in the bombing of Gaza,469 and the Times of 
Israel having to apologise for momentarily publishing a blog post entitled When Genocide is 
Permissible at the height of Operation Protective Edge,470 it is little wonder some Jewish 
activists are concerned the country is beginning to represent Germany in 1933. As director of 
465 Ravid, B., IDF Intelligence Chief: Palestinian Despair, Frustration are Among Reasons for Terror Wave, 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.683860, November 3rd, 2015 
466 Levy, G., in TheRealNews.com., Gideon Levy: “Americans are Supporting the First Signs of Fascism in Israel, 
http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=15951, 
22nd March, 2016 
467 Van Dijk, T., Political Discourses and Racism: Describing Others in Western Parliaments as quoted in Higgins, 
S (ed), The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse, Thousand Oaks, London, 1997, pp. 31 
468 Stanton, G., The 8 Stages of Genocide, http://www.genocidewatch.org/genocide/8stagesofgenocide.html, 
accessed (12/03/2016) 
469 Jerusalem Post., Twitter Photo Showing Israelis ‘Cheering’ Gaza Bombing Goes Viral, 
http://www.jpost.com/Operation-Protective-Edge/Twitter-photo-showing-Israelis-cheering-Gaza-bombing-
goes-viral-362474, July 12th, 2014 
470 The Times of Israel Staff., Times of Israel Removes an Unacceptable Blog Post, 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/times-of-israel-removes-an-unacceptable-blog-post/, August 1st, 2014 
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Settlement Watch and Peace Now, Hagit Ofran put bluntly, “I’m afraid that we’ve already gone 
a long way down the path.”471 
It is not difficult to locate concrete evidence for Ofran’s remark. From a sample of 3,789 Jews, 
a recent study conducted by the Research Centre in Washington D.C. found 79% thought they 
were entitled to preferential treatment within Israel.472 More worryingly, nearly half (48%) 
agreed Arabs should be expelled from Israel; effectively condoning ethnic cleaning.473 Such 
prevailing attitudes translate into serious policy proposals. At the time of writing, Netanyahu 
is seeking authorization to deport families of convicted terrorists to Gaza474 like a penal colony. 
475 Not only does this propose punishing people on the basis of genealogy, it also entertains a 
policy of ethnic cleansing. The dehumanization implicit in these debates explain why 53% of 
respondents in another poll for the Israeli Peace Index agreed with the policy of shooting 
Palestinian terrorists on sight. 476 
The outcome of these dominant attitudes empower numerous Knesset members and cabinet 
ministers to suggest even more ludicrous, or potentially inflammatory policies with little public 
condemnation or backlash. For instance, Deputy Speaker of the Knesset and Likud lawmaker, 
Oren Hazan, promised to make room for the third Jewish temple by demolishing Al-Aqsa 
Mosque;477 an indication of how far some Jewish extremist groups who were once on the fringe 
of the political scene have managed to seep further into the vessels of government.478 Foreign 
Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, also questioned the loyalty of Israel’s Arab residents in the run 
up to the last election, suggesting they be metaphorically beheaded if they were against the 
471 Ofran, H., as quoted in Roundtable: Young Israeli Voices from West Jerusalem, Palestine-Israel Journal of 
Politics, Economics and Culture, http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=1674, October 24th, 2015 
472 Pew Research Centre., Israel’s Religiously Divided Society, http://www.pewforum.org/2016/03/08/israels-
religiously-divided-society/, March 8th, 2016, pp. 151 
473 Ibid, pp. 153 
474 Ravid, B., Netanyahu Seeks Attorney General’s Authorization to Deport Terrorists’ Families from West Bank 
to Gaza, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.706557, March 2nd, 2016 
475 Levy, G., Send them to Gaza, Israel’s Penal Colony, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/gaza-israel-s-
penal-colony-1876311536, March 8th, 2016 
476 The Israeli Democracy Institute., Latest Peace Index: Israelis are “Tense but not Hysterical,” 
http://en.idi.org.il/about-idi/news-and-updates/latest-peace-index-israelis-are-tense-but-not-hysterical/, 
November 5th, 2015 
477 Cohen, D., & Sheen, D., ‘When I Have the Opportunity to do it, I Will’: Likud Lawmaker Vows to Demolish Al-
Aqsa Mosque, http://mondoweiss.net/2016/02/when-i-have-the-opportunity-to-do-it-i-will-likud-lawmaker-
vows-to-demolish-al-aqsa-mosque/, February 29th, 2016 
478 See Ir Amim., Dangerous Liason: The Dynamics of the Rise of the Temple Movements and Their Implications, 
http://www.ir-amim.org.il/sites/default/files/Dangerous%20Liaison_0.pdf, March 1st, 2013 
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state of Israel.479 Hypocritically, when Israeli-Arabs did act on their residential rights and 
exercise their vote, which is normally encouraged by most democracies, Prime Minister 
Netanyahu reacted by warning right-wing voters that Arabs were voting in “droves” as left-
wing organisations ushered them to the poll booth by the bus load.480 Such inflammatory 
comments, along with the egregious accusation that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Amim 
al’Husseini, was the true inspiration for Hitler’s final solution,481 have done little to quell his 
popularity as a politician amongst the Israeli electorate.482 Taken within the wider context of 
the conflict, the ability of Israeli politicians to partake in derogatory and dehumanizing rhetoric 
with little consequence is a reflection of a political system that caters to the cultural attitudes 
of its respective electorate. The multi-dimensional approach to conflict transformation 
Parlevliet proposes is a means to reverse these cultural trends by highlighting the inherent 
consequences to the dominate attitudes in Israeli culture, which are exploited by the political 
leadership to formulate policies that are only set to exacerbate the conflict, rather than resolve 
it.   
5.4 Parlevliet’s Human Rights as Process Dimension 
Though Lederach and Parlevliet have different names for the final mode/dimension in their 
respective edifices, both complement each other in how they apply these concepts in respect to 
protracted conflicts like Israel-Palestine. Conflict transformation under the cultural mode for 
Lederach seeks to understand the ways in which the ever fluctuating contours of the conflict 
are interpreted culturally, and how this affects a group’s response. It has been shown 
throughout this chapter, how the shift to the political right in Israeli politics is a result of an 
intrinsic fear of Arabs as terrorists, who are conceived as intruders with little claim to the land 
of Israel. This simplified narrative is utilised to reinforce the meta-narratives of Zionist 
ideology, which are propagated through multiple cultural institutions within Israeli society, 
including education, the army, the media, the Knesset and religious leaders. In turn, as these 
attitudes of moral justification and ethnic superiority harden, they create an environment where 
479 Middle East Monitor., Lieberman: Behead Arabs Who Aren’t Loyal to Israel, 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/17398-lieberman-behead-arabs-who-arent-loyal-to-
israel, March 9th, 2015 
480 Tharoor, I., On Israeli Election Day, Netanyahu Warns Arabs Voting ‘in Droves,’ 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/17/on-israeli-election-day-netanyahu-
warns-of-arabs-voting-in-droves/, March 17th, 2015  
481 Netanyahu, B., PM Netanyahu at the 37th Zionist World Congress, IsraeliPM, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mZbMf7vDU6g, October 20th, 2015  
482 Finkelstein, N., Interview, 25/11/15 
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negative attitudes towards Arabs are solidified and become a source of policy;483 to the extent 
that they are harnessed and manipulated during elections.484 Politicians pander to these fears of 
terrorism. Netanyahu’s own source of electoral strength has always been his ability to preserve 
relative security for the average Israeli; a guarantee which has recently eroded485 as with the 
appearance of extreme far-right groups demonstrating outside his residence chanting of “Death 
to Arabs.”486 Some critics within Israel see these abhorrent chants as a manifestation over the 
past few years to stir up a revengeful atmosphere that endorses killing terrorists.487 The 
consequence of these attitudes is that it drives the Israeli political machine into smaller avenues 
in which to manoeuvre, as the self-righteous belief in resettling the West Bank is increasingly 
conflated with a religious interpretation of Jewish orthodox law to conserve the Jewish 
nationalist identity of Israel.488Israel’s politicians have become trapped by the infiltration of 
once marginal extremists who are now deep inside the establishment.489 Simultaneously, 
Palestinians perceive a lack initiative amongst Israeli politicians to implement a two-state 
solution, leading to disillusionment with the peace process and increased uncertainty 
concerning their own security and personal safety: 
“Where there is occupation and infringement of human rights and dignity, there will always be 
resistance, be it violent or peaceful. The only difference this time is that it comes after six years of an 
extreme right-wing rule in Israel. One that is dominated by leaders of criminal settler groups. This is 
translated in the accelerated building of illegal settlements, increased settler violence against 
Palestinians and extreme incitement against non-Jews by Israeli political and religious leaders.490 
483 Verter, Y., For Netanyahu, Hatred of Arabs is a Matter of Policy, http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/.premium-1.702797, February 13th, 2016 
484 Haaretz., Netanyahu Vowed to Turn ‘Mizrahi Hatred of Arabs’ into Votes, Veteran Reporter Claims, 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.703351, February 15th, 2016 
485 Harel, A., Israel is Beginning to Eat its Own, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/22/israel-eats-its-own-
palestine-violence-intifada-netanyahu-livni-herzog-lapid/, February 22nd, 2016 
486 Hasson, N., Right-wing Protestors March in Jerusalem, Chant ‘Death to Arabs,’ 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-1.679520March 8th, 2015  
487 Uziel, E., as quoted in Roundtable: Young Israeli Voices from West Jerusalem, Palestine-Israel Journal of 
Politics, Economics and Culture, http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=1674, October 24th, 2015 
488 Leon, N., Ethno-religious Fundamentalism and Theo-ethnocratic Politics in Israel, Studies in Ethnicity and 
Nationalism, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2014, pp. 20 
489 Schwartz, H., as quoted in Roundtable: Young Israeli Voices from West Jerusalem, Palestine-Israel Journal of 
Politics, Economics and Culture, http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=1674, October 24th, 2015 
490 Marouf, M., in Palumbo-Liu, D., “They Think They Have Nothing More to Lose”: Young Palestinians on the 
Frustration and Oppression Fuelling the Current Wave of Protests in Israel, 
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Paradoxically, as the Israelis persist in undermining the two-state solution and drive 
Palestinians into ever smaller, densely populated enclaves, they create space for more 
expansive discourses into notions of a single or bi-national state. The emerging switch to a 
human rights-based discourse appeals to universal notions of equality and accountability as a 
means to prepare for an uncertain future. Moreover, it opens up opportunities for discussion by 
circumnavigating the political and ideological constraints, which substantiate the various forms 
of structural and cultural violence discussed above. Landy’s analysis, especially, notes this 
applies to Jews as well as Arabs since Jewish anti-occupation objectors refer to human rights 
“to free themselves of Zionism and engage in activism.” 491 The universality of human rights 
is a pragmatic discursive tool to emancipate debate from the socio-psychological barriers 
prolonging the conflict, which pertain to a pre-existing repertoire of rigid beliefs that result in 
selective information processing.492 Parlevliet’s holistic approach in calling to consider conflict 
transformation alongside human rights, therefore, offers an invaluable academic avenue to 
address a fundamental flaw in adopting a U.S. or South African rights based model. Such 
models have limited applicability when applied to Israel-Palestine since they fail to articulate 
the loss of, not only Palestinian rights and land, but also the very “context that enables them to 
demand these rights in a way that makes sense.”493 In terms of conflict transformation, this 
entails building an actual culture of human rights. Insofar as they not only permeate mainstream 
thought patterns, but are consecrated as the embodiment of modern pluralistic societies. 
“This involves matters of governance, law and institutional reform, as well as the internalisation of 
rights norms, values and principles so that these guide people’s behaviour, attitudes, and belief 
systems in relation to self, others and the state.”494 
491 Landy, D., Talking Human Rights: How Social Movement Activists are Constructed and Constrained by 
Human Rights Discourse, International Sociology, 28(4), pp. 424 
492 Halperin, E., Oren, N., & Bar-Tal, D., Socio-Psychological Barriers to Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: 
An Analysis of Jewish Israeli Society, in Bar-Simon-Tov, Y (ed)., Barriers to Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_22213-1522-2-30.pdf?110316110504, 2010, pp. 
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494 Parlevliet, M., Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective, http://www.berghof-
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2009, pp. 10 
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Conclusion 
At the outset of this investigation, the groundswell of human and civil rights discourse amongst 
Palestinians was shown to be a result of the incompatible trajectories of the PA and Israeli 
leaderships. This switch is currently in the process of emerging from the political impasse 
jeopardising any possibility of a solution in the short term. It was argued, the undergoing 
metamorphosis of the Palestinian objective from nationalism to rights is a form of conflict 
transformation; a relatively new theoretical approach to resolving conflicts, especially those 
with an endemic, asymmetric character such as Israel-Palestine. As a concept, conflict 
transformation proves a practical alternative to the currently stalled peace process by 
introducing a transformative approach to the conflict with a focus on long and short term goals. 
Lederach’s four modes provided a conceptual framework in which to situate these fluctuating 
objectives in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Parlevliet’s article provided the 
bridging material to connect the practice of conflict transformation with the rhetoric of 
Palestinians at the grassroots level, as she outlined a mirror edifice which expanded Lederach’s 
modes by paralleling their relevance alongside human rights. Placing Lederach and Parlevliet’s 
edifices alongside each other, and connecting their individual components to their respective 
counterparts set up a platform in which to situate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in its current 
climate. This not only filled an important academic gap by discussing the recently morphing 
contours of the conflict within a fresh theoretical framework, but additionally, and more 
importantly, traced the holistic and multidimensional purpose of employing a human rights 
discourse to relieve the pressures on the Palestinian experience.  
The primary focus of this thesis has been to analyse each dimension of Parlevliet’s edifice to 
highlight the interconnectivity of the various normative issues exacerbating the conflict. It 
showed how human rights provides a theoretical vehicle to confront these issues by 
readdressing cultural attitudes that legitimate structural violence, which ultimately produce 
direct confrontations. The cyclical nature of this process constantly reproduces itself. Driving 
the conflict into ever tighter spaces, it hinders the political malleability for each leadership to 
appeal to alternative approaches, further entrenching the current status quo. 
Taking the practise of house demolitions as its starting point, this thesis pointed out the 
emotional, psychological and physical trauma this has on those displaced to make way for 
Jewish settlers. Depressive disorders like “bulldozer syndrome” have arisen in conjunction 
with the threat of demolition, seriously hampering the mental well-being of Palestinian adults 
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and children alike. In relation to the second mode, the displacement of Palestinians from places 
like East Jerusalem and Area C into a limited set of enclaves throughout the West Bank has 
resulted in less interaction between both sides. This forced separation, as part of Israel’s 
settlement and security policy, drives an increasingly existential wedge between the two 
groups, limiting any possibility for mutual, meaningful and respectful interaction to take place. 
Contact theory was drawn upon at this stage of the investigation to highlight how the 
fundamental drivers of prejudice are evident in the Israeli-Palestinian context. This process, in 
itself, then forms part of the structural architecture which enforces this separation. Creating 
thousands of individual cases of human loss and trauma, laws dating back to the founding of 
Israel set the legal parameters of who is and is not a citizen of the state.    
The main objective of the analysis here was showing the separation of the Palestinian 
experience into East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip and how these three areas 
are each controlled differently, under a variety of strategies, varying in severity. It is the 
differing experiences under the weight of the Israeli political and security machine, which 
contributes most to the fragmentation of the Palestinian people. Galtung’s theory of structural 
violence aided the study’s ability to contextualise this phenomenon in regards to the conflict. 
These structures were finally revealed to be set in a cultural attitude, which fundamentally 
values the principles of Zionist ideology over the prospect of a Palestinian state, and the well-
being of Jews over equality between Arabs. A major aspect of the cultural dimension was a 
disillusionment on the Palestinian side towards the Israeli leadership’s intention to resolving 
the conflict via the internationally sponsored two-state solution. The seeds of this doubt were 
located beyond the physical expansion of the settlement enterprise in the West Bank, and more 
in the national and ideological psyche of the overall Israeli electorate. The Zionist agenda to 
secure a Jewish majority in Israel at the expense of the rights of others enables politicians to 
exploit fears of terrorism and ambition to claim the West Bank as an integral part of the Greater 
Israel project. This meta-narrative is then enriched by multiple institutional narratives which 
negate the very existence of a Palestinian people, dismiss their claim to the land and equate 
them with terrorists. 
The cyclical nature of this process is observed in the current wave of violence. For, as the 
demonization of Palestinians is disseminated throughout multiple institutions, it reproduces a 
cultural tendency to devalue the rights of the significant other. This enables politicians to 
exploit this attitude for political gain and policymakers to codify inherently prejudiced laws, 
which are accepted as common sense since they align with the prevailing Zionist ideology. The 
Charles Elkins  
Conflict Transformation and Human Rights in Israel-Palestine 
120 
common sense understanding legitimating these polices continue to compromise the basic 
rights of the average Palestinian and contribute significantly to the forced separation between 
the two ethnicities. As separation is enforced, it aggravates the gulf in economic status and 
prospects, creating a vacuum which is ultimately filled by ignorance and frustration. This 
poisonous environment is manifested in incidences of sporadic direct violence, which create 
further personal losses on each side. As these incidents of direct violence become more frequent 
and fatal, they further harden the already solidified Arab prejudices amongst the public. Israel’s 
leadership is then forced to tighten its security policy to appease the fears of its electorate. In 
turn the Palestinian experience is further exasperated, creating a breeding ground for more 
disgruntled Palestinians to manifest their frustration through violence.  
It is for these reasons that the immediate future of the conflict is on a collision course for an 
extended period of direct violence. An observation encapsulated by the current fears of a third 
Intifada.495 Since a significant proportion of the Israeli public is unable to acknowledge the 
rights of Palestinians, to the extent that a vast majority do not understand the analogy with 
Apartheid South Africa,496 the likes of Netanyahu are forced to react to such violence by 
proposing more stringent security measures and more separation, which only amount to more 
cultural and structural violence. Nietzsche once argued, “Madness is rare in individuals – but 
in groups, parties, nations, and ages it is the rule.”497 Considered alongside Einstein’s definition 
of insanity as the process of repeating the same actions and expecting different results, further 
structural and cultural violence only generates more civilian clashes and direct violence, which 
will inevitably reciprocate the same reaction from the Israeli leadership ad infinitum. The 
Israeli state is thus cornering itself into tighter political spaces in which to introduce alternative 
approaches to managing the conflict, limiting the ability of more cooperative policies to be 
given a serious platform. At the same time, whilst some of the PA’s members confide in the 
impracticality of the two-state solution in private, the institution still maintains its importance 
in public so as not to compromise its legitimacy on the international stage. Hence, both 
leaderships are guilty of overlooking conventional wisdom as they continue to entertain 
policies and rhetoric which have so far only yielded more violence, more heartache and more 
extremism. The continuation of this status quo is comparable to a supernova. For, just as the 
death of a star eventually erupts as a result of the immense pressure created in an ever 
495 Carlstrom, G., Can Anyone Prevent a Third Intifada, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/14/can-anyone-
prevent-a-third-intifada-israel-palestine/, 14th October, 2015 
496 Schenker, H., Interview, 7/9/15 
497 Nietsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, Vintage Books, New York, 1886, pp. 90 
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concentrated space, the current trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is spiralling into an 
ever denser environment of prejudice, marginalisation and exasperation. Literally one week 
before the first knife attack on the 13th September 2015, Palestine-Israel Journal co-editor, 
Hillel Schenker, warned the current status quo was “unsustainable” and ready to “explode.” 
Criticising Israel’s management of the conflict, Schenker conceded, “This is their preferred 
option in the short term. There is a lack of readiness to make long term decisions.”498 The spate 
of violence which has terrorised the country since has been counteracted in the very ways 
shown above: transfer, stripping of rights, collective punishment and extrajudicial killings. 
Measures only set to intensify feelings on both sides until they erupt again.  
At the same time, it must be noted that like any other tactic, the adoption of a human rights-
based discourse is not without its drawbacks.  For instance, if Israel were to hypothetically 
abide by international law, it would theoretically have to allow all Palestinian refugees to 
return, sacrificing the current Jewish majority, and in turn seriously undermining the 
conception of a Jewish state. Moreover, for the PA or Hamas to appeal to the Human Rights 
Council on the basis of Israeli violations, given their own non-adherence to this body of law, 
would not only appear hypocritical but could even further jeopardise the already tarnished 
reputation of human rights. A lot of cynicism concerning the concept of human rights in the 
UN already exists as it is,499 without the institution entertaining the complaints of two 
leaderships who are also guilty in committing countess human rights violations against their 
own peoples.500   
Herein, therefore, lies a major weakness in the efficacy of the human rights discourse. If all 
concerned parties are guilty of inflicting violations, then it appears to be a moot point in who 
could actually petition for Israel to abide by its legal obligations. Both the PA and Hamas would 
in effect be launching an investigation into their own practises if they were to formally file a 
complaint to the commission. No political representative in either Palestinian leadership is in 
a position to voice the human rights concerns of the people since these same officials are just 
as culpable as those they would impeach.  
498 Schenker, H., Interview, 7/9/15 
499 Etkes, D., Interview, 5/7/15 
500 See Amnesty International., ‘Strangling Necks’: Abduction Torture and Summary Killings of Palestinians By 
Hamas Forces During the 2014 Gaza/Israel Conflict, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde21/1643/2015/en/, 2015, & Jerusalem Institute of Justice., 
Hidden Injustices: A Review of Palestinian Authority and Hamas Human Rights Violations in the West Bank and 
Gaza, http://jij.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Palestinian-Human-Rights-Violations-in-West-Bank-and-
Gaza.pdf, 2015 
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Consequently, questions remain as to how effective human rights is in such a context where all 
major political stakeholders are guilty of violations. Like any other tactic, solution or strategy, 
human rights-based discourse closes, as well as opens up, certain avenues of action. What 
exactly are the implications of such a discourse on the legitimacy and security of the current 
Palestinian leaderships? Is the lack of a political representative to spearhead the groundswell 
discourse into a movement responsible for the lack of organisation? To what extent is the 
adoption of this discourse a reaction to the failure, shortcomings and discrepancies of the PA 
and Hamas?  Moreover, to what effect does this phenomenon bear on the international 
community’s role in the conflict? Will the U.S. be able to maintain its mediation role in 
negotiations if a resolute, coherent civil rights movement transpires? Would the formation of 
an organised human rights movement have any immediate reputational or publicity 
consequences on the U.S., given the latter are often accused of bias towards Israel? Could it 
provide an avenue for the likes of the EU to play a more pivotal role in the political outcome 
of the conflict? These questions illustrate the wider implications of what a more refined and 
established human rights movement has for all internal and external stakeholders.  
As pointed out in the introduction, it was not the intention of the following thesis to extol the 
virtues of human rights as the conflict’s unknown solution. Rather, it was to highlight the 
existence of such a social phenomenon and discuss how it related to several important issues 
prolonging the conflict. Civil rights movements are by no means a guaranteed winning formula. 
Often requiring time to develop into a significant political and social force, a successful civil 
and human rights movement would entail Palestinians completely abandoning a significant 
national movement, which took decades to legitimise, and effectively start again with a new 
platform of objectives based on equality. For a lot of already weary Palestinians, such a 
proposal would be to give up a life-long ambition for a movement which has no political 
endorsement, nationally or internationally, and has little clear strategies in how it is to attain its 
objectives. Haitham Khatib sided with this view in stating, “a political solution was most 
important…We can get human rights after a state.”501 Despite Khatib’s view contradicting the 
main narrative of this thesis, his statement pertained to a further implication of what states and 
human rights can or cannot achieve. Would states guarantee human rights? Looking at most 
contemporary Middle East states the evidence would suggest not. At the same time, states are 
not infallible or permanent phenomena. They constantly change and mutate as the near 
501 Khatib, H., Interview, Skype, 10/12/2015 
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disintegration of Iraq, Syria and Libya in the region also illustrates. Some Palestinians 
understand this and acknowledge “a state would not end their suffering. They are looking 
towards an agenda that has a clear relation to their problems.”502 
Adopting a human rights discourse, therefore, is a pragmatic reaction to the reality of the 
political impasse and a transformative method that enables the readdressing of normative issues 
at the micro level to potentially effectuate change at the macro level. “It recognizes that human 
rights exist in a social context and are reciprocal, and that ‘recognition of the other,’ is a core 
value of human rights.”503 As shown throughout, its applicability extends beyond mere 
adherence to the law and encompasses fundamental issues located in the cultural psyche of 
others. Alongside the rudimentary principles of conflict transformation theory, it is more about 
overhauling the systems and thought processes sustaining and deepening the conflict, rather 
than just making the corporeal aspects more bearable. The importance of this cannot be 
understated since it encapsulates the pragmatism in aiming to achieve long term structural 
reforms through short term, direct initiatives. If a more respectful culture of human and civil 
rights is fostered, it will open up avenues and social contexts for Arabs and Jews alike to meet 
on more amicable terms, enabling more constructive discourses into transforming the conflict 
to flourish. Sometimes peace processes need to take a step back and concentrate less on 
reaching conclusive resolutions and focus more on reshaping relationships to achieve more 
positive interactions and cultivate a shared peaceful understanding.504 Nowhere is this more 
imperative than in the Holy Land where people on the ground view the current situation as a 
state of “political chaos,” and where both Palestinian and Israeli leaderships are unable to 
define what they want.505 For Palestinians on the ground, human rights offer an alternative 
discourse to the U.S. led peace dialogues. Negotiations that have led their own leadership to 
seemingly abandon the Palestinian diaspora in labelling the possible return of the refugees as 
illogical.506 They have learned to appreciate the fact that a fair and sustainable peace will 
502 Pappe, I., Interview, 19/8/2015 
503 Parlevliet, M., Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights Perspective, http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/fileadmin/redaktion/Publications/Handbook/Articles/parlevliet_handbook.pdf, September 
2009, pp. 10 
504 Mnookin, R., The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Is There a Zone of Possible Agreement (“ZOPA”)?, 
http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/The%20Israeli-
Palestinian%20Conflict%20Is%20There%20a%20Zone%20of%20Possible%20Agree.pdf, 2011, pp. 223 
505 Unamed Participant., Young Palestinian Voices from East Jerusalem, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, 
Economics and Culture (PIJ), Vol. 21, No. 2, 2015 
506 Mazen, A., Meeting Minutes – President Abbas Meeting with the Negotiations Support Unit, 
http://transparency.aljazeera.net/en/projects/thepalestinepapers/201218205622953732.html, March 24th, 
2009. This shocking revelation was discovered when leaked along with a collection of other classified 
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depend on their insistence of their own rights in accordance with international law.507 The 
important interrelation underpinning this projection is the dual focus on the responsibilities of 
the state alongside its citizens. Israel’s rich democratic traditions mean its citizens license the 
state to act accordingly. A human rights discourse aims to transform the perspective of citizens 
to necessitate changes in state practise. By constructing new narratives steeped in human rights 
discourse, it is anticipated new conceptualisations will emerge which pitch relations to the 
significant other on an equal platform. In turn, transformations in individuals at the micro level 
are hoped to hold the key “to modifying the existing conditions that maintain and exacerbate 
the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians across generations.”508 This is not based on the 
eventual achievement of a Palestinian state, a bi-national state or a single state. It is more a 
mechanism to foment friendlier relations in aiding a harmonious transition to whatever solution 
is eventually implemented. In uncertain and hostile times such as these, human rights 
reintroduces a very simple and poignant message. A modest truth swept aside by the tide of 
conflict. Simply: 
“Palestine does not belong to the Jews and it does not belong to the Arabs, nor to Judaism or 
Christianity or Islam. It belongs to all of them together: it is the Holy Land.”509 
documents detailing negotiations between the Israeli, Palestinian and American leaderships from 1999-2010. 
In another document, Palestinian Chief Negotiate Saeb Erekat states the Palestinian people will have to learn 
all 5 million refugees will not be able to retain, nor will they be granted the chance to vote on the possible 
settlement with the Israelis. 
http://transparency.aljazeera.net/en/projects/thepalestinepapers/201218211125875573.html, October 21st, 
2009 
507 Falk, R., Human Rights and Israel-Palestine, Arena Magazine, Oct/Nov 2013, pp. 39 
508 Hammack, P., Identity, Conflict, and Coexistence: Life Stories of Israeli and Palestinian Adolescents, Journal 
of Adolescent Research, Vol. 21, No. 4, July 2006, pp. 324 
509 M, Buber 1929., in T Kushner & A, Solomon (eds)., Wrestling with Zion: Progressive Jewish-American 
Responses to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Grove Press, New York, 2003, pp. 19 
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